25 OCTOBER 1884, Page 11

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

LORD PENZANCE ON THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

f To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPEC/LTC/E."]

SM,—Lord Penzance's letter, published in the Times of the loth inst., appeals to such high principles that it is worth while to enquire how he contemplates their working in practice. He asserts, expressly or implicitly, and under several forms of expression, that no laws can be made without the free assent of the House of Lords acting quite independently of what is done in the Commons ; that to require a law to be passed without such free assent does grievous violence to the .Constitution; that the Peers are part of the Constitution, and have no right to lay down their functions ; that they exist for the benefit of the nation, not for their own, and have no right to give up what is not theirs ; and that if they pass a measure which has not their free assent, they will forfeit their self-respect, and be guilty of a grave political delinquency.

Very well, that is an intelligible view, and it is easy to sym- pathise with and to respect a Peer who really means that, come what may, he will never accept a measure which he does not conscientiously approve. But, then, supposing two-thirds of the nation continue to desire a change which two-thirds of the Peers continue to disapprove of. What is to happen ?

Lord Penzance does not tell us. In one passage he intimates that it is wrong to tender the Franchise Bill again to the Lords "after a lapse of time so short that a genuine alteration of opinion cannot be expected, and under circumstances so un- changed as to leave no excuse for concession." And in another passage he speaks of "the excuse of yielding to a national desire." Possibly he means these indirect references to other principles, for they are nothing more, to indicate limitations-of the absolute principles which he has so fully and emphatically laid down.

Of course, a genuine alteration of opinion on either side gets rid of all difficulty, but we are dealing with the common case where each party retains its own opinion. And how can there be any concession, or any yielding to national desire, if it be true that every Peer is under an inherent and indelible obligation to oppose every measure which has not his free assent?

Again, in another passage, Lord Penzance contemplates the abolition of the House of Lords. He says :—" As an institution it is the property of the nation, and as such is at the free disposal of the nation. If it be the national pleasure to alter or abolish it, as soon as that pleasure is made manifest the thing will be done." He would add much to the interest of his letter if he would tell us how this thing is to be done. Strictly speaking, the national pleasure can only be made manifest by an Act of Parliament to which the House of Lords is a party ; and in that case, no doubt, the manifestation of the pleasure and its translation into action would be simultaneous. But Lord Pen-

sance cannot be so trifling with us. He must mean a national pleasure manifested in some way other than a law. How is the assent of the Peers to their own abolition to be procured, sup- posing them not convinced of its expediency ?

Surely there are only two ways of overcoming the resistance of the House of Lords to a measure which its majority dislikes : —1. A sufficient number of persons favourable to the measure may be made Peers. But this is only a temporary expedient, and one which for very obvious reasons will not bear much repetition.

2. The Peers may vote for a measure on the ground that, though they personally disapprove it, they are bound to yield to the wishes of a great majority of the nation. That is not free assent, or assent of any kind. It is surrender, based on a recognition of the truth that, in order to avoid civil war, the weaker of two opposing wills in a community must yield to the stronger. It is only by recognising this truth that an irremove- able hereditary branch of the Legislature can continue to exist with a representative branch. What loss of self-respect there can be in openly avowing and acting on it I cannot conceive. The great Duke of Wellington did so more than once without losing his self-respect, or the respect of others. No doubt if any one pretend to be a convert to a principle when he is only yield- ing to superior force, he is defiling his own mind. But that is the effect not of his yielding, but of his false pretence. An honest recognition of the only modus vivendi between two bodies formed on contradictory principles, and representing conflicting forces, can degrade no one.

It may be that Lord Penzance means no more than this. But then it is difficult to see why he should dwell with such fulness and emphasis on the necessity for the free assent and indepen- dence of the Peers, tempered only by some obscure allusions to the possibility of their acting by way of concession. Nobody will dispute that Peers, like other people, should act conscienti- ously. The question is whether, before accepting a measure, they are bound to believe in its wisdom and goodness. To pass a measure on the ground that the occasion is one for yielding is just as conscientious an act as to pass it on its merits.

Upon this question, we glide back into the now well-worn groove of controversy. Has such a conflict arisen that a Peer may honourably say,—" On the merits of the case I am not con- vinced, but I am convinced that the struggle should no longer be maintained " ? Lord Penzance has not discovered any reason- able evidence of "enthusiasm for a great national cause or united will in favour of any great political end." Of course, he may think that the present controversy is not great or not national, or not political. I will not discuss that. If there is enthusiasm or united will upon the issue that has actually arisen, viz., whether or no the Franchise Bill shall be passed at once, that is sufficient to attract the principle on which I maintain that the Peers are bound to act.

On this I will make some brief remarks. At the election of 1880 there was no topic of domestic policy which was of such interest to the Liberal Party, or which more cordially united them, as "Uniformity of County and Borough Franchise," and "Readjustment of Seats." They won the battle. In course of time the Ministry proceeded to carry their wishes into effect. Their opponents contended for a long time that the people were apathetic on the subject, and when they found out their mistake, took issue on the mode of procedure. The Liberal Members, even the most erratic sections of them, supported the Ministry. Those Members again were supported—and more than supported, urged on—by their constituents. The Peers took up the plea which failed in the Commons, and (pace Sir R. Cross) rejected the Bill on that plea. That rejection and that plea are what the country has been discussing.

Lord Penzance has seen only good-humoured indifferent audiences. I too have seen audiences good-humoured enough, as men are apt to be when they feel sure of winning. But I am curious to know what Liberal meetings Lord Penzance has attended where the audiences were indifferent. Such a phe- nomenon is contrary to my experience, and to that of every one with whom I have spoken on the subject.

Those who will attend meetings, or inquire carefully about them, will find evidence enough of enthusiasm and of united will that the Lords shall pass the Franchise Bill without delay, the only counter-feeling being among those who wish to come to death-grips with the Lords. The evidence is the decision of 1880, the unanimous adherence to it of a great majority of the House of Commons eagerly backed by the party that returned it, and an enormous preponderance of public meet- ings. I do not know how better evidence is to be got. We have no referendums or plebiscites on isolated questions. A general election turns on a great number of questions and per- sonal predilections. A general election would not give us the evidence of the persons mainly affected by the measure. And to refer this matter to a general election would be to concede to the House of Lords, however they may deny it, the power of forcing one at any time by stopping legislation.—I am, Sir, &c.,