CZECH CHOICE
By MARGOT WOOD
CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S recent acceptance of the Anglo-French invitation to Paris to discuss the Marshall plan .was greeted with such relief, and one might almost say pleasure, by the West, that her ultimate refusal came as an even more disappointing blow than would otherwise have been the case. Up to this point, in spite of her record at U.N.O., English Socialists and progressives still persisted in regarding Czechoslovakia as one of the democratic nations—a country that really believed in international co-operation, vetoless discussion of mutual problems ; a small country, but an independent one, whose foreign policy could not be dictated by an outside people. True, Czechoslovakia has never been known to vote against the Soviet Union in the United Nations, even on ques- tions of procedure ; true, she has recently expelled the Daily Mail correspondent from Prague in a manner very reminiscent of the Governments east of democracy ; true, the picture of Stalin stands next to that of Benes in banks, board-rooms and factories throughout the country ; but still we clung to the idea that any difference we had with Czechoslovakia was due to her unfortunate geographical position, memories of our behaviour at the time of Munich and her feeling of sentimental kinship with her Russian neighbour.
Since the Marshall conference, however, public opinion seems to have swung to the opposite extreme. We re-echo Mr. Bevin's words when he says that the door is still open, but the echo has a thin and reedy note. We do not, in fact, believe that the Czechs will do anything without the full approval of the Soviet Union. Instructions that the Czech delegates in Paris should buy their return tickets came from Moscow, says the average man, and instructions will continue to come from Moscow. What people forget, however, is that the instructions came from the Czech Prime Minister, Gottwald, who happened to be in Moscow at the time. This fact is basic to the understanding of Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union at the present time. Mr. Gottwald is both Prime Minister and leader of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. He is Prime Minister because he is head of the party which gained 4o per cent. of the votes of the Czech people in a perfectly free election after the liberation in 1945. His cabinet has been formed by a coalition of the four parties which were adjudged to have kept a clean record under the German occupation, and ministerial posts have been allotted on the basis of the numerical strength of each. There are, naturally, great differences between the Czech National Socialists, the Catholics and the Communists, but these are mainly confined to domestic affairs, and are usually ironed out in a spirit of give and take.
In the sphere of foreign policy, however, the differences between the parties are not so great. This state of affairs has been brought about by a gradual acceptance among all parties of the attitude of the Communist Party. When I left Prague two weeks ago, very few people in Government circles considered that the Czechs would be coming to Paris, not because the Russians had slammed the door upon East-West co-operation, but because they quite genuinely and independently did not think that any good could come out of Washington. My impression, based simply on local observation, was that they went to Paris to see what it was all about, and when they discovered that help from America would be contingent upon mutual planning among the European nations, and the possible infringement of national sovereignty in the process, they simply were not interested. There was no need for the Russians to interfere. The Czechs were already convinced. It seems to me that we shall get along much better with our friends (or our enemies for that matter) in Prague if we admit the fact that they form their foreign policy themselves without interference from Russia, rather than assuming the opposite. We can at least discuss the matter with a country we know to be in disagreement with our views, but dis- cussion with an opponent who we are convinced really agrees with us is almost impossible. One can but take refuge in tactful pauses.
The most interesting question is, however : By what means have the Czech people reached this position of almost complete accord with the Soviet Union? The tie is not a racial one, although the phrase " Slav brotherhood " is heard frequently in public speeches. The Czechs are methodical and tidy people, impregnated with the virtues and the vices of sturdy peasants and petty officials. They do not have much in common with the gay and emotional Slays. President Benes, indeed, made a recent speech in which he pleaded with his brother Czechs to adopt " calm, critical and dispassionate Slavhood " as their mental attitude. Most people have never heard of calm and critical Sian, but we may sympathise all the same with Benes in his attempt to reconcile East and West. Emotional ties with Russia there certainly are. Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Red Army, and the people will never forget it. The Right wing will also never forget it, since they claim that the presence of the Red Army, and the enthusiasm engendered by their presence, was largely responsible for the success of the Communists in the elections. Be that as it may, it was Malinovsky and Koniev's men who received the kisses, cheers and the garlands of flowers. The Prague Communist Party organised the taking of the city from the Germans in the " Revolu- tion " of May 5th-10th, from which all recent Czech history is dated, and the liberation was completed in an atmosphere of Left- wing rejoicing. Relations since that time between the two countries have been conducted with a smoothness which is in striking contrast with Czech relations with the United States. There has been a certain amount of grumbling over the low quality of the cotton and iron ore which the Soviet Union sent to Czechoslovakia, but it never reached much more than an undertone. The national Press is extra- ordinarily free in comparison with other Central and East European countries, but criticism of Russia seldom appears.
This is due to a self-denying ordinance on the part of the editors. Even the most conservative or non-political of them are convinced of the vital nature of the Russo-Czech military alliance. They would not do anything which might endanger relations between the two countries. They still remember Munich with great bitterness, and are not any more convinced now than then that we would come to their aid in the case of a struggle between East and West. The possibility of such a. struggle is talked of freely in Czechoslovakia, with the recognition that, whatever the outcome, their own small country would be engulfed in destruction. But whereas we in Eng- land talk of the war in terms of Russia and America, the Czechs still think of Germany as the main enemy. They have expelled their own minority of 3,000,000 Germans, but the frontiers still join. This hatred and fear of the Germans is probably the strongest motive behind the alliance between the Russians and the Czechs. They are determined that they will never again be controlled by.Gauleiters, new or old style. And they are convinced that America and Great Britain, in that order, are bent on the reconstruction of Germany, old style, complete with reactionary capitalists aid feudal landlords. The Marshall plan is just one more step in that direction. There is very little that we can say to disabuse them, since all attempts to improve the frightful condition of Germany at the moment seem to them part of a sinister plot, aimed especially at Czechoslovakia.
We shall have to try to understand this feeling if we are to get on with the Czechs. We have forgotten much of the horror of the war in this country, but our arms do not bear the neatly tattooed numbers of the concentration camps, nor were our relations shot in the streets. We were bombed from the air, but this experience, though more lethal, does not seem to eat into a nation's self-respect to the same extent as seven years of curfew and petty humiliation. At the same time the .Czechs from their side must recognise that the reconstruction of Germany is an economic and political necessity for Europe, and that sooner or later they will have to recover from their phobia and get on with their neighbour to the West. We for our part shall have to convince them, and still more important, their Eastern Ally, that American dollars do not mean political reaction and economic instability, and that co-operation with the West may result in the triumph, not the defeat, of the ideals which They cherish.
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