25 JUNE 1904, Page 29

The arguments used in your comments have been over and

over again exploded by more able pens than mine. If they have not been entirely demolished, it is because of the great reluctance with which professional soldiers of all " schools ' approach the uncongenial task of adversely criticising their "Auxiliaries." We have now left the South African muddle far enough behind to justify plain speaking, an unemotional survey.

I have a "Little Book on Logic." It tells me (1) that the basis of all correct reasoning consists in substituting like things for like ; (2) that there are several kinds of fallacies, one being that of wrongly arguing from a special case to a general law; (3) that experimentation is superior to mere observation. (I may add, as a corollary, that trained observation is superior to untrained.) Now, to infer that because some five hundred Yeomen of a corps d'aite (who were not Volunteers) made a resistance at Lindley which compares favourably with that made in even more trying circumstances by a Regular battalion (who were not Volunteers) at Nicholson's Nek, therefore the Auxiliaries of Great Britain are a valuable military asset, is to reason incor- rectly, according to my "Little Book.'

Secondly, to infer that because some thousands of picked Volunteers proceeded, after some preliminary training in home depots, by single companies to South Africa, where, after a further perio4 of training and probation, they were attached to Regular units in the field; and because in these circumstances they performed with credit the comparatively easy tasks allotted them in a w.ar of desultory skirmishes, therefore the Auxiliaries of Great Britain might usefully be employed by complete units in the More serious operations of war, is to argue fallaciously, according to my "Little Book." Thirdly, the "large amount of military opinion" which you say is not the best, and which you would pass over in favour of lay prejudice, has been formulated by experimentation under the con- ditions of the battlefield, and by experience of both Regular and Auxiliary troops in peace and war. The lay prejudice is the result of untutored observation from a distance.

But no responsible school of military opinion is actuated by personal animus against Auxiliaries qua Auxiliaries. The desire of the school you mention is rather to utilise the energies of the best officers and men of our Auxiliary Forces in an organisation more suited to the present and probable future needs of the State, in an organisation more controllable, more "efficient," and capable of a more extended employment. The soldiers of this sehool are perhaps the last to regard pipeelaying of belts and In reply to the question, If the Auxiliaries are as useless as he says, why did they not do much worse in the war F" the cynic might observe, with some truth, "Because they were not pro- vided with opportunities." But the observation would be both

malicious and unjust. I would rather explain as follows :— •

(a) As regards those Auxiliaries who were attached in small groups to Regular units, in proportions varying from one to eight to one to ten (Volunteer service companies, &c.) Picked from an Auxiliary corps, or from several Auxiliary corps, distributed amongst Regular units, under the direct orders of Regular officers, subjected to the same discipline as the Regular soldiers around them, breathing the atmosphere of Regular organisation, forethought, and method, they lost their worthless Auxiliary characteristics while developing their best, became Regular soldiers in all but name, and made an addition of the greatest possible military value.

(b) As regards those Auxiliaries who went out as complete units under their own officers,—e.g., Militia battalions, Yeomanry, the C.I.V., the Elswick Battery, &c. The experiment was not a success. The units that did best were recruited from exceptional strata, and contained an important Regular element. The majority were not highly tested, probably because it was not advisable to allow a severe test.

(c) As regards the Colonial and other Irregulars. The best could scarcely have done better, the worst could not have done worse; but their services were valuable mainly owing to the peculiar conditions of the campaign, conditions which do not enter into our calculations when pondering the question of the employment of our Auxiliary Forces in serious war.

Just one word more. It is, I know, usual for some Auxiliary officers to deny that the Volunteer service companies were "picked men." This denial is valueless, for the men were picked, being of "military age," whereas the bulk of the Volunteers are not of that age, and "passed the doctor," whereas the bulk of our present Volunteers could not survive that test. And it is a matter of common experience that the best war soldier is also the best peace soldier. "Tommy Atkins," who, in the barrack-room jargon you quote, " soldiers ' best, will also fight beat. It is a matter of psychology.

I must ask you to print this letter also, if possible, because our controversy is incomplete without it.

—I am, Sir, &c., ADJUTANT, VOLUNTEER ARTILLERY.

[Our correspondent begs the question. Once more we assert that, if the Auxiliaries were worthless, they could not have produced, either directly or indirectly—the Yeomanry were Auxiliaries raised ad hoc—some hundred thousand men, who, even on our correspondent's own admission, did not do badly. Our correspondent who signs himself " Semis " gives some figures which "Adjutant, Volunteer Artillery," should ponder before be again dubs the Auxiliaries as worthless. During the war there were 225 surrenders by British troops to the Boers. Sixty-six of these surrenders were made by South African Irregulars, 28 by Auxiliaries at home and oversea Colonials, 131 by Regular British troops. These figures show that the fighting value and pluck are by no means all on the side of the Regulars. But though we hold it a public duty to combat the plans of those who desire to do away with the Auxiliaries, we by no means hold that the Auxiliaries are incapable of improvement. On the contrary, we desire very strongly to see them improved instead of being destroyed. The Auxiliaries are not worthless because they, like the Regulars, might by a little care and patience be greatly improved.—ED. Spectator.] pro TEE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."]