AN AUTOMATIC REDISTRIBUTION BILL.

OUR readers know our views as to the immediate need for remedying the gross electoral injustice at present suffered by England, and for remedying it by an Automatic Redistribution Bill. The meeting of Parliament, and the general expectation that the Government will make a clear statement of policy in regard to the matter, render it oppor- tune to set forth the details of the scheme for an Automatic Redistribution Bill, which we proposed in outline six months ago, and in which our aim was—as Professor Dicey puts it—to " achieve a result which has been reached in France and some other countries, and create an arrangement nudes which representation might shift every ten years, as it were automatically, with the fluctuations of population." The decennial Census is the obvious basis of any such scheme, and we think that every one who will take the trouble to follow us will admit that the difficulties, senti- mental or practical, of such a scheme are very much smaller Oita; the first view of the subject. might suggest.

In the first place. we assume that population must always be the criterion of representation. It is Utopian to hope that we shall ever attain a state in which that will be mathematically true, but something near enough for all practical purposes is within our reach at this moment. The enactment of the following principles would suffice, as we think, to produce a simple and satisfactory Automatic - Redistribution Bill :—

(1) "As soon as each Census has been taken, the total popula- tion of the country shell be divided by the existing number of Members of the House of Commons, to determine the average number of inhabitants represented by one Member."

In this operation it would probably be necessary to except the nine University Members, who stand on a quite different footing from their colleagues, so that their inclusion would complicate the result ; and this recognition of their ex- ceptional status, which we shall assume, leaves it possible for their number to be increased or diminished as may seem desirable. The total population of the United Kingdom at the last Census was 41,454,621. Dividing that by 661—the number of Members now sitting for popular constituencies—we find that at the present moment there should be one Member for every 62,715 inhabitants. But it is clearly impossible to divide the country into districts of 62,715 people,—and if we did so they would not remain equal for a single day. We must allow a considerable margin for fluctuations, and we have already suggested that substantial justice would be done if we fixed the .nferior limit of a constituency at 50,000 souls. For some decades to come that limit would serve well enough ; but if it were desired to obtain a principle which would work automatically to the crack of doom, it might be thus expressed

(2) " The inferior limit of any Parliamentary constituency shall be 80 per cent. of the number of inhabitants shown at the last Census, according to Clause (1), to be re• presented by each Member."

In the present case, this limit would work out to 50,172. It makes no difference whether we use that number in our calculation or take, for convenience, the round number of 50,000. The Bill would then go on to say :-

(3) "Any constituency which, in the year following each Census, is found to have fallen below this limit, shall be thrown into the neighbouring constituency, as hereafter defined."

But constituencies do not merely decrease : many ram increase, since the population of this country is steadily increasing. Provision must, therefore, be made for the additional representation of the growing populations. The obvious way to ensure this is to add a provision that any constituency which has increased till its population is double the fixed limit of population should thereupon be divided. But it is clear that, in many cases, one constituency may have sunk a little below the limit, while its immediate geographical neighbour has risen above it. Such transfers of population are very common, and have actually taken place in about a score of cases in England alone. It would involve needless labour and disturbance to insist on uniting each pair of constituencies so situated and then redividing them. Every practical purpose would be served by the following clause:—

(4) "Any constituency which, in the 3 ear following each Census, is found to have a population of twice the limit fixed in Clause (2) shall be divided int. tw i constituencies : but if such a constituency would be formed by the union of two neighbouring constituencies under Clause (3), then the two existing constituencies shall remain un- changed, so long as the excess of population in the one continues to balance the defect in the other."

Any possible injustice which was done by an exaggerated case of such a transfer of population would be more than compensated by the freedom from disturbance which this clause would ensure. It only remains to lay down simple and adequate rules for the automatic working of this principle, so as to avoid any suspicion of gerrymandering', and to simplify the task of the Revising Commission which would go to work after each Census. As we have already suggested, the following principles seem to be natural aid sufficient:— (5) "Any constituency which is found to have fallen below the limit fixed by Clause (2) shall be united to the neighbour- ing constituency with which it has the longest conterminous boundary; but ' neighbouring constituency' shall be defined to mean a constituency in the same county, or city, or borough ; and in no case shall county boundaries be broken into, or constituencies belonging to two counties be inter- miueled." 11—‘, is to say, towns, like Bedford or Carlisle, which lose their Member will be included in the county division

which they are situated, but the Exchange division of LiverPool will be added to the division of that city which has the longest conterminous border. Lastly, it would be desirable to remove any possibility of undue favour being shown to the "predominant partner" by adding the following clause :— (6)."If the application of this principle at any time leaves Wales. Scotland, or Ireland with a smaller proportion of Members than each country is entitled to by the compari- son, of its total population with that of England, the necessary number ef Members shell be added by the preservation of threatened constituencies in order of magnitude, beginning with the largest."

We have taken the trouble to apply such a Bill to the existing constituencies as defined by the Census of 1901, and we find that it would provide a very equitable redis- tribution of seats without great disturbance and without any possibility of gerrymandering. Our readers will, no doubt, be interested in following us rapidly through the details of such a redistribution, which, we may say at once, would give as near an approach to the ideal distribution of Members as we are likely to see on this side of the Greek Kalends :— •

Taking England first, we find that the effect of the application of our principle is a net gain of 5 seats : 6 seats are lost to the boroughs, and 11 gained by the counties into which these boroughs are merged. The following list includes the 26 English boroughs which, having less than 50,000 inhabitants, would lose their separate Parliamentary existence :—Bedford, Boston, Bury St. Edmunds, Cambridge, Canterbury, Carlisle, Durham, Gloucester, Graw ham, Hereford, Kidderminster, King's Lynn, Liverpool (Exchange division), Oxford, Penryn and Falmouth, Peterborough. Rochester, &Rebury. Scarborough, Shrewsbury, Stafford, Taunton, Warwick, Whitehaven, Winchester, and Windsor. In addition. 8 two-Member constituencies, being under the limit of 100,000, lose a Member eacb,—viz., Bath, Devonport, Halifax, Ipswich, City of London, Northampton, Stockport., and York. Oa the other hand, certain boroughs have so increased as to entitle them to aeditional representation, especially in the Metropolitan area, where there would be a net gain of 12 Members :—Battersea, Clapham, Deptford, Fulham, Hackney (S.), Hammersmith, Lewisham, Wandsworth (2), West Ham (3), Woolwich Other boroughs would be entitled to re- division and extra representation, as follows :—Birkenhead, Brighton, Croydon, Gateshead, El oiley. Leeds (N.), Leeds (W ), Leicester, Middlesbrough, Newcaste-on-Tyne Oldhem, Ports- mouth, Sunderland (2). England would thus lose 34 borough Members, and gain 28, with a net loss of 6. It is when we apply our principle to the counties that England begins' to profit. There are 11 county divisions, however, in which it involves a loss of Members. These are :—Ca rubridgeshire (Newmarket division), Dorsetshire (W.), Essex (Saffron Walden), Huntimgdonshire (S.), Lincolnshire (Louth), Norfolk t S.W.), Northamptonshire (S ), Rutlandshire, Somerset (E.), Westmore- land (N.), Yorkshire (Holderuess). On the other hand, we find a gain in the following 22 county constituencies: — Cheshire (Eddesbury), Essex (Walthamstow 2, Rumford 3), Kent (Dart- fi ird), Lanceshire (Blackpool, Clitheroe, Prest wich, Bootle), Middlesex (Enfield, Tottenham, ECirnsey, Harrow 2, Ealing), Northumberland (Tyneside), Staffordshire (Handsworth), Surrey ( Kingston), Yorkshire ( Barnsley, Osgoldscross). Many boroughs, like Chester, Darlington, and Worcester, and many county divisions are saved by the operation of Clause (4).

We se then, that the application of the proposed principle would lead to the loss of 34 borough and 11 county Members in England, and the gain of 28 borough and 22 county Members, with a net gain to the " predominant partner" of 5 Members.

The case of Wales is much simpler. Six borough constitu- encies now existing would lapse into their respective counties,— the Carmarthen, Carnarvon, Denbigh, Flint, M. ntgomery, and Pembroke groups of boroughs. On the other hand, the Cardiff Boroughs would be redivided into three constituencies. Radnor- shire would merge into Brecknockshire; while the East and South divisions of Glemorganshire would each be redivided into two conete uenciee.

This leaves Wales with a gain of 2 county and 2 borough Members; and a loss of 1 county and 6 borough Members, or a net loss of 3 Members.

The application of the Bill to Scotland is chiefly marked by the transfer of repre-eatation from the smaller towns to the larger ones, and from the remote Country to the dense population that clusters round 01 isgow. Seven groups- of boroughs—Dumfries, Elgin, liawick, Inverness, Kirkcaldy, St. Andrews, and Wick— and one town—Perth—sink into thee" respective counties, while Berwickshire has to be merged with Haddingtonshire and Caithness with Sutherland. On . the other hand, Dundee and Edinburgh each gain one Member, and. Glasgow two, while Lanai ksbire gains no less than four, in the Govan, Partick, Nurth- East, and North-West divisions. Thus we have in Scotland a loss of 8 barough and 2 county seats, balanced by a gain of 4 borough and 4 county seats, or a net loss of 2 Members. The application of our principle to Ireland alone remains to be

examined. In the province of. Leinster one borough disappears,— that of Kilkenny, whose 12,924 inhabitants at present exercise as much Parliamentary influence as the 179,832 of Wandsworth. Kildare, Kilkenny, King's County, Longford, Louth, Meath, Queen's County, Westmeath, and Wicklow each lose one of their two Members, and are reduced to single Member constitu- encies. Leinster, then, loses 1 borough and 9 county Members. In Munster a still cleaner sweep is made by our Automatic Redistribution Bill. Cork City loses one of its two Mem- bers, and Limerick and Waterford are both merged in the counties. North and North-East Cork, Mid end East Cork are united as two single-Member constituencies, while West, South, and South-East Cork are thrown together and redivided, so that the county returns four Members in place of seven. Kerry County loses two Members by the union of the North and West and the South and East divisions. Limerick is saved by the inclusion of Limerick City. Tipperary is similarly reduced from four to two Members, and Waterford from two to one, with Waterford City thrown in. In all Munster loses 3 borough and 8 county Members. In Ulster, Belf-st (E.) is entitled to one extra Member, but Newry Town and Londonderry ity dis.ppear from the list of Peril •mentary boroughs. Antrim, Armagh, and Cavan lose one Member each, Donegal two, Fermanagh and Monaghan one each, and Tyrone two. The net result for Ulster is a loss if 1 borough and 9 county M. tubers. In Con- naught, Galway Town disappears, while Galway, Leitrim, and siligo Counties lose one Member each, with a resulting loss of 1 borough and 3 county Members.

For the whole of Ireland, then, we have a net loss of 6 borough and 29 county Members, or 35 in all. The following table summarises the results thus far obtained

Borough Members.

Loss. Gain.

County Members., Loss. Gain.

England 34 ... 23 ... 11 ... 22—Net gain... IS Wales 6 ... 2 ... 1 ... 2—Not loss ... 3 Scotland 8 ... 4 ... 2 ... 4—Net loss ,.. 2 Ireland 7 ... 1 ... 29 ...- 0—Net loss ... 35 Total 55.,.35..,43...23 Net loss 20 15 Total loss 35

It remains to analyse the results thus obtained, which we shall do very briefly. In the first place, it will be seen that the total number of Members is decreased from 670 to 635. We will only remind the reader that there is no special sanctity in a number which has been changed twice within the last century, and that the House bf Commons is confessedly congested at present. Let us see how far this change would affect the proportion of the representation of each country to its population. Excluding the University Members, we see that England would have 465 Members instead of 460, Wales 27 instead of 30, Scotland 68 instead of 70, and Ireland 66 instead of 101. Then, applying Clause (6), we see that the only country which has less than its fair share of Members, as compared with England, is Ireland. A simple caleela- tion shows that two additional Members will bring up the Irish representation to the percentage (10'8 per cent.) based on po ulation. Accordingly, Cork City and Cavan County would each regain the two. Members that they now send to Westminster. We may now draw up the following percentage table of the representation of each country, in which it will be understood that by " ideal " representation we mean that which is exactly proportional to population

Present. itlirRES ENTAT1ON. Proposed. Ideal.

England

695% ... 74%

74-3% Wales

4'5%

... 4 3% ...

41

Ireland 15.3% ... 10.8% 10.8 Scotland 10.6% ... 10 b% 10'32

We think that the remarkable agreement of the figures obtained by our scheme with the ideal percentages will strike every reader. We have omitted various details which might still improve the scheme, — e.g., if provision were made, for the sake of historical con- tinuity, that no county should ever be deprived of independent tepresentation, as happens under • this scheme to Rutland, Radnor, Caithness, and Berwick- shire. But without going further into detail at present, we think that we have said enough to show every thoughtful politician not only the desirability, but the extreme practical simplicity of attaining such a, reform in our electoral system as shall' always secure a reasonable agreement between population and representation in the United Kingdom. Remember that after our automatic scheme had been once put into operation the subsequent applications would cause far less disturbance. Even on the first application, only 96 constituencies disappear, of which 63 are replaced by new ones.

If, then, Parliament were to enact the principles of an

automatic scheme of the kind we have suggested above— doubtless it could in its wisdom greatly improve on our draft—there would be no need for endless discussion of details. A Commission of three lawyers armed with the Census returns could apply the Act without the possibility of any gerrymandering in 'favour of either party.