Keeping an eye on the colonels
ROME PETER TUMIATI
Rome—Italy's strongest defences against pos- sible authoritarian attempts to seize power are the inbuilt lack of secretiveness of the Italian temperament, the far from exalted prestige in the public mind enjoyed by the highest ranks of the armed forces, and the discord, to put it mildly, prevailing within them. A coup d'etat whose likelihood, chances of success and pos- sible authors, were all being discussed in the cafés of Rome's via Veneto weeks ahead, would have a somewhat serious handicap to overcome. Furthermore it would have to contend with a thoroughly alerted government.
Until now the shortcomings of the Italian navy, army and air force have not included political-mindedness. Since Italian national unity was achieved a century ago there have been several successful and attempted devia- tions from orthodox democratic legitimacy. But in all cases, if not the initiative at least a very warm blessing for them has come from the very summit of the state. What is certain now is that no such initiative or overt com- plicity would ever come from President Sara- gat. It should be stressed that even though Italy is a parliamentary and not a presidential republic the real and ultimate powers of the president are very wide.
From many points of view the general con- ditions of the country and a recent chain of events culminating with what happened in the small Southern town of Battipaglia earlier this month have justified a feeling of alarm. But they have also sounded an alarm signal for the government and for the political parties, and have set in motion the adoption of long-over- due measures. The possible claws of the armed forces are being firmly clipped. A complete re- appraisal of what must be done with the utmost urgency to meet the problems in the South is in progress. The Socialist party has seen the writing on the wall and has abandoned its more irre- sponsible attitudes. Last week's meeting of the socialist executive gave ample evidence of this. The demand for the disarming of the police which up to a few days ago most socialist leaders had been clamouring for, was quietly dropped. The socialists realised in time that it was an issue which could well have brought about the downfall of the government. Even the left wing of the Christian Democrat party had adopted a chastened line in comparison
with its previous noisy quest for a 'dialogue' with the Communist party. Recent develop- ments in Prague have not gone unnoticed.
The danger of a coup promoted, organised and engineered from within the country is some- thing few Italians would consider credible. The real danger is thought to come from outside Italy or more exactly from non-Italian forces which could be tempted—perhaps have been in recent weeks—to utilise Italian 'colonels' or their equivalent to avert any possible danger of Italy drifting out of the western fold. If the red light is making the government coalition and its supporters pull up their socks, a devel- opment of which there have been promising signs in the very last few days, then an excellent result will have been achieved.
The promising signs cover a number of fields from the clipping of some major military claws to the reorganisation, retraining and re-equip- ment of the police to enable it to deal with situations which are completely different from those of the late 'forties and early 'fifties when hardly anyone in Italy had heard of Che Guevara—or Mao Tse-tung either, for that mat- ter. Even more promising, if it proves to be true, is the apparent awakening of the left wing of the Socialist party on one side and of the- left wing of the Christian Democrats on the other to the fact that flirting or threatening to flirt with the communists in their inter-party bar- gaining and elbowing for position could easily start a chain reaction which would sweep them out of existence or into jail at the very least. The most promising sign of all is a new official awareness of the inadequacy of all policies pur- sued so far for dealing with the country's back- ward Mezzogiorno and of the need to review them.
Estimates of the size of the southern prob- lem, ideas about what could be expected to hap- pen and ways and means of dealing with such developments have all proved faulty in varying degrees. The two most erroneous forecasts, and therefore the equally mistaken measures adop- ted to deal with them, concern the flight from the land in the south and the creation of new jobs outside agriculture to meet it. The flight from the land has been at least double what was expected and the creation of new non-agricul- tural jobs far less than had been expected. Italy's first attempt at economic planning was the `Vanoni Plan' drafted in the very early 1950s. Starting from the assumption that per capita income in the south in 1954 was rather less than half what it was in the north it was envisaged. that a national annual rate of growth of 5 per cent would raise it to about three- quarters of northern per capita income by 1964.
However, what has happened is that the national rate of growth has exceeded what had been aimed at, but the industrialised north has grown much more and much faster than the south. The gap between north and south has not narrowed. What happened in Battipaglia is a textbook example of the effects of mistaken economic forecasting and of its inevitable political repercussions.
If Italian politicians have been sufficiently frightened in the last few days—not so much by Battipaglia as by ominous reports from out- - side Italy—to establish a minimum degree of common purpose, then Italy's prospects could be judged to be anything but bleak. The coun- try's economy is doing well and were it not for Italian politics 1969 could easily be an excep- tionally good year. The problem of the south has proved to be bigger and much more urgent than had been thought. But there is little doubt that it can be coped with if a really basic national infrastructure—confidence in Italian politics and politicians and in their will to devote at least some of their time and attention to national interests—is re- established.
It is not possible to say whether Italy has been or is or has not been on the verge of a putsch of some kind. What is certain is that knowledge- able people have been frightened. An old Italian saying is .1101110 avvisato uonto mezzo salvato'—the man who has been warned is half- saved. They have suddenly realised that move- ments and men which are completely dis- credited and considered little more than a joke in Italy are still being taken seriously elsewhere. that even though Italy's armed forces have a non-political tradition the personal ambitions of some of their leaders may be stirred when they cast their gaze around the Mediterranean and see almost every nation bordering it is run by a marshal, a general, or a colonel. Such ambitions can be strengthened if they hear top civil servants or businessmen bemoaning the paralysing effects of political chaos and say plaintively, 'If we only had some colonels I,'
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