24 MARCH 1973, Page 24

Education

How much freedom?

John H. Chambers

A permanent problem presents itself to teachers in liberal western democracies—the problem of appropriately allowing children freedom at certain times, while at other times authoritatively directing them. This problem is of course somewhat different from that facing adults in their dealings with one another for it is complicated by two facts: 1. The persons with whom teachers have to deal are at various levels of immaturity and have not yet been granted a wide autonomy over their activities; 2. Schools are the chief institutional transmitters of the culture, and teachers are people paid to initiate the nation's young into the public body of knowledge and experience.

Now freedom is an important social-political principle that we in this country believe to be valuable. It is however but one principle amongst others such as truth-telling, non-injury, fairness and so on. Thus if we bear in mind the two points raised above it should be clear that there will be many situations in schools in which one or more of the above principles will be considered to be of greater weight than children's freed,om.

Principles other than freedom can be seen to have importance in two overlapping contexts — firstly in the general social control of children, and secondly in the teaching that occurs.

It is in the context of social control that the oft-mentioned "paradox of freedom" comes into importance in the schoolroom, which is, as Popper has put it, " the argument that freedom in the absence of any restraining control must lead to very great restraint." For it is both an historical and a social scientific fact that if human beings are given freedom to do just as they wish, then the strong impose arbitrary restrictions on the weak and the few have wide freedom while the many have little.

A teacher need not have had much classroom experience before becoming convinced of this general point. Some children, even infants, can soon become real tyrants when not restrained by adult controls (or by controls widely-accepted and implemented by the children themselves). In the social sphere then, in order to have a modicum of freedom for all children, it is necessary for children to accept some restrainsts on their freedom, which also prevent other children from interfering with them.

In the context of teaching, it is to be noted that schools are crucially concerned with education. And in order to get children started on educational activities it is often the case that certain sorts of restrictions on their freedom are again necessary — education is controlled activity. It is here that Froebel's notion of the kindergarten has its real analogical force. For plants in a garden do not just grow. In gardens it is weeds that just grow. In gardens plants are pruned, nurtured, fertilised, re-potted and watered so that they take on a desirable form. Likewise, no responsible teacher can let children just 'grow.' Teachers in order to do their job properly have to restrict, channel, guide, help. They have not merely to deal with what children want, they have also to broaden and change these wants. Just as not just anything is allowable in a garden if it is to remain a garden, so not just anything is allowable in a school if it is to continue to be a school rather than merely a place of entertainment or containment. To put it another way — teachers in general consider that in this area of human activity the principle of consideration of people's best interests must for the time being overrule the principle of freedom.

Indeed, a strong case can be made that it is wise to impose restrictions now so that later in their lives children will be able to exercise a wider freedom to act as they wish. For instance, it is advisable to keep children at school for five or six hours a day for many years, even though many of them at the time see this as an imposition and a restriction on their freedom; because the restraint imposed on children in, say, getting them to learn to read, leads to a wider variety of Creedom to choose what they will read and what they will do when they are grown up. Learning to read is of course merely one example. The same basic argument applies to many things learned at school. Furthermore it is necessary that children be restricted in this way, not merely to widen their own freedom of choice in the future, but also to help them to be economically viable when they grow up and so take a proper place in the adult community.

Thus it shoulct be clear that we must be wary of the notion of freedom in the classroom, for how much freedom ought to be allowed will depend upon just how the term is interpreted. For instance if it is claimed that because of the principle of freedom, pupils should have control over the school tuckshop organisation, and some part in deciding and applying disciplinary rules and procedures, that may be all very well. If it means that they should be consulted about whether or not to wear a school uniform, and about which methods of teaching they believe to be the most effective, these too may well be acceptable. For in such areas, children have some relevant experience. But if it means that children should be given actual executive control over the content of what is taught and participation in the appointment of staff, then I think it must be staunchly opposed.

For it is only those who have got near to the frontiers of the public modes of knowledge (science, mathematics, literature, etc.) who can sensibly decide either curriculum issues or the appropriateness of staff appointments. Children are neophytes in such matters; teachers are comparative sophisticates. As Chou En-lai said recently, "The young are in no position to judge any necessary changes (in education)."

John H. Chambers is lecturer in the Philosophy of Education at Maria Grey College, London