THE JUTLAND DISPATCHES.
THE public having long demanded all the papers on the Battle of Jutland have got them with a ven- geance, and now do not know what to make of them. This
confusion of the public mind had been foreseen, and Captain Harper, a trained naval writer with a clear brain, had accordingly been instructed to collate the various documents and produce such a narrative as ordinary people could understand. For some reason or other Captain Harper's book has been held up. We need not inquire whether the reasons which have delayed it are personal or are such reasons as are generally described as " in the public interest." It is enough to say that the book is temporarily withheld, and that in our opinion it ought to be published as soon as possible. Lord Wester Wemysa, who as First Sea Lord authorized its production, has protested in a letter to the Times that there is no satisfactory reason for refusing publication.
Now to turn to the mass of documents which we have before us. Although they do not throw much new light on the battle, what they do throw illuminates certain facts in a most interesting way. First in importance we place the fact that Lord Jellicoe's much-discussed " turn away" from the enemy was not a policy of prudence conceived at the moment, but was part of a plan which had long been arranged and which had the full approval of the Admiralty. In October, 1914, Lord Jellicoe pointed out to the Admiralty that the Germans obviously intended to rely chiefly upon submarines, mines, and torpedoes. This, after all, was only what British seamen expected, as they have always regarded these weapons as the weapons of the weaker Power. We had not ourselves enough submarines ; we were woefully lacking in mines ; and the number of our destroyers had been badly let down. The British Fleet which fought the Battle of Jutland was in effect the creation of Lord Fisher, and Lord Fisher, putting all his eggs in one basket, as the saying is, had cared little for ships which were not immense gun-platforms. As it turned out, the real counter to the submarine was the destroyer, and though we built furiously during the war we never had anything like enough. But Lord Jellicoe, when he wrote his memorandum to the Admiralty in October, 1914, had to take the facts as they were. He showed that in the so-called weapons of the weaker Power the Germans had an actual superiority over us. What, then, was he to do if the Germane in a battle concentrated upon the use of weapons which might give them an advantage He pointed out that the Germans would probably try to draw us on by feigned retirements in order to manoeuvre our ships into a position where they could be sunk by torpedoes and mines. He came to the conclusion, therefore, that if the Germans adopted these tactics he ought to " decline to be drawn." He put great emphasis on this. He also told the Admiralty that if there should be a Fleet action, and for reasons which seemed to him to be perfectly cogent he should " turn away " from the enemy, he might seem to the public to be declining action, and a great deal of odium would be thrown upon him. He insisted, nevertheless, that his view was right, and that by comparison with the advantages to be obtained by doing the right thing, the disadvantages of any personal condemnation he might earn was a small matter. The Admiralty fully agreed with Lord Jellicoe, and the consequence was that the Battle of Jutland was fought on our side " according to plan." Let us say here that this revelation shows Lord Jellicoe- whether he was right or wrong, and we shall return to that matter later—to be a publio servant of the highest integrity and of great moral courage.
When the battle was joined, beginning with the pre- liminary engagement between Lord Beatty's battle cruisers and the enemy and continuing with Lord Jellicoe's battle- ships engaged, it was discovered that the Germans were superior in several respects besides their possession of a preponderant number of weapons of the weaker Power. Here, however, a slight reservation is necessary ; there is a dispute about the German submarines. Lord Jellicoe declares that several were Fresent, but Admiral von Scheer says that there were none in the actual battle. No doubt several were roaming about the North Sea to waylay our ships. As regards other points of German superiority there is no dispute. The German ships were better armoured, and their methods of fire-direotion were probably better than ours ; their speed was about three knots higher than had been expected ; and finally their devices for keeping in touch with one another during night fighting were so good that Lord Jellicoe remarks that we had a good deal to learn from them. Our want of thicker armour was proved when the plunging shots of the Germans went through our decks ; but it must be remembered that our ships were built for service in all parts of the world, whereas the German ships were designed for service near home— to wit, in the North Sea—and space was given up to armour which in British ships would have been given up to men. The " habitability " of the German Navy was bad.
When all allowances have been made, however, the fact remains that our Fleet, though it was superior in capital power, did not win a great victory. A victory of course it obtained in the sense that the German Fleet returned to port and was never able to emerge again, but that was not the kind of victory we had hoped for. Its results could not be compared with what would have been achieved if the German Fleet had been annihilated. The ability of an enemy to use the weapons of a weaker Power is ultimately based upon the existence of a fleet ; and so long as the German Fleet still existed, as of course it did after the Battle of Jutland, we were a long way from winning the war at sea. If the whole German Fleet had been sunk, the agony we suffered from the submarines in 1917 would probably not have happened, and we should also very likely have been able to enter the Baltic. The influence upon the course of the war might have been very great.
The manoeuvre which Lord Jellicoe carried out in turning away from the enemy may be described once more now that we have from the official documents an exact account of what occurred. He brought his battleships into action in six parallel divisions of four ships each. Oh his right was Lord Beatty with the battle cruisers, and the Germans were to the right of Lord Beatty. It is clear that the quickest way for Lord Jellicoe to " close the enemy " was to deploy his ships on the starboard wing. As a matter of fact, he deployed on the port wing so that there was necessarily a delay in coming to close quarters with the Germans. A little later the Germans turned away under the combined fire of our Battle Fleet and battle cruisers, nad this turning away was covered by an organized destroyer and torpedo attack.. Now the very crisis which Lord Jellicoe had foreseen in 1914 and had discussed with the Admiralty had arrived. He would not accept the risks of the torpedoes. Within five minutes he made two separate turns away in order to give the Germans poor targets for their torpedoes.
Next in order of events came Lord Beatty's famous signal. This has been variously reported, and generally wrongly. What happened was as follows : Lord Beatty did not make his signal, as has often been said, when Lord Jellicoe was turning away but when Lord Jellicoe, having evaded the torpedoes, was once again turning towards the enemy. Just as Lord Jellicoe had twice turned away, so he made two successive turns towards the enemy. The last turn towards the enemy was made at 7.41 p.m. Lord Beatty's signal appeared at 7.47 p.m., and ran : " Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We can then cut off whole of enemy's Battle Fleet." Lord Jellicoe received the signal at 7.51 p.m., and did not immediately answer it. His book gives his reason. German battle ships were visible to the West, but Lord Beatty himself was actually invisible owing to the smoke-screens and mist. Lord Jellicoe therefore went on steaming towards what he could actually see. Unfortunately, he also lost sight of the German ships to the West, and at 8.10 p.m. he ordered the SecOnd Battle Squadron to follow Lord Beatty. As bad luck would have it, the Second Battle Squadron could not see Lord Beatty's ships either, and were therefore unable to follow. In any case the story of Lord Beatty appealing in despair to Lord Jellicoe when Lord Jellicoe was turning away is a myth. If, on the other hand, Lord Jellicoe when he received the signal had rushed to the place where he believed Lord Beatty to be, he might, as Lord Beatty slid, have cut off " the whole of the enemy's Battle Fleet." This is a matter upon which opinion may always be divided. When darkness came on Lord Jellicoe refused a night action—again for the reasons which have already been stated—and he steamed South in order to get between the Germans and their base. But the Germans were much too clever to try to outsteam our ships by shaping a direct southerly course home. While Lord Jellicoe went South they got behind him and escaped. Apparently only one destroyer kept in touch with them, but her wireless messages, probably because they were jammed by the Germans, never arrived. Another fact which must be noted is that the Harwich destroyers whose services would have been invaluable were recalled by the Admiralty after starting. Whatever the reason, this was not done through want of information. Our Intelligence work was so good that the Admiralty had known a day before the battle that the German ships were coming out to fight. The Jutland papers will not abate the controversy between the two schools of naval policy. We think it only fair to say that if the naval doctrine which for fifteen years or more has been fashionable at the Admiralty is accepted as sound, then an extremely good case can be made out for Lord Jcllicoe's handling of his ships in the battle. For our part, however, we cannot agree that the fashionable school is right. We do not venture to say this as laymen who have no particular right to an opinion, but because we have the support of many seamen who are deeply versed in naval history and strategy. The old ilea—the Nelson idea—used to be that the one object of naval warfare was to destroy the enemy. The new or fashionable idea is that it is enough to guard "passage and communication," that is to say to keep the sea free for commerce, and that so long as the seas are thus kept the enemy may just as well be contained as destroyed. We cannot help regarding this doctrine as being morally bad because it teaches naval youth that tricks, evasions, and subtleties may fairly take the place of the old offensive spirit which, for metaphysical as well as for physical reasons, is an essential part of the equipment of the fighting man. All military history proves this. Those who forget it or dispute it are in great danger of losing the power to win victories. This issue of naval doctrine ought to be decided. It can be decided without any disagreeable personal controversy because, as we have seen, Lord Jellicoe did in the Battle of Jutland just what he was required to do. He put into effect a stereotyped plan. But the offensive spirit cannot long survive association with such plans as are made in offices and kept in desks.
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