The Cabinet's difficulties are obvious, and entitle it to some
sympathy. Talks with Italy have been entered on, and they are understood to be making progress. If there is really a reasonable prospect of their ending in an agreement which would secure to us certain essentials—in particular the complete and early removal from all Spanish territory of Italian troops, Italian aeroplanes and Italian guns—then it might be folly to imperil them at this moment by public declarations on the matters under discussion. But there is considerable reason to believe that an old and familiar technique is being invoked, and that while the discussions proceed—and perhaps are being protracted with intention— attacks on Catalonia, supported by fresh troops and munitions from Italy and fresh aeroplanes from Germany, are being intensified with a view to finishing the war in Spain before the talks in Rome result in anything. On that, and other matters, the Government must be presumed to possess more and better information than the average citizen. It must be assumed that it has formed some opinion as to whether Signor Mussolini in his secret heart desires ultimately to lean towards London or towards Berlin, if he has to choose. Germany and Italy have announced that they will not tolerate a Bolshevist Spain. We cannot retort simply that we will not tolerate a Fascist Spain, for if Spaniards genuinely desire to go Fascist, that is their affair. But we can, and should, say that we will not tolerate a Fascist Spain created and sustained by foreign arms. We can, and should, in the last resort declare non-intervention dead and lift all pro- hibitions on the export of arms to Republican Spain.
