25 OCTOBER 1845, Page 11

NAVAL RETIREMENT.

THE principal objections to the Government plan of retirement are, first, that though it may produce some good to the service, it will not secure an effective list of Captains ; and secondly, that it is so imperfect in itself, that it cannot form part of that general system of retirement which is imperatively required.

After so much time for consideration, the Government might be expected to have matured a complete arrangement by which two lists of officers should exist,—the one, called the Active List, con- sisting exclusively of men capable from age, health, activity, knowledge, experience, zeal, and every other professional requisite, to perform at a moment's notice, and in any part of the world, whatever duties, in their several ranks, the country might require of them ; the other, called the Retired List, consisting of officers who are no longer capable, whether from age, infirmity, or any other cause, of serving at sea.

The Lists of Naval Officers contain 156 Admirals, 715 Cap- tains, 849 Commanders, and 2,528 Lieutenants ; and the whole British fleet (including ships building, old and useless ships, hulks, coal-depats, prison-ships, 'hospital-ships and others which will never again go to sea) is no more than 671 ships and vessels of every size and description; of which number only about 298, of every class, are in commission. It is therefore manifest that the number of officers is much greater than such a navy can possibly require; and it is no less evident that the honour and safety of England may again depend upon her navy being efficiently officered and manned, and superior in ships and materiel to any other nation. Another important objection to so dispropor- tionate a number of officers to the demands of the country, is the impediment they create to bringing forward young and able men, at a time of life when they are most capable of performing useful service, and before their ardour is chilled, if not destroyed, by being kept too long in one rank. Promotion, a vital principle in every profession, is eminently so in the Navy and Army.; and it is not more beneficial to individuals than useful to the state. Let any one dispassionately look at the Navy Lists, and he will be convinced that an immediate change must take place, if our navy is to be properly officered, so as to maintain that naval superiority which has secured us from invasion, protected our commerce, and preserved our colonies. If this fact be con- ceded, (and it is scarcely: denied even in the ex parte corre- spondence in professional journals, to which we alluded last week,) it is the duty of the Government and the Legislature to secure that object, even at the sacrifice of the feelings and wishes of individuals, be their merits what they may. The first and para- mount consideration is to obtain efficient officers for our squadrons and ships ; and there ought to he no other test whatever for the Active List than efficiency. The Admiralty has shown itself aware of the necessity of having an extensive Retired List of Captains : but it is quite u obvious with respect to all other officers ; and no reason can be given for having a retired list of Captains, which does not apply to Commanders and Lieutenants, and especially to Ad- mirals. Formerly, when Captains, from seniority, came within the number to receive their flags, a selection was made, and those who had not comnfanded a ship for lour years in war, or sin years in peace, were deemed ineligible for employment as Ad.. mirals, and were placed on a separate list, being jocularly called "Yellow Admirals." Here was a principle of retirement; and though a few cases of hardship attended it, (as must always occur in carrying out any general rule,) we doubt if a much bet- ter proof of inefficiency could be devised, than the performance of so little active duty as four or six years of sea-service in twenty or twenty-five years of Captain's rank. At the recommendation of the Navy and Military Commission, however, the Admiralty, in- judiciously, we think, not only abandoned the rule, but restored the whole of these Yellow Admirals to their rank on the Active List; where many of them now stand, forming 45 out of the 156 Admirals,—distinguished, however, by a dot indicating their ineli- gibility to serve, and that they are not to have any increase of pay. Except the nominal progressive rank, which it was as use- less as unjust to have withheld, they have gained nothing by the change ; and it is extraordinary that, though the Admiralty say in their plan that it is intended the Admirals shall hereafter be kept at 150, they do not state whether these 45 ex-Yellow

and now-Dotted Admirals are to be included in that number. If ineligible to serve, how can they be efficient? and if not efficient, are they to be allowed to prevent the advancement of Captains who have held that rank for the unprecedented period of thirty- seven years ? Of the 849 Commanders, at least 300 are between fifty-five and seventy years of age ; of the 2,528 Lieutenants, 1,200, and pro- bably many more, must be between fifty and seventy; and of the Admirals, Captains, Commanders, and Lieutenants, a large pro- portion have never been at sea since the peace in 1815—thirty years ago. A small part of the others may have served three or four years since that period, but in many instances not for fifteen or twenty years ; while hundreds of the Commanders and Lieu- tenants have been converted into a hybrid animal, half custom- house-officer, half soldier, called "Coast Guard Officers," whose practical knowledge of seamanship has been kept up by walking or riding about the coast dressed like so many "Guys" and armed like so many Robinson Crusoes !

It would be absurd to suppose that officers thus circumstanced are any longer capable of performing effective service at sea. They should therefore be sent into retirement ; and their places on the Active List filled, so far as the wants of the Navy may re- quire, by younger and abler persons. Every Captain knows that the discipline and efficiency of his ship depend as much upon the ability of his officers, and especially of his Lieutenants and Master, as upon his own ; and a greater misfortune can scarcely exist in a ship than an idle, incapable, or ill-conducted Lieutenant or Master. 'The evil and danger to all on board of having incompetent officers must be obvious ; while the effect of such an example to younger -men, Mates and Midshipmen' is as pernicious as that of good, zealous, and skilful Lieutenants is valuable.

The difficulty of ascertaining who are and who are not efficient officers, is, we are aware, extremely great : but it is not insur- mountable; and the public service demands that some rule should be discovered and adopted. It is scarcely to be expected from any man that he should confess his own incompetency for the duties of the profession in which he has passed his life, especially when such confession will be attended with a public mark of inefficiency. If the Navy were canvassed individually, it would probably be found that most officers, even though octogenarians, and even though they may not have seen a ship for thirty or forty years, yet if they can only creep, speak, and see, will declare themselves as able as ever to command a fleet, a squadron, or a ship. No doubt, there are instances of the retention of bodily vigour and intellectual faculties to a very advanced period of life; but they are the exceptions ; and no large measure can provide for excep- tions. In the retirement of Captains, the Admiralty consider a9e as the test, and have fixed fifty-five as the period when they might, beneficially to the service retire. This, however, would seem, in the opinion of the Admiralty itself, to be too low a standard ; for most of the Captains who have been appointed to the ships forming the Experimental Squadron are as old as fifty-five, if not older, while the Admiral commanding it must be nearly seventy- five.

An attentive consideration of all the facts has convinced us that no revision of the Navy List, which will be really bene- ficial to the country, meet the necessity of the case, and secure an efficient corps of officers, can take place unless one part of the plan be compulsory retirement, and unless it be applied to every -class of officer, from Admirals to Lieutenants and Masters, as well as to those usually called Civilians—Surgeons, Pursers, &c.

The question, then, would be, what should be the tests of effi- ciency, and what the future position of the inefficient ? To deal properly with the first question much information (which the Admiralty ought to possess) would be desirable; but we venture to suggest, that while age should undoubtedly form one and perhaps the principal proof, there are other facts from which in- efficiency may be correctly presumed. It would be desirable to fix for each rank a given age which should be deemed a proper reason for insisting upon retirement, not only because that age is usually attended more or less by incapacity, but because the re- tention of such an officer on the Active List prevents his place from being supplied by an abler man whose conduct deserves advance- ment, and the denial of which is injustice alike to him and to the public. Supposing, then, the age fixed upon were for Admirals sixty-five Captains sixty, Commanders fifty-five, and Lieutenants forty-eigitt or fifty, there could be an immediate and sufficient retirement ; after which an effective body of officers might be ob- tained by just and discriminate promotions. If age alone should not be considered a proper test of inefficiency—age combined with non-employment (from whatever cause) for several years in their present rank, might safely be adopted. Ill health, mental infirmity, misconduct, should also be considered disqualifications for the Active List ; as ought also an officer's having entered into any other profession, or accepted permanent civil employment. Why, for example, should officers who are surgeons, lawyers, schoolmasters, &c., or officers who, like the gallant Captains hold- ing the lucrative appointments of Usher of the Black Rod, Com- missioner of Customs Stamps, or Excise Consul-General, &c., instead of following the duties of their profession at sea,—and for whom it is surely enough to be allowed to enjoy their rank and half-pay,---be permitted to crowd a list so numerous as to prevent the advancement of men who have toiled for years and are still toiling in various climates in the performance of arduous duties ? If such principles of exclusion from the Active List were carried out firmly and impartially, the country would at last have none

but efficient naval servants; justice might he rendered to the really active and meritorious officer without friends or interest; and the Navy would continue in that preeminent state of disci- pline and power which have mainly rendered Great Britain what she is among nations. Numerous important advantages would inevitably attend an extensive retirement of Naval officers ; and one of the most material ought to be a change in the present system of promo- tion. The future number of each rank might, in peace at all events, be fixed bylaw; and although, as it is due to truth to state, little injustice is now done by the Admiralty, and conspicuous merit is always rewarded,* yet Parliament should insist upon a certain part of all vacancies being filled by seniority, so that

every competent officer (and no other should be retained on the Active List) might he sure of advancement. If half the pro-

motions were thus given, the spirit and ambition of officers, so essential to the service, would be kept up ; and there would still be an ample number of commissions for rewarding distinguished conduct, and for persons of interest. Another essential benefit from a greatly-reduced Navy List would be the means of keeping officers of every rank in constant employment, instead

of sending them into idleness at the expiration of three years. In no other profession—not even in the sister service, the Army—

does such a custom exist ; and it would be thought ridiculous for a barrister, a physician, or any of the working part of the community, to follow his avocations after long intervals, and then only for a limited time. This, certainly, is not the way in which a Lyndhurst or a Follett, a Chambers or a Brodie, ob- tained their knowledge and experience; and we greatly doubt if such interruptions-I- in professional pursuits is the way to produce Nelsons and Collingwoods. It has, we are aware, been suggested, that though officers may no longer be fit for service at sea, they may nevertheles be quali- fied for harbour and port duties. This may be so ; but we shall not enter into the question, because, whether being placed on a retired list should or should not preclude every kind of naval service, would be a mere matter of detail, and does not affect our only object—an efficient corps of Sea-Officers.

We shall now attempt to grapple with the obstacle to carrying out this' or a similar plan, by which that important object can be

attained. Two reasonable difficulties only present themselves to our mind ; but they might, if the will existed, be easily over- come. First, the expense; and secondly, the pain it would give to officers (many of them of great merit, whose services to their country deserve every practicable favour,) to be removed for ever from the chance of future emolument and distinction in their profession. With the expense we shall deal summarily. In the first place, it would not be very great, and would daily diminish by deaths: but whatever it might be, we assert without hesitation that the ex- penditure would be true economy. Not to press the obvious

facts, that in war the commerce and possibly the safety of the country-, can only be maintained by a navy superior in every

possible way to that of other nations, let the value (to say nothing of the loss of human lives) be considered of ships wrecked, or only damaged, through the ignorance or neglect of their officers; or, from similar causes, suppose a richly-laden convoy to b captured. What, moreover, would be the panic in the public mind, and the effect on public credit, if, in a similar political crisis, such a fleet as Howe led off Ushant, Duncan at Cam- perdown, or Nelson at the Nile and Trafalgar, were to be defeated ? and what sum of money can be thought too great to avert the possibility of such a calamity? No outlay is con- sidered too large to obtain the best ships which science and experiments can produce: but good officers and well-trained crews (the latter being always dependant upon the former) are quite as necessary ; for without them, of what use would be the finest ships ? We earnestly recommend, therefore, a liberal but not ex- travagant additional allowance to all who may be induced or compelled to retire, on a similar scale and plan to that about to be given to Captains ; together with the rank immediately above that which the officer now holds. That rank need not be (though it might perhaps be better if it were) progressive, as has been suggested for retired Captains ; because the latter would, if they lived and remained on the present list, have certainly obtained the highest professional rank.

No reasonable means by which the Retired List could be made agreeable to officers either in its title, or in any of its details, ought to be neglected ; and they should if possible be convinced, that on changing their position their Sovereign and their Country meant to show them gratitude and to do them honour. But, while every effort should be used to lessen their reluctance to retire, and to reward them fairly and liberally for their past

services, the Government is bound, above all other objects, to provide for the public welfare. The defence and safety of the country must neither be sacrificed nor impaired by a mistaken economy,—still less from mere deference to the feelings of even so deserving a class of men as old Naval Officers.

* The latest instances are the immediate promotions of the Medical Officers who so nobly. volunteered their services to aid the unfortunate crew of the fever- stricken Eclair.

1- Favouritism can, however, even in these times, secure to a Captain, the 289th on the List., who never saw any war-service whatever, a valuable and almost sinecure command continuously for fourteen years, which appointments, were always previously given to old and distinguished officers, and to them only for the short period that elapsed between their nomination to them and their promotion to Admiral. But Mu Captain is a King's natural son.