THE TUNISIAN TREATY. T HERE seems little doubt that the relations
between France and England are undergoing a process of improvement. We do not mean to say that any very great or any very definite progress has been made towards settling the thorny boundary problems in West Africa, or any of the other outstanding subjects of dispute, but we do see reason to believe that there is a movement in the right direction. As the Latin grammars put it, there is a tending to be better friends with France. The visible proof of the soundness of this allegation is to be found in the new Tunisian Treaty just negotiated by Lord Salisbury. Lord Salisbury has there shown himself so amenable to French desires, and has conferred such signal favours on the French Government, that it is impossible to doubt that his action is due to a general improvement in the relations between the two countries, and not a mere isolated act of good humour. Consider for a moment what Lord Salisbury has agreed to in the new Tunisian Treaty. France occupies in Tunis exactly the position which we occupy in Egypt. The only difference is that the native Prince is in one case called Regent and in the other Viceroy. Both are hereditary rulers, and over both the Sultan of Turkey claims over- lordship. France occupies the country with her troops and administers its affairs, though always in the name of the Bey. But as Tunis is theoretically an autonomous State, the various Powers have maintained the treaties with her which were made before the occupation by France. France, however, has gradually taken a firmer and firmer grip of Tunis, just as we have taken a firmer grip of Egypt, and she has therefore become anxious to set aside the old Tunisian treaties and substitute others of a kind more compatible with her system of government. Such reformed treaties she has negotiated during the past two years with all the Powers of the world except England. But all the new treaties, in effect, depended upon the treaty with England. If that remained on the old basis they practically would not come into effect. Thus everything depended upon the negotia- tion of a new treaty with England. But England held a perpetual treaty with Tunis under which certain privileges were accorded to her subjects and a duty of 8 per cent. was leviable on her goods. If, then, Lord Salisbury had simply refused to negotiate, had taken up a pure non possumus attitude, France would have been extremely hampered in the carrying out of her policy in the Regency. The British Treaty blocked the way. Lord Salisbury thus laid the French Government under a great obligation when he met their wishes and negotiated a new Tunisian Treaty. It is true that under the new Treaty a slight concession is made to Manchester cottons, which are for fifteen years to be admitted at a 5 instead of an 8 per cent. duty, but this is as nothing compared with the advantages gained by France. France in future gets what is virtually a free hand in Tunis, especially as regards fiscal matters. There is no sort of comparison between this and a reduction of 3 per cent, in the cotton dues.
It will be argued, no doubt, in many quarters that Lord Salisbury has made a great mistake in thus obliging France. He had France in a very tight place, it will be urged, and he ought not to have let her out without a specific assurance that she would no longer oppose us in Egypt. In a word, it will be said that any power of making ourselves disagreeable in Tunis ought to have been most carefully preserved, in order that it might be used from time to time as a retort to French disagreeable- ness in Egypt. Lord Salisbury will, in effect, be accused of having given away our rights in Tunis without having obtained any equivalent. We admit that prim4 facie there is a good deal to be said for this view. A closer inspection of the matter will, however, we believe, show that Lord Salisbury has in reality acted in the interests of this country, and that be has gained far more than he has lost. Lord Salisbury has always taken the line in regard to Tunis of allowing France a free hand, while inferentially claiming at the same time a free hand in Egypt. He has, that is, never refused to France in Tunis what France, if she were more reasonable and more friendly, ought to be willing to concede to us in Egypt. Because France has not been as accommodating as we are, that is no reason why we should play the part of the dog in the manger, and forbid her to do in Tunis what will not injure us and will greatly benefit her. Do as you would be done by has been our rule in Tunis. Possibly this will be said to be too one-sided a course of action, but on the whole we think it may prove to be sound. If France had ever made any direct or active attempt to turn us out of Egypt it might be necessary for us to treasure up every possible stone to throw at her. But since France, acting as a nation, has never seriously attempted to get us out of Egypt, we may be content to forego those minor opportunities for worry presented by the treaty with Tunis which has just been put an end to. Remember that, its abrogation leaves the main argument from Tunis elactly where it was. Though we give up the power to worry in detail, which we never used and probably never should have used, we retain to the full the right to remind France that she occupies in Tunis exactly the position which we occupy in Egypt, and that we shall not evacuate unless she does. The new Treaty does not impair that argument in the very least.
While we lose nothing as regards our right and ability to reply with Tunis when and if France complains about Egypt, it can be shown that in reality we increase, not weaken, our hold on Egypt by our recent concessions. In the relations of private life no one can doubt that if you have an outstanding dispute with Jones on, say, a boundary question, the fact that Jones asks for and accepts a con- siderable concession from you in regard to some other matter will render it almost impossible for Jones to make himself very disagreeable about the boundary dispute. The fact. that he asked and took the concession from you was a proof that he did not really mean business about the boundary. No doubt nothing was said. by Jones about the boundary, or he may even have politely but firmly declared that it must be understood that the present arrangement had nothing to do with the other dispute ; but for all that a concession asked for and accepted makes an alteration in the rela- tions of equals which nothing can efface. It is the same with nations as with individuals. The fact that France has asked for, and has received, benefits from us in Tunis will go a very long way towards neutralising her hostility in Egypt. Of course all Frenchmen, as well as the French Foreign Office, will deny this, but the fact remains the same. Though not on paper, nor even in talk, the men who direct the foreign policy of France have abandoned the idea of getting us out of Egypt. In their hearts they know that we shall no more leave the dominions of the Khedive than they those of the Bey of Tunis. They realise that we shall not now leave Egypt without a fight, and they realise also that the time for fighting has gone by. You cannot endure a grievance of the Egyptian kind for fifteen years and then suddenly make it a easus belli. If France had meant to drive us out of Egypt by force she would have endeavoured to do so long ago. Her virtual, though not her nominal, acquiescence during all these years is the measure of her desire to force us to evacuate the Nile Valley. The asking and receiving benefits from us in Tunis is the culmination of this process of acquiescence. There is yet another way in which the new Tunisian Treaty will strengthen us in Egypt. The great concessions made to France will certainly affect that portion of public opinion here which has felt that we have behaved, and are be- having, badly towards France in not satisfying her about Egypt. The majority of those who think we ought to consider more carefully and sympathetically the French feeling about Egypt will insensibly be influenced by the voluntary resignation of our privileges in Tunis and by
their acceptance in France. After all that,' men will be inclined to argue, it not nureasinable of Prince to keep on worrying about Egypt?' If France had refused to make a bargain about Tunis lest she should be suspected of condoning the occupation of Egypt and of compromising her claims, our " balancing " citizens would have said that here was clear proof that France was hopelessly irreconcilable, and that we must now consider whether Egypt was really worth the invoking of such stern and un- compromising irreconcilability. There will now be little excuse for such an attitude. Lord Salisbury's last piece of diplomacy has made it clear, then, that France does not mean business about Egypt. All that she now intends to do in Egypt is to retain for a little while longer the right to worry. That is not very dignified, perhaps, but it is at any rate intelligible. Grievances once started are precious things, and no one gives them up easily. In truth there is only one way, as we have several times said before in these columns, by which France can really secure the evacuation of Egypt. If she were to genuinely evacuate Tunis, and to call upon us to do the same in Egypt, we could not possibly resist the appeal. But while France, instead of setting us the example of evacuation, sets us the example of tightening still more her hold on the land she "occupies," it is preposterous to suppose that we shall evacuate. 'As in Tunis so in Egypt' is the formula which controls the question. But from this it follows that an advance for France in Tunis means ultimately an advance for us in Egypt. In the case of the Tunisian Treaty, then, appearances are deceptive ; and Lord Salisbury, instead of giving his country away, has tightened our hold on Egypt.
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