TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE REASONS FOR A MODERATE LIBERAL ADMINISTRATION.
WE are asked by a correspondent why a Government of Lord Hartington's would be preferable to a Govern- ment of Lord Salisbury's? We are very willing to answer that question, which, indeed, we supposed that we had to some extent answered before. And we answer it with as much confidence as ever, though we cannot persuade ourselves that the prospect of what we so earnestly desire has improved since we wrote last. Our correspondent urges that a party which numbers 316 is better entitled to have the Prime Minister chosen from amongst its ranks than a party which numbers only 50. According to the best information we can get, Lord Hartington's party is considerably larger than the number given ; but that is of no moment. Of course, even the true figures would be final, if these figures represented in any degree the real strength of the two parties, which they do not. The country has not become Tory, because,—through the necessary deficiencies of representative institutions,—it has only been found possible to censure Mr. Gladstone's Irish measure by rejecting Mr. Gladstone's policy as a whole. The number of Liberal votes given at the poll, counting both Unionists and Home-rulers, greatly outnumber that of the Tory votes, and though on this question of Ireland the Unionists and Gladstonians are opposed, on most other questions they are united. Now, in choosing a Prime Minister, it is certainly desirable not only to have regard to the amount of cordial support which he would obtain, but to the amount of eager hostility which he would provoke. More especially is this true in such a crisis as the Irish crisis. The object, as we understand it, of Conservatives and Liberals alike, is to obtain for the purpose of dealing with the Irish Question the largest amount of reasonable support, and to excite the least amount of reasonable opposition that is anyhow possible. We all hold the crisis to be a very grave one. We all hold it to be so grave, that for any considerable advantage in relation to Ireland a very great deal of advantage in relation to less important matters ought to be sacrificed. Now, the question is whether Lord Salisbury or Lord Hartington would command in all quarters the more hearty confidence that he would deal firmly with the Irish Question. We hold that it would be Lord Hartington. For this we advance the following reasons.
In the first place, Lord Harlington has never seriously changed his attitude about Ireland. We may be sure that Lord Hartington would never have appointed a Lord-Lieu- tenant of Ireland who was avowedly a Home-ruler, and permitted him to confer with Mr. Parnell as to the best form of Home-rule. Lord Salisbury has acted in this way. Lord Hartington has not so acted. We do not exaggerate the significance of what Lord Salisbury did. We do not in the least assert that Lord Salisbury virtually sanctioned the Home-rule policy, when he chose Lord Carnarvon for his Lord-Lieutenant, and allowed him to discuss freely with Mr. Parnell the form of Home-rule which would best satisfy Ireland. But we do say that in thus acting Lord Salisbury was extremely imprudent, that he indicated an irresolution of purpose such as renders him a very unsuitable Premier of a Unionist Government, and that his Premiership would on this account alone be dis- trusted in a way that Lord Hartington's would not. In the second place, we maintain that while Lord Salisbury would not be trusted to deal with the Irish Question with the same firmness as Lord Hartington, he would also not be trusted to deal with the Irish Question with the same wish to avoid anything like an anti-Irish attitude. When Lord Salisbury had discovered his mistake in sending a Home-rule Lord-Lieutenant to Ireland, and in permitting that Lord-Lieutenant to confer freely with Mr. Parnell on the form of Home-rule best adapted to Irish aspirations, he fell into the opposite error, and made a speech,—the famous" Hottentot "speech,—which very nearly effected for Mr. Gladstone what Mr. Gladstone had not other- wise been able to effect for himself. The " Hottentot" speech irritated Ireland beyond measure, and, we think, not altogether without reason. A statesman in Lord Salisbury's position is not usually credited with using illustrations of a nature to wound, without intending to wound. We, for our part, are dis- posed to think that Lord Salisbury has in him too much of the orator to be able to keep perfect control of his tongue. And we do not at all believe that he seriously intended to liken the Irish to Hottentots as regards their capacity for self-
government. Still, as he did not intend to enforce any such analogy, he ought not to have used the language he did ; and no one can deny that it was most emphatic language, language- adapted, though not calculated, to make the Irish regard any Government of his as a Government that would insult Irish susceptibilities. It is most unfortunate for the pur- poses of a steady government of Ireland, that the Prime Minister should be one who has set Irish feeling needlessly against him as Lord Salisbury unquestionably has. Poll Ulster as to its preference for. Lord Salisbury or Lord Hart- ington, and Ulster would not hesitate in choosing the latter. Indeed, any one who knows anything of the Loyalists of Ireland,. knows knows that they fervently desire a Hartington Administration.
But even this is not all. It will be absolutely essential for the new Government not only that it shall not waver in its Irish policy, and that it shall not needlessly offend Irish feeling, but also that it shall command confidence, as far as any Unionist party can command confidence, amongst the Gladstonians. The Liberals who support Mr. Gladstone number 191 in the new House of Commons, and it is of the first importance that the Government should not be one which it would be the first object of Mr. Gladstone's followers to displace. No one can deny that they would on all subjects, whether Irish or otherwise, be disposed to trust a Hartington Administration far more than they would be disposed to trust a Salisbury Administration. Lord Salisbury has too often filled them with political alarm and displeasure to command even their passive acquiescence. It is to be feared that if Lord Salisbury forms an Administration, the followers of Mr. Gladstone may give full sway to their political feelings, and do all in their power to weaken and undermine the new Government. We do not for a moment suppose that they would be very cordial even to Lord Hartington. Of course, they will express, whenever occasion arises, their confidence in their new creed, and will do what they can to advance it in the country and in the House. But at least most of them still regard Lord Harlington with respect, and we should not have the same political battering-ram applied to an Administration of which he was the head, that we might well expect to see applied to an Administration of which Lord Salisbury was the head. Supposing, for instance, the new Government were to deal with the Land Laws or with Local Government in Great Britain, Lord Hartington would be trusted for doing nothing that was not genuinely Liberal, however short it might fall of Radical aspirations. But any measure of Lord Salisbury's on these questions would be distrusted from the very first. The Radicals would never believe that even his general drift was in the right direction.
These are the reasons, and they seem to us very weighty ones, why a Hartington Administration would have far more cordial support from the country at large than a Salisbury Administration. We confess that the prospect of such an Administration has not improved since we wrote last. But then, the Queen, who has in matters of this kind the utmost influence, has not yet brought that influence to bear. And we believe it to be even yet at least possible, that, in the interest of the nation at large, and of that strong Government which is at the present moment so essential to us, the Queen may be able to secure the end so eagerly desired by the Moderates, whether Liberal or Oonservative,—a strong Administration determined to deal prudently and yet firmly with the Irish Question, and to avoid as much as possible anything like needless divisions of counsel among moderate men on all other questions, till on this most perplexing of all issues, the nation begins to see light.
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