RUSSIA AND PERSIA. G REAT BRITAIN, it seems, is never to
be without a Russian scare. Too optimistic upon Inkny points, and cheery upon almost all, our journalists are liable whenever Russia is concerned to accesses of nervousness -which deprive them in great measure of their usual forti- tude. They see Ruesia everywhere, and expect her every- where else. For years past, ever since the Trans-Asiatic' Railway was fairly commenced, they have been lamenting the weakness of the Government in not defending Manchuria, which is the natural outlet of Russia to the Pacific, which we do not want, and which we have no more power to defend without an impossible occupation than we had in the last century to defend Astrakhan, the capture of which we were then told was a menace to Great Britain. A few months ago it was Ceuta which was in danger, a vast plot having been arranged by which Spain was to sell Ceuta to France, which in turn was to hand it over to Russia, and so render the Mediterranean unsafe for British vessels. That Ceuta would be of no more value to Russia in a great war than Cyprus will be to us mattered nothing; Russia was coming nearer and England ought to fight. Just now the scare is about Persia. The Russian Government naturally desires influence in Persia, which abuts upon her great secluded lake, the Caspian, and the Government of Teheran being always in straits for money, St. Petersburg has advanced to the Shah a loan. That means, say the journalists, supported by most Anglo-Indians, with whom Russia is a bogey, and by the City, which hates Russia for threatening its monopoly of Chinese business, that the Russian Foreign Office will in future direct the politics of Persia. That great and rich Empire becomes in fact the dependent ally of the Northern Power. The deduction is a very large one, for although her right to demand pay- ment of the indemnity promised after the last war is a much more direct source of influence in Constantinople, Russia certainly does not direct the politics of Turkey. Oriental statesmen have no particular love for their creditors' and if opportunity serves, have very little scruple about shaking off their influence, which is almost certain to be pressed just at the moment when it is most inconvenient. Russians complain, and with reason, that the Sultan always listens to them but finally accepts German advice. Let us, however, acknowledge that Russia has gained an advantage, and will use it to " guide" Persia, and obtain railway concessions, or even to establish a port in the Persian Gulf. What is the injury done to us ? The obedience of Persia, even if it were as willing as it will be reluctant, will not increase the strength of Russia. Her population has been reduced by misgovernment to about five millions, her governing class is hopelessly corrupt, and her dynasty has ceased to produce great soldiers. Her people are not needed by Russia. Her railways will be exceedingly expensive to build, and when built, will carry more British than Russian goods, while every Persian will be plotting to reap pecuniary benefit from them, mainly at Russian expense. As for the port in the Gulf, if Russia ever got one, and made it a great place of trade, she would have delivered herself into our hands, for no fleet which she can build or maintain would protect it against the British fleet. Russia would, in fact, have parted with a portion of her great defence, her inaccessibility, and would have placed herself in a position in which Great Britain could at any moment compel her to defend herself at a point more than a thousand miles from the centres of her military power. If she threatened us through Afghanistan we could in return threaten her through Southern Persia, which would be for her a true damnosa hereditas.
Have those who write so easily of defending Persia ever considered seriously the kind of task they are proposing to our over-burdened statesmen? Mistress of the Caspian, owner of the Caucasus, and sovereign in Merv, Russia can always occupy North Persia, and no force which we could use in Asia would prevent her, or alarm her, or chastise her. The Indian Government could not forward an army sufficiently strong to defeat her, and if defeated in such a position itself might have to encounter insurrec- tion in its own dominions. That fact is, we think, at length fairly well perceived; but then, it is said, we should seize South Persia and hold it as a compensation, and as a sort of glacis to the Indian fortress. That is to say we are to give up all hope of keeping at a distance from Russia, and voluntarily to make our possessions march with hers, so that whenever her European interests re- quired it she could menace us with direct and swift inva- sion. It would take months for Russia to prepare an army able to reach the Indus from the North, to conquer the Afghan tribes who would fight to the last, and to open roads through the mountains over, which heavy artillery could pass. Indeed, she might even then be barred by irresistible force, for an able Indian Government would call to arms half a million of Sikhs, who as soldiers are quite as good as Russians. On the other hand, it would take only weeks' if Russia held Northern Persia and we the South, for her to invade our provinces, and compel us to send by sea an army at least as great as that now fighting in South Africa to defend them. The Army chiefs in India would be wild at such a prospect, and would call for fortresses, military railways, and garrisons in Persia to an extent which would speedily overwhelm the Indian Treasury. The Indian taxpayer has surely enough to ,do in providing for the scientific frontier on the Afghan side without calling upon him to pay also for an incessant expectation of war on the Euphrates. Germany says she is coming there with railways and commercial agents. Well, let Germany maintain the contest with Russia if she pleases, and so compel herself to regard Great Britain as her only useful, and indeed indispensable,, ally. Our business is to re- main, fully armed, within India, and let any Power which wishes to turn us out try to do it. They will succeed or fail according as we succeed or fail in attracting the warrior races of India to our standard. The whole world could not conquer India if the hundred and fifty Millions of its people who are inclined to fight would range them- selves behind the British artillery.
We can see no wisdom and little purpose in this eternal shaking of thern fist at Russia. That Empire absorbs provinces as the British Empire absorbs provinces' but if we do not want the provinces, as we certainly do not want either Northern China or Persia, what do we suffer from the expansion of Russia ? The world does not lose by it, for whatever we may think of the Government of Nicholas II., it is at least better than the Government of the fierce old lady who is now putting the clock back in China, or of the despot whose brothers and sons govern Persia, and are rapidly reducing one of the most fertile regions in the world to a desert studded with the ruins of once prosperous towns. Our trade is not injured, for we trade as freely with Russia as with China or Persia, and our mercantile agents are in less danger in Odessa or Riga than in Nankin or Ispahan. All that can reasonably be said by the Russophobes is that the growth of so mighty an Empire may hereafter prove a menace, which is precisely what the Continent is just now saying about Great Britain, and ought to be a subject of thought for philosophers, not for statesmen. Prophetic politics do not pay. If there is one thing certain in modern affairs it is that they are becoming more complex, and therefore more difficult either to disentangle or to forecast. Who would have 'dreamt two years ago that a defiance issued by two Dutch settlements in South Africa would produce a war more formidable to us in some ways than a first-class European contest, would rouse the free Colonies into fighting by the side of the Mother-country, or would bring the English people up to the temper in which they gravely consider, though they reject, the necessity of con- scription? We do not know in the least what will happen to Russia in the next few years, whether she will digest the provinces she absorbs, whether her tendency to grow strong will continue, or will be suddenly arrested like that of so many successful Empires. Our true course is not to fidget and swear, but to watch silently, resolved, if we are assailed or menaced, to defend our- selves, but resolved also to abstain from taking upon ourselves the defence of the whole ;odd. That we must arm is certain, and that we must keep armed, but we need not rush to the rifle stacks because a Power on one edge of the Caspian has lent to a Power on another edge a moderate sum of money. And if it is not wise to rush, it is still less wise to threaten to rush, and so create the impression, now, we fear, spread over half the world, that whatever we actually do we always wish to be directly in the way of any one who advances. If we want the road let us take it, but if not let us stand courtemsly aside. Above all let us abstain from shaking our fists at other men who are using the road upon their own affairs.
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