24 JUNE 1960, Page 10

Letter of the Law

Reasoned Decisions

By R. A

. CLINE NOTHING can produce a greater sense of in- justice in a litigant who has lost his case than not to know why he has been defeated; and nothing is more difficult than to appeal success- fully against a decision of a judge who gives no reasons for his decision. Those who had hoped that the Franks Report would create a change of judicial heart and thinking in this respect will have been deeply disappointed by a decision in the Divisional Court this week.

David Woodhouse, a Quaker, was provision- ally registered as a conscientious objector, but his name was later removed, both the local and appellate tribunals holding that he had not estab- lished a conscientious objection to military ser- vice. Woodhouse asked for their reasons, as he was entitled to do, under the Tribunals and In- quiries Act, 1958. He elicited no more than that they had decided be had not established his objection; and he then sought leave from the Divisional Court to apply for an order directing the appellate tribunal to state their reasons, argu- ing that the tribunal had given the decision itself as the reason for the decision.

The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, in the course of the argument said that the tribunal might not have believed the reasons advanced by Woodhouse, or they might have believed them and considered that they were not a conscientious objection in law. It would appear therefore that Lord Parker was himself at a loss as to the reasons for the decision. However, 'his Lordship thought from what he had seen of the papers that it would be a pure waste of time to carry the matter any further' and Woodhouse's application was rejected.

Yet the Franks Report asserted (para. 98): We are convinced that if tribunal proceedings are to be fair to the citizen reasons should be given to the fullest practical extent . . . a reasoned decision is essential in order that where there is a right of appeal, the applicant can assess whether he has good grounds of appeal, etc. etc.

And para. 219 (which deals with these very tribunals): The most serious criticism is of inconsistency in the application by the local tribunals of . . . the National Service Act. particularly in regard to the question whether conscientious objection to a particular war . . . is a valid objection under the Act. . . . We have already recom- mended that all tribunals should give reasoned decisions. . . . The need for this change seems to us particularly urgent in the case of the Conscientious Objectors Tribunals.

Among the seventeen members who signed that recommendation was the present Lord Chief Justice.

Most people are under the impression that the Street Offences Act, 1959, was passed by Parlia- ment in order to clear prostitutes off the streets. The Divisional Court (Lord Parker, again) has other ideas. In a case decided last week the court upheld the conviction of a prostitute who had solicited her customers from behind a closed window overlooking Curzon Street. Her method was to tap on the window pane with a metal object and then indicate her price by holding up three fingers. The Street Offences Act says that it 'shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.' According to the Divisional Court it is no defence that the prosti- tute was inside a private house if the prosecution can prove that an invitation to a prospective customer was projected into the street. On this view notices appearing in shop windows adver- tising the services of 'models' contravene the Act, and a prostitute whose client speaks to her from a public telephone box would commit an offence. By adopting this fanciful construction of the statute the court has come very near to saying that prostitution itself is a crime.