RETREAT TO MOSCOW
By G. B. THOMAS
THE refusal of the Soviet Government to take part in the Con- ference of European Economic Co-operation which took place in Paris earlier this month makes it clear that the Kremlin has now
fallen back upon its pre-war policy of non-co-operation with the Western World. There is, of course, something more in this policy than the mere doctrine of Communist purity. It is true that it is clothed in Communist terminology and is guided largely by con- siderations of party tactics, but it is also inspired by the old Slav suspicions of the Western world, suspicions that are endemic in Russian history. It is this baffling mixture of Communist principles with ancient Slav prejudices that makes it so difficult to forecast the future of Soviet foreign policy with any accuracy.
Curiously enough, rumours have been in circulation for some time that Soviet foreign policy was moving in the opposite direction, towards closer co-operation with the West, and that M. Molotov's notorious negatives would soon give place to an occasional and very welcome affirmative. His willingness to attend the three-power conference in Paris late in June lent colour to this view. So some European Governments were obviously surprised and disconcerted when M. Molotov finally broke away from this conference. We now know that it was not only the Western Governments that were surprised ; some of the Governments of Eastern Europe were also caught off their guard. When Polish Cabinet Ministers met members of the Czechoslovak Government in Prague late in June they agreed among themselves that it was in their interest to take part in any arrangements that might be made for working out the Marshall programme. But on their return to Warsaw the news from Moscow led the Poles to change their minds. Fortunately for their prestige they had not committed themselves in public as the Czechs had done. So an ignominious retreat, in full view of the gallery, was not forced upon them as it was forced upon the Czechs.
The Yugoslays were also very interested in the Marshall pro- gramme, and their Ambassador in Paris told M. Bidault that his Government wished to be a.:sociated with it. It was not until some ten days later that M. Sitnic, tne Yugoslav Foreign Minister, found it expedient to discuss the Marshall speech in studiously offensive terms when he received the French and British Ambassadors for a joint interview. So the Soviet Government's decision to slam the door was obviously a very sudden one, taken in the face of a sudden and unexpected threat. I have already explained (in The Spectator of July 18th, 1947, p. 71) the nature of this threat—the threat to the Soviet economic system in Eastern Europe—and I do not want to discuss it here. What I wish to examine is the Kremlin's return to its policy of non-co-operation. There have been many signs during the past year or so that the Kremlin was moving in that direction. What the Marshall speech has done has been to bring the whole thing out into the open and to precipitate events.
At home the ground has been prepared for a considerable time. All the patriotic propaganda of the war years has been switched off. The whole emphasis now is upon the lonely Socialist State fighting for survival in a world of capitalists. The generals whose pictures used to figure so prominently on hoardings, and who were so often photographed with such well-known members of the Politbureau as Molotov, Beria and Mikoyan as if they were their equals, have now been pushed into the background. When the decorations were put up for the May Day celebrations in Moscow this year there were plenty of pictures of Stalin and Molotov and the other senior party members, but none of the generals whose names were once house- hold words. The Politbureau itself—the supreme organ of executive authority—does not include a single soldier of consequence, in spite of the brilliant achievements of the Red Army during the war. It is true that its membership includes Marshal Voroshilov. But his reputation as a soldier is insignificant ; he held no important command during the war ; and he is there as Stalin's friend rather than as a Marshal. After all, he drove Stalin's car in those uncertain days when the purge was on—in those days when Stalin trusted
no one except a small inner ring of intimate friends. There is another Marshal in the Politbureau—Bulganin, the Minister of Defence—but he is not a soldier, although he has a military title. He is among the most influential of party members.
The whole propaganda machine, in short, is now concentrating upon party purity, and has little time for the great military heroes of the patriotic war. There are regular appeals to party discipline; and reminders to the honest Bolshevik of the important responsi- bilities that rest upon his shoulders. The impression that all this makes upon the observer is that the Soviet leaders are going back to fundamental party principles. The same signs can be seen in, the Soviet Government's relations with the outside world. Since the Potsdam Agreement in 1945 they have become increasingly strained.
There is an evident will to non-co-operation. Communist disruptive tactics, which apparently ceased when Stalin so dramatically dis- solved the Comintern as a concession to President Roosevelt, have been resumed. Leading officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs who have been much in contact with foreigners, and who had suc- ceeded in establishing friendly relations with members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, have been removed from office.
Litvinov went some time ago on the ground of age. Maisky has faded from view without any ostensible reason. A short time ago Dekanozov was relieved from office on the grounds of ill-health. He was the last of that circle of Deputy Foreign Ministers who had succeeded in maintaining fairly good contacts with foreign friends. Apart from Vishinsky, who remains in office as Molotov's principal assistant, all the Deputy Foreign Ministers are now new men with no friends among the diplomatic colony.
Most striking of all is the decision of the party leaders to make an all-out attack upon Socialist leaders in Europe. It is clear that the Kremlin has abandoned the tactics of co-operation with the
Socialist Party—or at least with what Moscow calls the Right wing of the Socialist Party—and is now openly bent upon its destruction.
An article published by Pravda early in June, and later broadcast in a number of languages by Moscow Radio, makes that quite clear. The Executive Committee of the Labour Party is said to be at " the centre of a separatist activity which aims at splitting the working-class movement " and to be moving " towards an open struggle against the party of the working class—the Communist Party." Among the Socialist leaders singled out for attack are Professor Laski in the United Kingdom, Leon Blum in France, de Brouckere in Belgium, Tranmael in Norway, the followers of the late Stauning in Denmark, Schumacher in Germany and Saragat in Italy. " In a number of countries," says Pravda, " the Right-wing Social Democrats have already inflicted grievous damage to the cause of the Labour classes and democracy."
This article brings us back to the old familiar ground—right back to the days when Stalin was fighting the Right deviationists in the Communist Party. The emphasis then was perhaps a little different— he was excommunicating these members of the Communist Party who were flirting with the Socialists—but the principle was the same. Speaking on October 19th, 1928, he said: " A victory of the Right deviation in the Communist Party in capitalist countries would mean the ideological collapse of the Communist Parties and an enormous accession of strength to Social Democracy. And what does an enormous accession of strength to Social Democracy mean ? It means the strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, for Social Democracy is the main prop of capitalism in the working class. Hence a victory of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties in capitalist countries would add to the conditions necessary for the preservation of capitalism." The emphasis, I repeat, is a little different, but the aim is the same. What is happening today is that all the memory of three-Power co-operation in the war is being systematically wiped out, at home as well as abroad, and Communist principles mixed with Slav suspicions are again in the ascendant— regardless of consequences.
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