TOPICS OF THE DAY.
OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.
THE French alliance is becoming one of the most remarkable of practical paradoxes. It is an alliance in which there is to be de- tected the maximum of professed confidence in official quarters, and official acts, at least on our side, with the minimum of real comfort and security. It is an alliance which may properly be characterized as an offensive and defensive one, though, unfortu- nately, in a sense different to the ordinary acceptation of the phrase ; an alliance, that is, in which France takes the offensive, in more than one sense, against England: and England will bZ obliged to take the defensive against France. It is an alliance which has rapidly degenerated from a faith to a cant, from the appearance of hearty cooperation to a conventional necessity of interchanging grimaces of courtesy. It is an alliance without reliance, and, if permitted to develop according to its present course and principles, will at no distant day involve this country, in serious perplexities. THE French alliance is becoming one of the most remarkable of practical paradoxes. It is an alliance in which there is to be de- tected the maximum of professed confidence in official quarters, and official acts, at least on our side, with the minimum of real comfort and security. It is an alliance which may properly be characterized as an offensive and defensive one, though, unfortu- nately, in a sense different to the ordinary acceptation of the phrase ; an alliance, that is, in which France takes the offensive, in more than one sense, against England: and England will bZ obliged to take the defensive against France. It is an alliance which has rapidly degenerated from a faith to a cant, from the appearance of hearty cooperation to a conventional necessity of interchanging grimaces of courtesy. It is an alliance without reliance, and, if permitted to develop according to its present course and principles, will at no distant day involve this country, in serious perplexities. There are several questions of greater or less importance, and of a more or less pressing nature, that arise out of the present state of the facts, and the history of the relations of the two countries for the last four years. There is the question, which must not be evaded by our statesmen—whether it was prudent at first even to appear to identify the French alliance with a personal friendship of a close and intimate nature with such a monarch as the French Emperor. We do not allude to his character so much as his position. Granting that the official character of sovereign displaces all consideration of the fair fame of a host, granting that state .purposes might justify a woman, a lady, and a Queen in associating, upon terms of outward intimacy, with one whose portrait will be drawn in such dark colours by history, yet at least it was important to enquire, whether the crimes that were ignored had purchased the stability of power, to which it was worth while to make such sacrifices of dignity and self-respect. And there were other reasons, which might have caused prudent politicians to pause before the affiance with France under the Emperor Napoleon III. was allowed to become a vague com- munto bonorum of politics, rather than an association for definite and specific ends, the principles and methods of which should be steadily kept within assigned limits, and clear view. Reflection might have taught our statesmen, that the foreign policy of the Emperor must, from the nature of his position, become a policy of equivocation and adventure ; such a policy as is abhorrent to the history of England, and the genius of -Englishmen ; such a policy as was likely to cause, sooner or later, the more we are mixed up with it or its author, a revulsion Of dislike and sus- pieion' threatening both countries with serious danger. But, besides this general question, there are more limited and narrow questions which are forced upon the attention of the English public, and which cannot be put by with a sneer, or an official assurance. It is exceedingly unfortunate that an alliance so conventionally close should be accompanied by acts, which, according to all the ancient canons of international intercourse, would be construed to be such acts of quasi-hostility as to give rise to a necessity for demanding " explanations." And equally remarkable is it, equally an inversion of all the ordinary maxims of conduct which have hitherto governed sovereigns and states, that the sovereign of the country which is menaced by those acts, should be advised, and according to present appearances, actually intend, to give them the solemn ratification, as it were, of her presence. There is in this either a new and valuable ele- ment of policy, as yet never brought into play in the transactions of nations, or else a merely fatuous false position, from which, as from every false position, the extrication may be difficult, dan- gerous, and melancholy hereafter. Cherbourg is nothing if not a menace to England. A naval arsenal, greater in extent and capacities, according to eminent authorities, than all our naval arsenals put together connected by railways, whose termini are on the very quays, with two of the great military depots of France, identified with associations which make it the very symbol, as it is the actual weapon, for the subjugation of England—what possible part can this naval port play, or be intended to play, save that of the Sebastopol of the British channel ? But, beyond the facts, which speak with the tongue of a trumpet to all Englishmen except those whose ears are stopped with cotton, the vague rumours of the ceremonial intended to accompany the opening of the port, give point and significance to the doubts existing in English minds as to the part which their Sovereign is to play in a transaction so novel and unsatisfactory. And we should like to be told whether that which is left to be rumour to the rest of the world is allowed to be rumour to the Queen. Has any programme of the proceed- ings connected with this inauguration, showing all the details, been submitted to her Majesty ? And would it not be at least prudent to require one ? For with the very peculiar notions at present rife in French governing circles, as to what is delicate, and friendly, and ' tact ' in their dealings with the English nation and crown, it is possible at least, that something might creep into the ceremo- nial which to the Queen of England might be a serious offence, although of course not intended to be so, and not even divined tO be so by the French authorities. Now if such a programme be submitted beforehand, this might beed against. But no precaution can do away with theincongruity of the whole proceeding. Cherbourg is the most deadly menace, and danger to these islands. It is not conceivable that if the friendship between the two countries were regarded by the French Emperor as a final and irreversible fact, the disorder of French finances would be aggravated by flinging away millions upm what would be a pestilent superfluity. It is clear, therefore, that Cherbourg will oblige us to keep a fleet, an expensive Channel fleet, nay, that it makes such a fleet a matter of the moat urgent, vital, pressing necessity, and one which, if neglected, might oause a calamity for which English statesmen would be held responsible in life and fortune. For, even supposing, which we do but sup- pose, that the French Emperor personally would not be_guilty of so unspeakable an outrage as an attack on the coasts of England, yet the insecurity of his life and throne, and the utter darkness of the future, would make of Cherbourg a terrible legacy from Im- perialism to the next regime. That, according to all appearances' is likely to be one of competing generals, and in which to make the " odd trick " of an English invasion might possibly be to win, But, putting out of supposition the invasion of our hearths, Cherbourg, unless we adequately counter-arm in ships and soi_ diery, would clearly neutralize our political action in the world, or reduce us to follow as merely obedient humble servants in the wake of imperial policy. So that while that arsenal exists, the finances of England will be weighted with an unnecessary bur- den, and a chronic disease of anxiety exist in the intercourse of the two countries, which men may eventually think it would be cheap, useful, and comforting, to exchange for the acute spasm of a war.
While there is yet time, we would respectfully and forcibly draw the attention of a sovereign who is beloved and popular, not less for her virtues, than for the political skill which she has shown all through her glorious reign, to the dangers which cluster about the course that our country is taking with France, and to the equivocal position into which she herself and the nation are gradually being drawn. Painful as it is to write the words, we cannot but say, that for the Queen of England to be present at the solemn inauguration of the arsenal of Cherbourg, will be regarded by all continental politicians, and not without reason, as a hypocrisy and a humiliation. The invitation ought not to have been possible. At the present moment, the French papers are instructed to take a tone of high courtesy upon the subject. But what if we should presently read, that the visit of the Queen of England to Cherbourg .typifies in the strongest manner, that English policy in Europe is now typifies, subordinate to French interests and views ; and other such " delicate " shades of insult? There will be no emus bell in suoh writing, but it is imprudent in a high degree to furnish the temptation to it. And we are quite sure, that although there has not been hitherto much ex- pression of the feeling, before long a strong resentment against the French Emperor for this invitation will spring up in the Eng- lish nation. None of his public acts more deserves the epithet of sinister. It will be felt that an invitation, which it was difficult to refuse, and not honouring to accept, should not have been given to the Queen of England. And we deeply deplore the state of relations between the two crowns and countries, which makes it possible for such equivocal courtesies to be paid to England by France.
We write with pain, but with conviction upon this subject. In the dealings of nation with nation dignity is the first of duties and almost the first of virtues. And if there be one nation which, more than another, is called upon to maintain her dignity in the strongest and most uncompromising manner, it is this England. We cannot afford to throw away a single point in the game of Empire. If we are great we must not behave as though we were little. It does not comport with our pride or our self- respect that our Sovereign should be placed in the strangely false po- sition of endorsing, as it were, acts of hostility to our eountry. Once more we say we cannot but view with disapproval and doubt this new code of international conduct, which gives to a power like France the opportunity of accumulating every weapon of offence against us under the sheltering cover of an intimate alliance. The opportunity is too favourable not to wear some of the ap- pearance of design. To some our remarks may appear cynical. But we recommend our cabinet ministers, at all events, not to think so. Unlike Mr. Bright and his co-fanatics, they are re- sponsible, and if they think it right to make maudlin professions of confidence before the House of Commons and the world, let them not believe their own words. " Conservative " statesmen have had, and are having, such practice in this disbelief, that its exercise, in this particular case, must be as easy as it is indis- pensable. But perhaps even better than this, if possible, which we are growing to doubt, would it be for public men to open their eyes to the truth, and not suppose that a naval arsenal like Cher- bourg is built to " inaugurate" the millennium of international sentimentality : or that a watchfully aggressive, and a stupidly negligent nation can go on with impunity for ever crying "peace, peace, where there is no peace." The great characteristic of our modern English policy is to be forewarned, without being forearmed. How far is it to go?
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