THE CHOICE OF GENERALS.
]J OWmuch would each of the one hundred and eighty thousand armed men now fighting for Britain in South Africa willingly pity to be quite sure that his Commander-in-Chief Was a thoroughly competent man ; would a farthing a day from each be considered an extrava- gant contribution ? Everybody knows it would not, but that apparently infinitesimal sum means a salary for the general of .£80,000 a year. That very simple proposition is a final answer to Mr. Burns's argument that no man is worth more than £500 a year, and it is also a rough measure of the value to an army of a sufficient brain at its head. The truth is, that value is incalculable. Until it is organised an army, however perfect its discipline, is a mob, hushed it may be in expectancy, but still a mob, and when it is organised it is useless till the man appears who can utilise it aright. Experience is valueless if it is misapplied, bravery is worse than useless if it only increases slaughter, even self-devotion only exalts the individual until it is well directed. Just look at the scene before us. Millions were expended, thousands of lives were given for the country, the world rang with stories of British valour, and we were left just where we were, face to face with the enemy, but unable to drive them from our soil, and believed by foes and friends alike to be incapable of performing the task which, nevertheless, remained imperative. The Cabinet Committee of Defence —we speak of them, because they are so lavishly abused and remain so silent—sent out two competent men to command the crowd, and in six weeks the whole scene is changed, the crowd has become a great mobile army, the enemy is flying over the border, and all enemies, sullen or admiring, reconsider the situation, and think that the smashing of the English must be postponed to a more favourable opportunity. Are not those two men worth the farthings we have mentioned ? We leave the answer to those whom they are leading, and who because they are so led are becoming victorious soldiers.
Why are we making these very obvious remarks ? Because the reading of much history and the observa- tion of many campaigns has convinced us that the British people, which comprehends some things about war very well, has never fully realised what the value of a general- issimo to his army is, and, while spending blood and treasure like water, will allow the chief to be selected almost without watchfulness. Every general is the same in their eyes, if only he is brave and "experienced." Until disaster occurs they see no difference between an astute and cautious leader, like Lord Hardinge, and a dense Paladin with the heart of a lion and the skill of a buffalo, like Lord Gough. "Give them the cold steel, boys," he used to cry ; and there are scores of generals in the service who, till the Boers woke them out of their dreams, still thought him, even after Chillianwallah, "quite right." The English, who watch their statesmen as a French author watches his "human documents," never watch their generals at all except in the field, know nothing of their "records," and will suffer anybody who is "recommended" to be entrusted with their children's lives. They are patient of failure, no doubt—not one man has been superseded yet for all that has happened— and that is to their credit, but they display as to choosing a thick-witted and apparently incurable carelessness which is the despair of their historians. They said nothing when Leicester was sent to the Low Countries, and never recog- nised Churchill untilhe had beaten Louis XIV. They would send, or rather allow to be sent, the senior Major-General against a Moltke, and never dream as they sighed over their dead that the choice might be in part their fault. The truth is they think that armies win battles or lose them, and do not understand that the historian who declares that "Alexander defeated Darius on the Granicus " is re- lating what is, in the main, a simple truth, which would only be obscured if he discoursed about the difference between the Hoplites and the Immortals.
What remedy is there if the people understand nothing of war except how to die ? Complete remedy there is not and cannot be, for even Napoleon never selected a first-rate general—possibly from his unsleeping jealousy of rivals —but there are at least three palliatives which are possible. One is for the people to watch soldiers as they rise, to insist on true accounts of campaigns, to listen to professional stories, and at least try to "reckon up" generals as they do statesmen, so that when an obviously incompetent man is named for high command the universal whistle of surprise may daunt the patron as it daunts the Premier when-making up the list of his new Cabinet. There is favouritism in armies as everywhere else, and it takes attention, insistent attention, to stop an ap- pointment which is indefensible. George Lord Bute could not be made Premier to-day, but he could be made general of a corps d'armee in the field. The second remedy is to insist, even with obstinacy, that a Minister of War and his chief-of-the-staff, whatever the record of the latter, shall choose the best generals they can, and shall be held directly responsible for selecting the wrong men. It is nonsense to say that this is cruel.; if the head of a firm chooses the wrong agents he pays in the bankruptcy of his house, and so should those who select the wrong agents for conducting war. We are too lax in this matter in all departments except the Navy, and sometimes lose heavily through the incompetence of a polished fribble who has been made Ambassador, or the ungraciousness of an able brute who has been sent out as Governor ; but in choosing generals responsibility should be strict, peremptory, and real. Their dice are human lives. The third remedy is the introduction into the service of a new and stringent etiquette. It should be held a moral offence equivalent to desertion for a general or other highly. placed officer to resign because a junior has been put over his head. The Sovereign, that is the responsible adviser, should be allowed as free a choice in practice as he already has in theory. What does it matter to the country if ten major-generals feel hurt because, say, Baden- Powell is made a local general if only the latter is the most competent man ? Let them feel hurt, and go on fighting with thanks to heaven, if the Minister is right, that they will be led to victory. We are not saying, be it understood, that the young should be preferred to the old. As a matter of fact a majority of the great generals of history, from Alexander to Napoleon, have been young men—the greatest, Alexander, was almost a boy—but there have been great old generals also, including the two greatest of the latter half of the century Von Moltke and Radetzky. It is not age or birth or rank or even public estimation which should be considered, but competence, bat that should be considered rigidly, and when settled the decision should be beyond reversal by any opposition from subordinates. We know quite well what will be said in opposition to this advice, that it would introduce and sanction favouritism, and destroy one of the great motives for continuous good service, and there is much in the objection, but not so much as to outweigh the advantage to the country of leaving the Crown a free hand. There is no need for the innovation in peace time, and in war responsibility sharply enforced will check favouritism, and the sullenness of the Army will restrain unjustified supersessions. If the State needs a Kitchener at the head of its armies it should be possible to appoint him, though he were no older than Wellington when he won Assaye, or Nelson when he averted French domination in Asia by his victory in Aboukir Bay.
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