25 OCTOBER 1957, Page 18

PASSCHENDAELE

SIR,-1 had hoped that my article on 'Passchendaele,' concluding with Lord Trenchard's estimate :"Tacti- cally it was a failure, but strategically it was a suc- cess, and a brilliant success—in fact it saved the world,' would make it plain that I it) not belong to the anti-Haig school. I am surprised that your cor- respondent, Sir Douglas Baird, has interpreted the article as an attack on Haig.

Moreover, I do not believe that Sir Douglas's defence of Earl Haig is helpful to the Field-Marshal's reputation. It is simply not true that 'Passchendaele' was launched to save the Frcnch army. Preparations for the battle were made long before the French army had any need of being saved. As early as November, 1916, in. an unsigned memorandum to the CIGS, Mr. Asquith urged the necessity, of clearing the German submarine bases from the Belgian coast. In January, 1917, General Plumer was instructed to draw up plans for an offensive in Flanders with Zeebrugge, Ostend and Roulers as objectives. The Messines attack on June 7 was designed as the first stage of this offensive.

It is absolute nonsense to state, as Sir Douglas does, that Haig began this offensive because `Nivelle came to the Field-Marshal and told him, in strict confi- dence, about the French army, which was in a state of mutiny.' General Nivelle was dismissed at the beginning of May; the mutinies of the French armies took place during that month. The first intimation of them received by Haig is indicated by an entry in

his Diary dated June 2 which reads, as follows : 'The "Major General" of the French army arrived about 6.30 p.m. and stayed to dinner. His name is General Debeney. He brought a letter from General Petain saying that he had commissioned him to put the whole situation of the French army before me and conceal nothing. The French army is in a bad state of discipline.' Haig received this news just five days

before the long-prepared Messines attack. •

It is true that the battle of Passchendaele was con- tinued into November because of the weakness of the French and at the request of General Main. It cer- tainly saved the French army, and this was perhaps the most solid return for three and a half months of bitter fighting under mainly dreadful conditions. But it was not the reason for launching the battle. Campaigns such as this are far too complex to be accounted for in such crude terms.—Yours faithfully, JOHN TERRAINS 33a Kensington Park Gardens, W11