TOPICS OF THE DAY.
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. DURING the past week there have been persistent reports to the effect that the -United States have sent an ultimatum to Spain declaring that if she does not put an end to the war in Cuba before November 1st, America will be obliged to intervene to prevent further bloodshed. Though these reports have been officially or semi-officially denied—always, however, in a somewhat half- hearted fashion—we do not doubt that they represent an actual incident in the relations between the two countries. It is not probable that the AmericanEnvoy, General Woodford, mentioned any special date for the conclusion of the war. That would be absurd, pedantic, unnecessary. It is much more likely that he confined himself to polite but firm generalities. But firm and polite generalities can be con- veyed in such a way as to make it clear that they are a warning, and a warning which must be attended to if very serious consequences are not to follow. Suppose General Woodford expressed great regret, on the part of his Government, on account of the distracted state of Cuba, went on to point out the terrible injuries caused to Spain thereby, dwelt on the fact that a friendly desire for Spain's welfare actuated the President in drawing atten- tion to the effects of Spanish policy in the island, and ended by saying that unless there was improvement in the condition of things before the meeting of Congress, American public opinion would be so greatly aroused that it would be necessary for the American Government to consider what action they ought to take in the interest of both Spain and Cuba to prevent the complete ruin of that unfortunate island. Language of this kind is not officially regarded as the "language of menace," but every diplomat and every Foreign Office official knows perfectly well what it means. It means war unless the State admonished for its good quickly manages to assume the position desired by the admonishing Power.
Accepting the fact that Spain has received such a general admonishment, what is likely to be the result ? It is difficult to see how war can be avoided, though not necessarily war of a very terrible or prolonged kind. Perhaps it will be said, Why should there be war, why should not Spain give a civil answer to the United States, and go on her way, trusting that, after all, the conflict of opinion in America may prevent the Americans carrying out their threats? Spain knows that a very large party in America does not want a war which could hardly end except in annexa- tion and the introduction of four Senators—Cuba would be admitted as two States—who would in all probability be the nominees of a Sugar or a Tobacco Trust. Annexation means giving the blacks and half-breeds of Cuba a part share in the government of the Union, and many of the best citizens in the States will resist the notion to the uttermost. Why, then, should not Spain avoid war by making some minor concessions to American opinion ? That is possible, no doubt, but we do not believe that it will happen, because we do not believe that any very con- siderable number of people in Spain will wish to avoid war on these terms. The mass of the Spanish nation is immersed in what Dr. Johnson, speaking of the Highlanders, called "a muddy mixture of pride and ignorance." The peasants we not able to realise their own weakness and America's strength, and the educated people are as a rule too proud to admit it. Pride dominates all classes and all things in Spain, and pride will bid Spain stand up to the United States without the slightest fear of the con- sequences. Curiously enough, too, war will probably be considered the best way out of Spain's difficulties by the small number of thoughtful and far-seeing politicians she possesses. They will argue that the drain on the resources of Spain owing to the Cuban revolt is destroying Spain. But it is impossible to propose the abandonment of Cuba in cold blood. If the Queen's Government were to carry out such a plan they would simply be handing the country over to Don Carlos. The only escape from the dilemma which the country will admit is the loss of Cuba after a war with a Great Power. If Spain, as it were, "goes out" with America and fights till honour is satisfied, she can lose Cuba without losing her self-respect also. To use another metaphor, America ls to be employed as a surgeon and to do the necessary amputation,—an amputation which alone can prevent the Cuban gangrene spreading to the rest of the body politic. Here, then, we have reasons of high politics as well as national characteristics combining to make Spain meet a. war half-way rather than escape from it. Of course America may not intend to take up the position we have assumed she is taking up, or again she may withdraw, but if things are as we have assumed, and if there is no change in the attitude of President McKinley, we do not see how war is to be avoided.
It is hardly necessary for us to say that if war takes place our sympathies will be with our own flesh and blood, and not merely because they are our own flesh and blood, but because we believe that the rule of Spain in Cuba is an outrage on humanity. We have no abstract or senti- mental prejudice in favour of insurgents, but it is clear that the men whom Spain sends to Cuba are utterly unfit to rule their fellow-creatures. The native Cubans may not be a very worthy set of people, but this does not alter the fact that Spanish rule has turned the island into a hell upon earth. No man would live in Cuba who could possibly live anywhere else. The Spanish tyranny is not even efficient. While the wretched lads sent from Castile- or Andalusia die of misery, fever, and starvation, or desert to the rebels, the worst of the officers and officials are said to sell the stores or to take money from the con- tractors, whose occupation would be gone were the war to cease. This unholy partnership, if the accounts are true, makes even a section of the army by no means too anxious to end the war. The better part of the officers—and of these, of course, there are many, for Spain has never been without a supply of high-minded and courageous men—are rendered depressed and hopeless by the ills they see around them. In the spirit of fatalism, they resign themselves to the fact that in an island the size of Ireland, with a population of only a million and a half, some two hundred and twenty thousand disciplined men are unable to put down a body of about forty thousand rebels. Yet we turned Napoleon out of the Peninsula with a fifth of the force which Spain now possesses in Cuba. Cuba is, roughly, about seven hundred miles long. At its narrowest point it is only twenty-seven miles wide. At its broadest not more than ninety. Spain, commands the sea, and can therefore move her troops as. she will. Yet in spite of all these facts in her favour she has not only made no progress in putting down the rebellion during the last four years, but has actually lost ground. To prolong the war any further, and to forbid the return of peace to the miserable island, is a crime, and if America chooses to undertake the work of putting a stop to the hideous cruelties practised in Cuba, all Englishmen should applaud her, and should refuse to inquire too narrowly into the reasons which have influenced her statesmen in putting pressure on Spain_ When a nation is doing or about to do a piece of work good in itself we must not demand a certificate of origin as to her motives. Certificates of origin are as foolish in politics as in. trade. Let us be content with action which is on the right side, and is intended to prevent such a condition of things as exists in Cuba to-day. But though, if war comes, our sympathies will be with America and against Spain in her attempt, at the bidding of a false pride, to make the ruin and degradation of Cuba even worse than they are just now, we can understand patriotic Americans doing their best to prevent war. Every nation has its duty as well as its destiny, and we hold that America must ultimately see to it that good order and decent government shall prevail in Spanish America. Still, we can understand the best American citizens at the present moment refusing to take up the carrying out of this duty. They may well argue : 'War with Spain over Cuba will mean in the end the admission of Cuba as two States of the American Union. If at the same time Hawaii is admitted as a State, we shall be introducing into the heart of our Constitution- i.e., into the Senate—six representatives chosen at the best by an inferior and degraded population who are not fit to help govern the American people, or at the worst nominated by some great capitalist combination such as the Sugar Trust. The alternative is intolerable. We have quite enough negroes and half-castes and degraded Spaniards already. We have also allowed the Trusts to take quite enough hold on our Constitution. Until, then, some change in the Constitution will allow us to hold new acquisi- tions on a different footing from now, we decline to add to the inferior element in our population. It may be our duty to drill Spanish America into good living, but not till we have made arrangements that will guard us from the degradation of our own institutions.' But though it may be extremely difficult to see how these arguments are to be met, we feel that they are matters of domestic concern, and cannot profitably be discussed out- side America's own household. Here all we can do is to say that America has a duty in regard to Spanish America, and that in pursuance of that duty she should put a stop to the long agony of Cuba. If her Constitution will not safely admit of her doing so, the sooner she puts her Constitution in order the better for her and the better for humanity.
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