25 MARCH 1854, Page 11

TOPICS OF TH

"LA PAROLE D'ITN GENTILHOM

ness, as to have deluded himself into the opinion that 11610 esta- fails in his endeavour and becomes the victim of his own craft. blished an understanding with the English Government, wAlch, if " MERE is never one dupe but there are twO4VrIee4ii441411.iie the Eniperor of Russia and the English Government furnish an instance, of the exception to this rule, in a case where the duper authors of Guesses at Truth ; tersely indicating the unwisdom of duplicity. The secret and confidential communications between The Emperor Nicholas was so blinded by his own selfish eager- IMPERIAL FERSIO . - less ,complete 'than he wished to make it, was yet sufficiently ample to encourage him to pursue his ends without fear of ob- struction. He clld so, and advanced by degrees through every gradation of evasidn, concealment, and absolute falsehood, into a position from which he could not recede without a total loss of personal and political dignity, and in which he cannot remain without-an absolute certainty of mi,litary defeat and political de- gradation: The annals of intrigue furnish no more striking warn- ing.

The policy of Russia, as revealed by the confidential communi- cations, was to form a secret alliance with England for the nefa- rious object of partitioning the territories of a mutual ally. The pretence was, the imminent dissolution of the empire of that ally from natural and unavoidable causes, and the certainty that the peace of Europe would be endangered by such dissolution, unless a system of rearrangement were previously agreed upon. What laid bare the hollowness of the pretence was the pertinacity with which the event wished for was predicted in opposition to the con- trary belief of the English Governmeut,, and of the Emperor's own most able and experienced servant that Chancellor Nesselrode. "Ah !" he says, in answer to Sir Hamilton Seymour's representa- tion that the fall of Turkey was rendered probable by nothing but the Emperor's own anticipation of the event—" that is what the Chancellor is always saying to me : but I tell you it will happen." Such prophecies, uttered by those who have the power and the interest to accomplish them, are the surest indications of foregone conclusions. We should tremble for the fate of the man whose physician was his heir, if at every slight ailment the said physician publicly exaggerated the symptoms, and gave his private opinion that the patient would suddenly die upon his hands and perplex him with the inheritance.

If these considerations fail to convince any admirers of the Em- peror Nicholas that his pretence was hollow, they will hardly re- sist that conclusion when they consider that the means he proposed to secure the peace of Europe were exactly those most certain to bring the Great Powers into collision. Assuming that a positive under- standing had been effected between Austria and Russia,—a point we are not bound to believe on the word of Nicholas, but which will demand explanation from Austria,—could any more certain method of provoking war have been devised, than contemptuously to ex- clude France and Prussia from an arrangement in which the former power at least was as deeply interested as either Russia, Austria, or England ? Those who look upon Nicholas of Russia as one of the ablest statesmen of Europe will be puzzled to reconcile with his ability or his honesty a proposition having such inevitable con- sequences, urged for a purpose diametrically opposed to those con- sequences. The probability is, that the object of the proposition was to procure a consent from England, which might hereafter, according to circumstances, have been violated in the interest of Russian aggrandizement, or disclosed to the other Powers to pro- duce exasperation against England as a consenting party to an en- gagement that would have been at once an insult and a breach of faith to all the parties that signed the sextuple treaty of 1841: But if the substance of the Russian policy was nefarious, the sense of that nefariousness is heightened by the manner in which it was proposed. The negative character given to the arrange- ments, belied as it was by the offer of Egypt and Candia to Eng- land, and the suggestion that the Principalities with Bulgaria and Servia should be constituted under Russian protection—the jocose and _playful style in which the demise of the Ottoman Porte was handled—the studied contempt for France—above all, the super- fluity of protestations of regard for the Sultan and desire to main- tain the integrity of Turkey—the nauseous reiteration of personal protestations of the honour of a sovereign and a gentleman,—all these details concur to produce an impression of disgust which has been seldom equalled by the diplomatic proceedings of high per- sonages, and for a perfect parallel to which we must seek in the effect produced upon honest men if by chance they are thrown into the society of fashionable swindlers, gamesters, and turfites. Yet we would by no means charge the Emperor of Russia with being consciously a scoundrel and a hypocrite. There is a lower depth, a gloomier circle of the Inferno, to which we should assign his place,—that in which no man can be consciously a scoundrel, because he is not conscious of the difference between right and wrong ; in which no man can be a hypocrite, because honour and honesty are to him such unrealities that he cannot be said to as- sume them. The Emperor appears to use the words gentleman and honour as paraphernalia of his rank, as he would wear his orders of knighthood ; they have no meaning in his mere phrases de convenance—serve to carry on the current business of politics, but have no representative value as symbols of qualities of soul, as guarantees for conduct or intention. The fact that it is

through the Emperor's own challenge that these remarkable docu- ments have been given to the world seems to bear out an impression of the true eharaoter of his immorality. No man would have chal- lenged his own condemnation, or have procured a triumphant verdict of universal approval for those he was anxious to lower and convict of treachery. It must be that he does not understand the meaning of the high-sounding phrases he perpetually uses— that moral distinctions have no force for his mind—that be does

• not know the force they have for other minds. And even in the correspondence published previously, we find frequent reason to conclude that neither the Emperor nor his Chancellor have any sense of the mixture of amazement, ridicule, and indignation, that the reiteration of statements repeatedly overthrown by the evi- dence of facts is calculated to produce in the minds of the civilized inhabitants of Western Europe, whatever their form of government and religion may be. The fact is, that we have here the most irresistible demonstration that Russian civilization is varnished barbarism; that the moral sentiment common to civilized Europe, and on which its essential unity rests, is not shared by Russia. It is this fact, more than anything merely political, which explains and justifies the alarm with which civilized Europe has for so long time past looked upon the advance or suspected advance of Russia in power and influence. It is this fact which, far beyond anything merely political, explains and justifies the enthusiasm with which a decisive conflict with Russia is welcomed by nearly all in Eng- land, with the exception of a few factious and self-seeking traders in polities. But if Russia's part in this correspondence is discreditable at once to the ability and honesty of her Sovereign, on the other hand the Sovereign and Government of our own country must rise higher in the estimation not of England only, but of the whole world. We at home cannot pretend to be surprised or elated at discovering in our Queen and her Government sufficient wisdom or sufficient highmindedness to reject temptation which had in them little that was either practicable or desirable in our position ; but other countries have been in the habit of attributing to us ambitious designs, and have not uniformly given credit to the scrupulous disinterestedness of our statesmen. These disclosures cannot fail to convince the other Powers of Europe that England has no such designs, and that secret intrigue is not her method of working out her aims. On the cordiality and permanence of our relations with France in particular we should augur the happiest influence from these disclosures; and while we are amazed at the folly of the Emperor of Russia in thus aiding to draw closer the bonds of friendship between his adversaries, we cannot but rejoice at the opportunity thus afforded us, without self-display or ostentatious pretence, of proving that we are deserving of con- fidence from our neighbours over the Channel. That such will be the effect of the publication on foreign powers, we have not a moment's doubt. What will be the effect on our factions at home ? Will they avail themselves of this additional information to retract, or rather to drive home, the chaige of " connivance or credulity" against Lord Aberdeen and his Government? Will they at once avow that no treaty, convention, or diplomatic act, could have conveyed more reliable assurances of the Emperor of Russia's desire to main- tain the integrity of Turkey, than were conveyed by his solemn per- sonal pledge, accompanied by the promise to communicate any change of intention to the English Government before acting on it ? or will they maintain that the Emperor gave fair warning of his in- tention to make war upon Turkey if his demands were not satis- fied, and simply carried out his avowed intentions ? Experience does not warrant us in assuming that they will refrain from the latter course ; and in case such should be their line, we take the opportunity of stating the facts truly by anticipation. The Em- peror did threaten to make war on Turkey if his demands for satisfaction in regard to the Holy Buildings dispute were refused. Perhaps he had the right to do so, in the very imperfect state of international law existing in Europe. The English Government, while remonstrating against the exercise of this extreme right under such ludicrously slight provocation, urged the settlement of the Holy Buildings question ; and, mainly by the efforts of the English Ambassador at Constantinople, it was settled. Therefore the threat of the Emperor of Russia was thenceforth as if it had not been uttered. What the English Government had no reason for expecting was, that the Emperor of Russia would invade Tur- key on a new and totally distinct though related ground. In doing so, he violated his solemnly pledged word. But long before that event took place, the English Government had begur both to speak and act in accordance with the changed circumstances. Confidence lasted no longer than the promises on which that confi- dence was founded, though diplomatic politeness prevailed, in ac- cordance with a usage perhaps more honoured in the breach than in the observance. These are the facts which faction may twist and turn, but will not alter.

But whatever Foreign Powers may think of us—whatever the Hebrew leader of the Derbyites, without a country, and therefore without national sentiments, may utter in his blind passion for annoying the Ministers who displaced him from office—one result worth whole campaigns must follow this unlooked-for publication. All the Powers will be made aware of the unscrupulousness and fraud of Russian policy; henceforth Russia must cease to sway the councils of Northern Europe. Alone and detected, she must gain her ends by force, or she must abandon them. As she will not tolerate a power at Constantinople strong enough to keep her in check, it must be the definite and clearly-avowed purpose of the war to constitute such a power in the South-east of Europe.

The force requisite for this purpose must be sought by the arms of the allies ; the solution of the difficult problem that will remain we commend at once to the forethought and ability, and, we will add, the disinterestedness, of English and French statesmen.