CORRESPONDENCE.
GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TO THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION.
To THD EDITOR Or TIM " SrECTAT011."1 Sin,—" if there were no Austria, it would be necessary to create one." These words of the great Bohemian historian, Palacky, form a fitting introduction to any discussion of the Austrian question. The political ravens of Eutope have for some years past been forecasting the fate of Austria-Hungary, and justify their croakings by the view that one whose in- heritance is so much debated during his lifetime can hardly be in a robust state of health. Indeed, the Austrian question, like that of the Near East, haunts the dreams of the modern statesman, and renders uncertain the whole political•future of Europe.
What, then, would be the results of the partition of the Hapsburg Empire, and who would derive advantage from it? From the nature of the case, such fragments as failed to assert their independence at the final catastrophe would fall to the share of Austria's three chief neighbours,—Russia, Italy, and Germany. Leaving aside for the moment the two former Powers, I wish to treat the question from a specially German point of view, and hope to prove that the Power which runs the most serious risks from a forward policy in Austria is no other than Germany herself. And for this contention I may take the words of Bismarck as my text:—" The preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a strong and independent Government is for Germany a necessity of the balance of power in Europe."
The propaganda of the Pan-German League, the ravings of such leaders as Schoenercr and Wolf, and the Los von Rom movement, which is engineered by this wildest of all political parties,—all these have thrown a somewhat lurid light upon the future of Austria, and have made us familiar with the possibility of German expansion at the expense of her Southern ally. Such a policy offers many attractions to the political dreamer. (1) In the first place, a compact State would be formed in Central Europe, far surpassing in strength the Mediaeval Empire in its most brilliant days. With a population of close upon eighty millions, its armed forces would be irresistible, and Greater Germany would be relieved from much of the anxiety which her exposed frontiers cause the German Empire of to-day. (2) The dream of the poet Arndt would be realised, and (save for the Eastern Swiss Cantons) the German Fatherland would at length be conterminous with the language of Luther and of Goethe. (3) A fatal blow would be dealt to the growing "Slav peril," and the Cisleithan provinces would be finally resouedefor German culture and ideals. (4) German commerce would receive a powerful impetus from the extension of the Zoltueretin to Austria, and would control an internal market as large as that of the United States. (5) The acquisition of Trieste weuld ensure fresh triumphs to the German merchant marine, while the Austrian Navy would be a genuine windfall for "the Admiral of the Atlantic " ! (6) Germany would become, beyond all question, the predominant Power in the Balkans ; and her hegemony from Hamburg to Bassora, on the Persian Gulf, would soon enter the range of practical politics. The casual observer might be pardoned for assuming that such vast advantages would outweigh all possible risks or sacrifices. But before adopting such a view, he would do well to examine theTeveree Of the medal. The dangers of a forward policy may be described as twofold,—external and internal." (a) In the first place, there is the prospect of foreign intervention, rendered all the more likely by Germany's present isolation. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Austria-Hungary, despite its domestic quarrels, forms the pivot of European politics, and that its dis- appearance would deal a fatal blow to the balance of power. Without enlarging upon the dangers in which such a situation would involve Mimes (these have been ably expounded by such writets as MM. Cheradame and Ren6 Henry, though in a spirit of distinct hostility to Germany), it is enough to say that her very existence as a Great Power would be at stake ; and the well- known speeches of MM. Deschanel and Pelletan only serve to emphasise this view. Assuming for the moment that Great Britain succeeded in holding aloof from the quarrel—a highly doubtful ' contingency—it is well-nigh certain that the Irre- deatist and Pan-Slav aspirations of Italy and Russia would draw these two Powers. into war on the French side, and that certain Balkan rulers would employ the occasion to fish in troubled waters. Strange as it may sound, the only conceivable ally for Germany is Hungary, and then only in return for such concessions as would ill suit the Pan-German mood. In any case, her assistance would be largely discounted by the Magyar lack of artillery, and by the temptation which such a crisis would offer to the Roumanians to make a bid for Transylvania. Thus the probable result of German intervention would be a European coalition against the Hohenzollern. History would repeat itself, but with one important exception : there would be no British subsidies, such as rendered possible Frederick the Great's resistance to Europe in arms.
(b) But quite apart from external complications, the idea of an- nexation is not so simple as it appears at first sight. (1) If Germany contents herself with the seven German-speaking provinces (Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Styria, Carinthia), what is to become of Bohemia ? The Czechs, whether under a kingdom or a republic, are not strong enough to stand alone, even if there were no hostile German minority to complicate the internal problem. Union with Hungary is inconceivable, and thus they would of necessity gravitate towards Russia. This would place the Slav Colossus across the direct line of communica- tions between Berlin and Vienna, and would assure to St. Peters- burg—whether as the master or the adviser of era.gue—immense geographical and strategic advantages. Bismarck's phrase, " The master of Bohemia will be the master of Europe," would be startlingly fulfilled. Thus Germany would have no choice but to include Bohemia and Moravia (with Austrian Silesia) in the enlarged 0 erman Empire,—a step which would of course meet with fierce opposition from the six million Czechs, who dream of a restored kingdom of Bohemia. (2) Moreover, in their resistance, the Czechs would have the support of the South Slays—Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs—who people Carniola, Istria, and Dalmatia. For Germany in her advance southwards could not stop short at the linguistic frontier near Klagertfurt, but would lay claim to Trieste and the Adriatic seaboard. Indeed, the possession of a port on the Mediterranean, directly connected with Hamburg and Bremen, may be said to form the chief attraction of such a policy of expansion. (3) This would, however, make desperate enemies of all believers in the restoration of an Illyrian kingdom, pr in the rival dream of a greater Servia, and would probably involve a slow and harassing guerilla war in the Istrian Alps. (4) Besides, let us suppose Germany to be successful in quelling their united resistance ; she would still be faced with the task of controlling eleven and a hall millions of disaffected Slays within the borders of her own Empire, a problem before which that of Ireland would appear a trifle. (5) Nor is this by any means all. The occupation of Trieste by Germany would be bitterly resented, not merely by the Irredentists, but by the whole Italian nation, and would inevitably lead to a war, in which Italy could probably count on allies. In all circumstances, it would finally ruin the Triple Alliance, throw Italy into the arms of the Western Powers, and leave Germany with Abd-ul- /latrild as her only ally. (6) While Italy's enmity is inevitable, Russia, it may be argued, might be appeased by a share in the spoils. Such a share could only take the form of Galicia and the Bukowina, and by the annexation of the former the chief step would be taken towards the reconstruction of Poland. The two main divisions of the Polish race would thus be reunited, forming a compact State of sixteen million inhabitants; and the Prussian Poi& would become more unmanageable than ever. The danger from this quarter would be increased, rather than decreased, by the triumph of the Russian Revelation, for one of its inevitable consequences will be the grant of Polish autonomy.
(7) So much for the Slav races of Austria. Blit are we to suppose that even the Germans of Austria would be unanimous for incorporation? The Austrian is nothing if not loyal; and the first price that he would have to pay for union with Germany would be the loss of the dynasty, with which six centuries of glorious traditions are bound up. • For it is obvious that no Ile.psburg would ever consent to become the vassal of the King of Prussia. German Austria therefore would sink to the level of provinces, and take up a position similar to that of Alsace- Lorraine, on a larger scale. The present regime of easygoing Gemathlichkeit would be replaced by the "stramme " of the Prussian system ; and above all, Vienna, the pride of every Austrian's heart, from an Imperial capital would Weenie a mere provincial city.
(8) But what of Germany herself ? In the first place, she would cease to be a Protestant Power. In the present German
Empire there are (in round numbers) thirty-five and a quarter million Protestants to twenty million Roman Catholics (or sixty- two to thirty-six per cent.) The annexation of the Austrian provinces would alter these proportions to thirty-five and three- quarter million Protestants to forty-one million Catholics (or forty-sit to fifty-three per cent.) Among the far-reaching effects, of this change, the Roman Catholic Cent runs, which already holds the balance in the Reichstag, would attain to a positiort of absolute predominance. These facts explain the desperate efforts of the Pan- Germans to further the Los von Rom movement in Austria. They understand the reluctance with which most North Germans woula view any increase of the Roman Catholic element in theRnipire, and hope to attain their'end by wholesale proselytism. The Austrian Heir-Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, has been frequently attacked for the speech in which he asserted that "Away from Rome" was merely another name for 'Away from Austria." But no amount of criticism can obscure the fact that he was right, and he is hardly to be blamed for throwing down the gauntlet to the open enemies of his dynasty. (9) But, above all else, the annexation of the Austrian provinces would prove fatal to the unity won in 1866 and 1870. It would revive the old rivalry of Prussia and Austria, which so long made Germany a negligible quantity in the affairs of Europe. Prussia would no longer enjoy the same predominant position, and the South German States, whose dislike for Prussia .and her system is very real, might come to dream of a revision of the status quo. Dresden, Munich, and Stuttgart would gravitate towards Vienna, and the antagonism between North and South would be revived in an acuter form than ever. An internal balance of power, to the destruction of which Bismarck devoted his whole life, would be created once more on a new footing, and would seriously impair the efficiency of the Imperial machine. (10) Again, it would be no easy task to assimilate the very different diplomatic itleals of Berlin and Vienna, of Bismarck and Billow, as opposed to Beast, Andressy, and Goluchowski, still less to satisfy at once the Prussian and Austrian aristocracy in the matter of diplomatic appointments. (11) Nor would an extension of the fiscal frontier be an agreeable change .for the East Prussian Junker, whose selfish interests favour high meat prices and restrictions on foreign corn. Historic traditions, caste feeling, and fiscal convictions all combine to make Conservatives and Agrarians' hostile to union with Austria, the more so as one probable result would be a special commercial agreement with Hungary, their chief agri- cultural rival.
Enough has been said to show that a forward policy is open to far more serious objections than the Pan-Germans in their fanaticism would have us suppose. Meanwhile, the trend of eyents in Austria is hardly calculated to increase their enthusiasm. Nowhere has the Russian Revolution produced greater effect, and already the question of electoral reform is the all-absorbing topic. The Government is irrevocably pledged to the cause of reform, and the Bill which is to be introduced this month into the Reichs- rath will at length substitute direct universal suffrage for the anomalous curial system which has hitherto prevailed. But while in Vienna such far-reaching changes are accepted in the very highest quarters, Prussia remains the uncomIromising foe of constitutional reform, and Conservative reactionaries cling more firmly than ever to their travesty of a Constitution. The absorp- tion of Austria would mean the introduction of a liberal element, and would usher in a new era of democracy such as prevails in France or Britain. Hut however desirable such a result might be from the standpoint of civilisation, it would be anathema to the ruling classes of Prussia; and William II.'s antipathy to popular government would probably outweigh the temptations of an expansive policy.
In the words of Bismarck, "we could not make use of German Austria, either in whole or in part, nor would the acquisition of provinces like Austrian Silesia and pieces of Bohemia tend to strengthen the Prussian State. An assimilation of German Austria would not ensue, nor would Vienna be governed as a mere annexe from Berlin." This is as true to-day as when the founder of modern Germany wrote his "Recollections." It would be Absurd to maintain that his successors have proved worthy of the traditions of the Bismarcklan era; but I cannot believe that they will thus rashly endanger the structure which they owe to his glorious exertions.
Vienna, February 91h.
["Scotne Viator " shows with remorseless logic the un- wisdom of the Pan-German movement ; but, unfortunately, history affords no guarantee that nations reject unwise projects. The temptation to the Germans to pick up the Teutonic fragments of the Austrian Empire would, we fear, prove irresistible, and oblige them to put Aside all thoughts of prudence and policy ? Happily, however, the Austrian Empire has not yet gone into the melting-pot.--ED. Spectator.]
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