THE DEBATE OF THURSDAY ON EGYPT.
THE sharp discussion of Thursday night on Egyptian affairs was, in some ways, even more unsatisfactory than pre- vious discussions have been. The attack, to begin with, led by Mr. Chaplin, was utterly unjustifiable. Though often reckless, he is not a mere free-lance, nor hopelessly outside the list of men to whom a Tory leader would confide office. He knows perfectly well that the Government, hampered by the excessive difficulties of the French Cabinet, considers secrecy for the moment all-important, and that every question asked and answered gives some information to the astute men who from moment to moment are watching the course of British policy, with a view to thwart it. Nevertheless, he not only demands information which cannot be given about that policy, but he raises the second Egyptian question—the safety of the Suez Canal—in its crudest form. Not content with asking whether the Canal will be protected, which is unobjectionable, though unnecessary, he carefully describes, in the hearing, as it were, of Arabi Pasha, the exact means by which that dangerous pretender could most effectually render the Canal useless. Any ruler of Cairo could, as he points out, cut off the fresh-water Canal, and so close all the, immense establishments along its length, establishments absolutely essential to its working. They could not exist twelve hours without drinking-water, they cannot drink salt water, and they must fly. Merely to state such a fact as most indis- creet, for there is no certainty that Arabi Pasha was aware of his advantage ; but to state it as Mr. Chaplin did, in order to compel Government to admit that this means of closing the Canal existed, was to do an act which dis- tinctly imperilled the interests of Great Britain. We do not suppose, any more than Mr. Gladstone did, that the Member for Mid-Lincolnshire intended this. English country gentle- men do not, even in the heat of passion, lend themselves to plans inimical to their country ; but what are we to think of the judgment, or even the common-sense, of Mr. Chaplin ? As it happened, the only mischief he has done is to warn Arabi Pasha that the British Admiralty knows of a way out of the difficulty, a way in which it has full confidence, and therefore to set him thinking of means to thwart that way,—which, how- ever, he cannot do—but Mr. Chaplin might have done irrepar- able mischief. His own party, as Mr. Gladstone said, perceived his error, and his leaders ought to have denounced his speech at once and on the spot, as one for which they had neither sympathy nor tolerance. Party spirit excuses much, but it does not excuse language "however," as Mr. Gladstone put it, "innocently intended," from which the weak place of British interests in a struggle still going on may be discerned. On the other hand, we think the Government fails a little, as every Liberal Government has always failed, to recognise the absolute necessity, with such a constituency as governs us now, and, indeed, with English people at all times, of a certain direct- ness and roughness of language. We quite understand their diplomatic difficulties ; bht in diplomacy, as in everything else, strength is a weighty argument, and their strength comes, and
must come, from the support of the British people. That they deserve that support, we fully believe. Either we misunder- stand all that is officially said and done, or the Government is pursuing firmly a definite policy quite as acceptable, in the complexity of the situation, as any other. They do not intend to annex Egypt, but they do intend to reinstate Tewfik Khedive in such authority that there shall be no danger of a renewal of anarchy, or of any further menace either to the free resid- ence of Europeans in Egypt, or to the English or Anglo- French Protectorate of the Valley. They intend this so strongly, that they will employ force, if they must, and if Arabi cannot be quelled without it, but they feel sure they can secure the result through the European Concert. They also intend with still more energy to protect the Canal, and keep it as clear as if it were a channel in open sea. We can- not understand how any one can read Mr. Gladstone's, or for that matter M. de Freycinet's, declarations in any other sense, and see no reason even to suspect any arriere pense'e which would weaken the general nature of their policy. But we see great reason to believe that the Ministry exaggerate the inconvenience both of stating their plans, and of de- finitely and finally refusing, on the ground of the national interest, to say one word about them. A clear, rough declaration of their intentions, or of their resolution to maintain absolute silence, would be equally acceptable to the country. Instead of this, Sir Charles Dilke displays his remarkable tact., and Mr. Gladstone his wonderful dialectic skill, in dozens of answers which are intelligible enough, we have no doubt, to the Embassies, but which leave plain men puzzled and con- fused, and enable Sir Stafford Nortlicote to hint that, after all, her Majesty's Government is not impressed with the import- ance of the Canal. That is, of course, nonsense. Since when has anybody been able to teach Mr. Gladstone, or, for that matter, Mr. Chamberlain, anything about English commer- cial interests, or why are they supposed to forget that, under modern circumstances, when time is of the essence of competition, a short water-way to Asia must be invaluable ? Still, Sir Stafford was able to say it just because the Premier, deeming secrecy indispensable, thought he could guard it by carefully-chosen words better than by silence. He may be right. We do not pretend, like his opponents, to teach Mr.. Gladstone his business, but we are convinced that he under- rates popular confidence in him, and the willingness of the country, if he will only speak out clearly, or say it is best to. be silent, to leave him in full charge and with full respon- sibility.
It is, of course, useless, as this is our view, to say anything further of the situation in Egypt, which underlies the debate.. That is in its essence unchanged. A modes rirendi has been. patched up for the moment between Tewfik and Arabi, rioting is suspended, and the Europeans are either gone, or awaiting events under the protection of the Fleets. That, however, is a mere truce. All parties are waiting with swords half-drawn, until Europe accepts or rejects the Anglo-French proposals, which are, that Tewfik be restored to full authority, that the Control be reinvigorated for certain definite purposes, and that the safety of the Canal be further rendered certain. When Europe has given its decision, it will also decide how to carry it out—not, as we think, a very hard thing to arrange, with the Europeans gone or safe—and then Arabi must make his election for resistance or submission. We incline to believe he will resist, but his action will depsnd on influences both in Constantinople and Mecca which no European thoroughly understands, and meanwhile the situation is clear. Action is delayed. until Europe has spoken or refused to speak, and the English, like the rest of the world, must possess their souls in.
patience. If they will only believe that Mr. Gladstone'a answers are intended to preserve secrecy, that he is about as likely to abandon British interests as any other proud Scotch- man, and that both in England and India the authorities are silently preparing for conceivable eventualities, they will be much wiser than any attempt to read between the lines of Parliamentary question and answer is likely to make them.
For ourselves, who believe in British ascendency in Egypt as essential to the closest interests of the kingdom, we have, after reading everything, no manner of doubt that the Government is—the limits of the attainable being always remembered—on the right track.
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