THE PETROL-DOLLAR AXIS
?V HE Middle East, traditionally lavish of trans- formation scenes, has seen few more startling peripeteia than the visit of King Saud to Baghdad. The rivalry between the Hashemite and Saudite dynasties which_started with the attempt by the former to establish its hegemony over the Arab world has ended as it began with the rise of a new foreign power, the US, to preponderance inside the Arab world. King Saud's Washington visit evidently marked a switch in his allegiance from the embattled forces of radical Arab nationalism embodied in the person of Colonel Nasser to the more congenial allurements offered by the Ameri- can Government and the oil companies. As chief American ally in the Middle East he was able to exert his influence effectively during the Jordan crisis with a consequent loss of prestige for the Egyptians and the Syrians. Now the new dynastic rapprochement carries the process a stage farther. The Suez episode is over : a new Arab front is taking shape in the Middle East backed by America and based firmly on dollars and petrol.
As a means of keeping Russian influence out of the area the effectiveness of these measures over a short time cannot be denied. However, Mr. Dulles and the State Department have yet to face the real difficulties which are bound to arise. The statement issued after the meeting of the two kings contains condemnation of interference in the in- ternal affairs of other countries clearly aimed at Egypt and, eventually, Russia. This should please Washington. When, however, the monarchs go on to describe the Gulf of Aqaba as 'a closed Arab gulf leading to the Moslem holy places,' when they demand the return of Palestine refugees to their homes in Israel, and condemn French actions in Algeria, they face their protectors with the same problem that has haunted the British Foreign Office. In the game of who is lining up whom to light what, the trumps are all on the Arabs' side. They are on the spot, and there is no way in which the US can ensure that arms and economic aid supplied to them will not be diverted into the jehad against Israel. In other words, the Arab national cause is of far more importance to most Arabs than the clash between the two world blocs in which they happen to be involved.
Moreover, by backing Arab monarchs, the Americans, like the British before them, are pin- ning their faith to a political body which may turn out to be a broken reed. Just what do the Kings of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan represent apart from themselves? Is ,it wise to alienate more m widely based political movements for the sake of supporting them? These questions do not have to be answered for the moment, but they will make themselves felt increasingly.
One of the paradoxical results of all this has been that Britain is now looked upon with a slightly more favourable eye by Arab nationalists. Recent overtures on the part of the Syrian Gov- ernment for a resumption of diplomatic relations as well as the moderate tone of the Egyptian press on the decision to cease boycotting the Suez Canal show that here, as elsewhere in the world, peoples emerging from colonialism tend to regard an up- and-coming imperialism with more suspicion than a decaying one. An unforeseen consequence of Suez might be that Britain will undertake in the Middle East the role it has filled so long in South- East Asia—that of restraining actions of the State Department and the Pentagon which might lead to a hotting-up of the cold war. This would mean that British foreign policy could be far more uni- fied than in the past when the Middle East was always an exception, and that it would be in a good position to make the best of that new regard for international morality which has become in- creasingly a card to be reckoned with in modern diplomacy. It pays for any State declining in strength to adopt a resolutely moral attitude in its foreign policy. Suez, by removing the last area where a. British realpolitik operated, has opened the way for a policy based on our positions of strength—the Commonwealth and our special position with regard to the Afro-Asian bloc— rather than on outmoded conceptions of the type held by the Tory rebels.
Applied to the Middle East, such a policy would mean that we should exert our influence in Wash- ington and elsewhere to press for a policy of stability rather than one of lining up the Arabs in military alliances against the USSR. Given the existence of Israel and the hostility felt for it by the Arabs, no peace in the area will be possible until the Great Powers agree to sink their differ- ences sufficiently to impose an acceptance by the latter of present frontiers. If the price to be paid for the friendship of the three monarchs is consent to the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, then the State Department should be made aware that that price is too high and, in any case, useless, since the US cannot pay Danegeld to Arab nationalism beyond a certain point. It is not conceivable that Ameri- can public opinion would stand for the destruc- tion of Israel even in the name of a Middle East united against Communism.
Britain, therefore, must do its best to bring about another Geneva conference on the Middle East. Even ordinary self-interest would dictate this, since stability in the oil-producing countries is an urgent British interest. A situation in which the oil flows without interruption is not likely to last if the Russians are provoked into causing as much trouble as they can. Of course, any negotia- tion with the USSR requires to be carried out from a position of strength. One result of the meeting of the kings is that, over a short term, such a posi- tion now does exist for the West. But it can hardly be expected to last very long.
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