The French Left cracks
Sam White
Paris One had to be a considerable political innocent to believe that the united French Left would remain united for long after its apparently likely victory in the general elections next March. What appeared unlikely in the extreme, however, was that the cracks in its unitarian facade would begin to show before the elections and not after. However this is exactly what has happened and however the cracks are patched up — and patched up they will be — it will never be bright beautiful dawn again. Although Robert Fabre, the leader of the tninuscule left wing Radical Party, is the hero of the day for walking out on last week's negotiations between Socialists, Communists and his segment of the Radical Party, credit for blowing the gaff on this fraudulent alliance must go to the Communists. They at least had the honesty when they opened their campaign to up-date the five year old common programme of the left to spell out in detail what they wanted and how they Proposed getting it. If this gave M. Fabre indigestion and made the Socialist leader M. Mitterand go green around the gills the Communists could point out with impeccable logic that all they were proposing was already implicit in the 1972 programme. Wholesale nationalisation instead of limited nationalisation? But if you nationalise all the banks why not nationalise all the industries in which the banks are already majority shareholders?
And if you have already decided to nationalise nine major industries why not nationalise the entire motor industry also and why not nationalise the ailing steel industry which is already in debt up to its eyebrows to the Government? And why, if You are going to increase the basic wage anyway, why not increase by a hefty 30 per cent and counter the inflationary effects of this by limiting pay differentials to a ratio of five to one to the basic wage? It was pathetic for example to hear M.Fabre say that he was 0Pposed to 'Nationalisation a la carte'. M.Marchais was able to point out that it was Precisely 'Nationalisation a la carte' which the original common programme had foreshadowed with a provision that workers could petition the government for their industry to be nationalised if it were not already on the nationalisation list. In short what Marchais was saying was that in effect, if the common programme Was to Mitterrand and Fabre little more than political hoax he, Marchais, was in deadly earnest about it and wanted guarantees now that it would be applied if the left WO n next March, There has been a spate of Political fiction in France recently pre dieting what would happen if the left won. They all predict that at some point or other — and sooner rather than later the left wing coalition would break up giving place to a centre left Government with the Communists left out in the cold. Marchais does not have to have an excess of imagination to foresee himself precisely such an outcome. He knows his history and he knows what happened immediately after the war, and what happened before the war with the victory of the Popular Front.
In the first case the communists were expelled from the postwar coalition by the Socialist Premier Ramadier and in the second the Popular Front collapsed after only eight months. This time the Communists aim to have stronger levers of power not only in terms of Government posts but through control of key industries through their powerful industrial base. Why though risk losing. the elections by getting tough now? A popular theory which is being actively spread by the Elysee is that Moscow does not want a Left government in Paris because this would only serve to strengthen Washington-Bonn ties. It is even being said that Brezhnev gave this assurance to Giscard during his recent visit here. I find this implausible if only because I doubt if Moscow is still in a position to impose policy on the French party. A much more likely explanation is the most obvious one: that the party would look very foolish indeed if the new Popular Front were as short lived as the old one and it would suffer the most from the resulting disenchantment. Better defeat now than defeat and demoralisation later. In any case the party is in a strong position to impose its own will now. Its proposals have the backing of the left wing of the Socialists and of both the major trade union federations, its own, the COT, and the rival one the CFDT. Whatever his own reservations may be and whatever his calculations Mitterrand knows that in the final analysis he cannot win without the Communists though he may not be able to win with them. As for M.Fabre his political future would be extinguished if the Left lost. At present the Radical Party, split as it is, has a foot in each camp and if the Left won Fabre could fulfil the traditional role of the Radical Party — that of holding the balance of power. At present he has only thirteen seats in Parliament but by wily negotiations now he could easily be presented with another fifteen by his partners, who would stand down in favour of his candidates. This would be his obvious if unannounced price for rejoining the coalition.
On the face of it the two big winners of last week's dispute are Fabre and Marchais and the big loser is Mitterrand. Fabre will have emerged by the time the negotiations are completed as the champion of the little man against the Communist goliath and Marchais as the man who put principle before office. As for Mitterrand he appears to have lost on all counts. He neither stood up to Marchais during five months of systematic baiting which preceded the famous summit of the Left, nor did he prove that his principles were anything less than extremely flexible. In fact these principles appear to be melting away from him like wax from a gutting candle. Poor Mitterrand. All his electoral strategy was based on the idea that every day in every way the Communists were becoming Socialist moderates like himself. He now finds that he has to become more revolutionary sounding than he ever intended to appear. He has one consolation. In so doing, few people will take him seriously — least of all his Communist allies.
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