TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SPIRIT OP RUSSIA.
WHAT is the meaning, what the cause, and what may be the results of the Bulgarian mobilization cannot be discussed at present. We record elsewhere the facts as far as they were known up till Thursday evening, but make no comment. Apart from this momentous event, the military situation continues good for the Allies. It was feared that the fall of Vilna—it was evacuated, not taken by storm—was going to be followed by the encircle- ment of a very considerable portion of the Russian Army. The Russians, we were told by our eager pessimists, had held on too long in the Vilna salient, and would certainly be caught this time by the closing pincers of Marshal von Hindenburg—the colossal Scissorsman of the war. Happily these forebodings proved to be ill-founded. The pincers closed, but when the German General spread the glittering forfex and then "joined them to divide," ho caught nothing. The Russians had once more slipped through and accomplished that " manoeuvre in depth " for which their armies have shown such wonderful aptness. Whether the Russian Chief of the Staff ran too great a risk in holding on at Vilna as long as he did is a subject which cannot be discussed without a, great deal more knowledge than we possess. All that can be said is that be did take the risk and that he succeeded, with the result, of course, that the Germans suffered greater losses both in men and in time, and were altogether much more embar- rassed, than if he had made the retreat more precipitate.
The art of retreating is to retreat as slowly as possible, lighting every inch and delaying every hour, but at the same time never allowing the enemy to cut off and surround any considerable portion of the rearguards. It will readily be seen that when the retreating force holds on till the last moment to some important place like Vilna, and then slips out just as the pincers close, a real injury is inflicted upon the enemy—i.e., a good deal more is gained than the mere escape of the threatened force. The closing of tie pincers upon. nothing means an enormous amount of wasted energy on the part of the enemy. When the pincers have closed and caught nothing, not only is a rearrangement of the line necessary, but a great many miles are found to have been traversed without any advan- tage The troops that take part in an encircling movement are, for the purposes of advance and invasion, losing ground. They are marching in the wrong direction. Measure the distance covered by a series of encircling sweeps by two armies, and then measure the distance that would have been covered by a simple forward movement, and it will be seen how enormous is the extra burden laid upon those who adopt the strategy of encirclement. But the Germans have been making unsuccessful encirclements in Poland ever since the end of July. Is it to be wondered, then, that they show signs of exhaustion P But though' the exhaustion of the German troops has evidently been very great, it is not the only serious trouble with which.they are confronted. Accounts show that the Germans and Austrians, in spite of the great towns they have occupied and the groat stretches of country now in their possession, are suffering from depression of spirits and are not in as good heart as might have been expected. What makes this fact the more curious and interesting is that we read of the same depression in the accounts of Napoleon's advance. From the superficial point of view, that advance, till the Emperor reached Moscow, ought to have been conducted like a triumphal procession. The French occupied city after city and won battle after battle. Indeed, on the advance they did not fight an unsuccessful action.. Yet from the time they left Vilna and plunged into the heart of Russia the accounts show that the army was gloomy, if not actually nervous. All the picturesque incidents of the campaign, instead of being viewed as signs of good luck, were twisted into evil omens, We lopo we shall not be thought fantastic if we suggest that the explana- tion of this depression is in both cases to be found in the physical features of the country. Except for those who have been born and grown up' in them, vast stretches of plain have undoubtedly a depressing effect upon the human mind. It is a commonplace in America that the inhabitants of the stretches of open prairie are apt to suffer from nerves, and that newcomers especially find the huge expanse of the tent of heaven a source of low spirits. We can well understand that the endless stretch of Russian forest and Russian plain produced a sense of melancholy in Napoleon's army, and we should not be in the least surprised if a similar cause were producing similar resultiamongst the Germans. Pursuing a foe who is always eluding you is necessarily trying and disappointing work, and if this task has to be accomplished in the narrow- ing days of autumn and in the long-drawn vistas of grey flood and field, it requires no great stretch of imagination to see that, in spite of the appearance of victory, a mist of hopelessness may descend upon, a " victorious army." Even the most spicy of boasting bulletins would seem disheartening in the gloom and menace of the Polish autumn. But though the depression suffered by all invaders of Russia is worth noticing, we do not, of course, intend to draw therefrom any promise of final victory. That is to be found, not in the endless expanse of grey-green forest and misty river and the vault of leaden sky, but in the indomitable spirit of the Russian people. Russia, as was natural, nay, inevitable, reeled under the first stunning blows of the invasion. But she has recovered herself with wonderful quickness. All the latest accounts show that her people are now meeting the great crisis that confronts them with a passion of patriotism of which history records no nobler example. There is but one will in the nation, and that is the will to resist to the uttermost and in that resistance to conquer.
A conspicuous proof of the magnificent temper of the Russian people is to be found in the way in which they received the sudden prorogation of the Duma. We are not going to express any opinion as to the merits of the Constitutional quarrel, for criticism of that kind would be out of place at this moment. The Allies must not interfere in each other's home affairs. It is, however, permissible to say that no one could have been surprised if the Russian people had shown a great deal of open dis- satisfaction at the closing of the Dame, when so much was expected from its influence in the matter of bettering the supply of munitions, and generally increasing the efficiency of tho Administration. Yet the Russians, with the wise instinct that every feeling must be subordinated to the successful prosecution of the war, and that this is no time for civil contention, however well justified in the abstract, withstood the temptation to resist the Executive. The quarrel with the Bureaucracy is put away till peace time. Take as examples of what we mean the speeches made at the Congress of Zemstvo representatives, which has lately been meeting in Moscow, recorded in Thursday's Morning Post. Prince Lvoff, the head of the Zemstvo organizations, though he deplored the prorogation, declared that the Russian people would continue under any conditions whatsoever the work they had taken in band. M. Alexander Guchkoff, one of the most prominent members of the Dania, said some very hard things of the official heads of the Army. At the same time, be warned his hearers that they must be careful not to weaken the principle of authority. There was an evident soreness and bitterness in his speech, but he was determined that this should not give an advantage of the weight of a feather to the nation's enemies. As long as the spirit of Russia remains what it is, and there is not the slightest risk of, it changing—it is far more likely to grow even stronger—Russia must remain unconquerable. When to the physical difficulties of conquering an Empire so huge as that of Russia are added the invincible patriotism and willingness to sacrifice themselves shown by the Russian people, the task of the Germans will be seen to be hopeless. We regret the misfortunes of our allies. We sympathize with their sufferings, but for all that we would not have them other than they are. They, like us, made grievous mistakes in the way of preparation. They, like us, were guilty of military miscalculation. They, like us, had not read the signs of the times. Nevertheless, we would far rather have comrades who made such mistakes but who showed the Russian spirit than comrades who exhibited far more mechanical efficiency. To put it in the language of the camps, what you want in a fighting friend is a man who will " stick'it to the last." The Russian people are that sort. They will stand by us, as we will stand by them, till the crack of doom. The Russian people are the stuff out of which heroes are made I
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