25 NOVEMBER 1854, Page 11

— TOPICS OF THE DAY

WIFE THE WAR MUST GO ON.

Fonestoer among the motives which should deter powerful states from taking up arms against each other on slight pretences, is the impossibility of either party receding when once committed to hos- tile measures. The great resources, the 'lofty ambition, the die- tinguishedhistory, implied in the position of an European power of first rank, are forces which effectually prevent such a power from acknowledging itself easily 'beaten; and the passions of a nation once roused to the fighting point will as effectually prevent it from owning itself in the wrong. It is, however, only on one of these convictions that the restoration of peace between communities, once broken, can be founded. The Emperor of Russia forgot, or cared not for this, when he ordered his armies to cross the ?rah. The English and French Governments were neither forgetful nor care- less of it, when they replied to a forcible seizure of territory by ex- postulation and measures of distant precaution merely ; when they allowed nearly a twelvemonth to pass without taking up the gage of defiance so recklessly thrown down in their faces ; when, finally, they offered to condone the offence provided the offender simply withdrew. It is very probable that the Russian. Emperor trusted too much to the strength of this wise reluctance to let loose upon Europe the miseries of war; quite certain that he would now em- brace withthe utmost satisfaction terms far more stringent thanthose proposed to him before the actual declaration of war; not at all impro- bable that there may be good foundation for the recent newspaper ru- mours ofvagne offers on his part to treat upon the basis of the "four points. But 'the principle we have asserted stands in the way of any successful negotiation at present. The issue is no longer of the interpretation of this or that treaty, originally wrung by force from a prostrate peoplee it is no longer a question under what form or phrase Tinley. is to be guarded against undue dicta- tion from her powerful neighbour; no longer a question what right Russia has in the territories of a sovereign whose relations to his neighbours are of the 'utmost importance to the rest of Eu- rope. All these subjects of debate were the mere technicalities under which a greater question was masked, and under which it might have lain masked for years but for Russia's too eager ma- station of her designs. The mask has fallen, and no man can fail to read the problem that was beneath it, and which Western Europe puts to herself in the most intelligible language when she asks whether Russia is to be allowed by force and by intrigue, by violence and by stealth, so to swell her resources by the addition of territory after territory, that the will shortly become a match, or more than a match, for the whole of the rest of Europe combined. France and England are answering the question at Sebastopol; and before that answer shall be translated into an accomplished fact, there can be no peace, because there can be no security for its continuance. The only security that Russia could voluntarily give would be by consenting to evacuate the Crimea and to raze Sebastopol to the ground and even the Peace Society would be scarcely sanguine enough to sug- gest such a proceeding as likely, or rash enough to venture as a depetation to St. Petersburg for the purpose of urging it upon the Imperial owner of the " mild blue eyes."

The war must continue as a necessary consequence of antecedent acts which are irrevocable—of circumstances which, having ex- isted, must be followed by results in conformity with them. The two parties in conflict must find out which is to be henceforth master. And Sebastopol must fall, not only 'because it is the sym- bol and instrument of that Russian aggression which it is the spe- cific object of the war to check—not only because it stands a per- petual menace to Constantinople and therefore to Europe, and the war has been formally undertaken by the Allies to free Constanti- nople and Europe from perpetual menace—hut still more because on its capture and destruction the whole question of the military power of the contending parties is staked. If Russia retain Sebas- topol, henceforth Europe not only cannot prevent Russian conquest of Turkey, except at the expense of a permanent occupation of the Black Sea by a superior naval force, if even that could be effectual, but Russia will have establithedlier superiority in mili- tary power to the utmost force the most fortunate combination has been able to bring against her. True, Austria lends no active as- sistance; true, Prussia remains a dreamy spectator of events that are modifying the fate of Western. civilization ; true, the Baltic Powers are afraid to stir, or uninterested in the great drama. But who is mad enough to suppose—at least if recent experience is to

'de speculation—that these Powers will rush to the aid of a ailing cause P " Tictrix cause Diis &alit, sea. victa Catoni" is seldom enough true of individual men, far seldomer of states; he must indeed lea perverse reasoner on events who would attri- bute the old Stoic's spirit and temper to Frederick William, or even to his nephew, who has perhaps a loftier and more kingly nature, but has not shown any of the mettle that would feel at- tracted by sympathy with misfortune and failure. No ! if we fail to take Sebastopol without the Germans, we shall never take it with them. If we fad to take Sebastopol, we have tried our strength under the most favourable combination against Russia, and Russia is too strong for ns. From that failure the mission of Russia to conquer and absorb will start with renewed zeal and irresistible prestige; she will no longer need to proceed by degrees, to feel

way with caution and cunning; she will only have to ac- cept the destiny assigned her, and to develop it as suits her pur- pose. An Imperial ukase would be omnipotent from Totalsk to

London, from Archangel to Ceylon ; the limits of states would re- main, if at all, as mere geographical divisions ; the institution of states, if at all, as mere machinery for carrying out the will of the monarch, whether he continued to date from Moscow or .Constan- tinople. Time, no doubt, has its whirligigs; and the revenge would come. But for the generation that allowed such a consum- mation, could one hope, could one wish for that revenge ? Would not the very fact of such a consummation condemn the age that could not prevent it to purgatorial pains in the interests of human- ity ? Great nations never fell yet but by their own fault ; and while we discuss the possibility of such a fall for Europe, we have not a shadow of a doubt that, as her laws, religion, and manners, train men and women of a higher and nobler standard than the edicts of Russia's Emperor have yet produced, the result of a decisive con- flict between her and Russia can but end in the humiliation and defeat of the latter. We would only insist upon the fact, that the decisive conflict is now going on, and must find issue one way or the other, before and within Sebastopol. We cannot suppose that any man is blind to this fact. Certain it is that no states- -men can be so. They at least by this time fully apprehend, and have, we hope, remedied, the original error of attempting a great task with too scanty means. For disproportions condemned by rules of war we care not; we may give a large margin to the hero- ism of the men who carried the heights of Alma, wrung from the Russian horsemen yells of terror at Balaklava, and have main- tained with unabated heart, hope, and courage, a contest that will render the name of Inkerman a word that no inglishman can hear for generations without a thrill of pride.