25 SEPTEMBER 1971, Page 4

THE SECURITY OF EUROPE

A Helsinki conference, a disarmament treaty?

There is much to be said for letting sleeping dogs lie; and although a European security conference becoming, or leading towards, a conference to conclude a peace treaty with Germany is not likely to unleash the dogs of war, it might well sufficiently awaken them to provoke some very noisy barking, snarling and yapping, and even a snack or two. The peace of Europe, uneasy though it has been, has allowed a kind of de facto peace treaty, and European settlement, to congeal which is based upon the general acceptance that the Oder-Neisse line provides the eastern boundary of Germany, and which recognises the division of Germany, and the larger division of Europe, into two blocks, divided by a political, military and ideological Iron Curtain.

The post-war European system is however, an unstable, one : the recurrent Berlin cri4es'are' evidence of its instability, as have been the revolutionary attempts ' of the Poles, the Hungarians and the'Ciechs to change the satellitic nature of ffieir relationship to the Soviet Union. The systeth has survived because of the respect the,ioviet Union and the, United States have for each other's military strength, and.lwause of the working agreement arrived at by both camps to stand idly by whenever there is internal trouble in the other. This agreement has been almost entirely to the benefit of the Soviet Union, which has been able to subdue the East Germans, as well as the Poles, the Hungarians and Czechs, with force and the threat of force. The preservation of European peace has been very largely at the expense of these countries, and in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The ad hoc post-war European system is not only unstable, but is also unsatisfactory. The decision of China's new leaders to bring that country out into the world, forcing both the Soviet Union and the United States to reconsider their strategic positions and interests, and their relations with each other, cannot but incline the two superpowers to look again at their European arrangements to see whether a more stable and a more satisfactory European system may be established.

The Finnish government is prepared to act as host for a European Security Conference to be held at Helsinki, and unofficial exchanges have taken place recently suggesting objectives for such a conference. These include the agreement by all European states to the renunciation of the use or threat of force for the settlement of disputes; the acceptance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of any state; the recognition of the right of any state to choose its own social and political system without external interference; and the recognition of the inviolability of existing borders together with . the renunciation of existing claims. Political cooperation between the European states is envisaged, and the suggestion has been put forward of the establishment of a standing body or agency to advance such political cooperation and to provide the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

However desirable such an agreement on European security might be, it would not in itself establish a durable and stable European system unless it was part of a general agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and accepted by all the European states, on the control and limitation of arms. Fortunately, the ever-increasing cost of weapons systems is beginning to exert its own discipline : even the super-powers are realising that they are not wealthy enough to engage in an indefinite arms race. Nevertheless, the success of the non-proliferation treaty in halting the spread of nuclear weapon manufacture among the lesser powers has not been paralleled by an equivalent success between the two super-powers in their crucial Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Here, the suggestion going the rounds is that the parties at SALT should agree not to deploy any anti-ballistic missiles. This most far-reaching suggestion is an attempt to preserve the nuclear stalemate. Associated proposals are that missile test launches should be severely limited, and, more important, that there should be a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

In the European context, an even more radical proposal has been put forward. Its source is American, unofficial but expert; and it has apparently met with expert, but unofficial Soviet interest. It has also, quite naturally, occasioned some alarm. The essence of this proposal is that there should be no foreign nuclear weapons in Europe : no American nuclear weapons in Europe, no Russian ones outside Russia, no British ones outside Britain and no French ones outside France. British and French nuclear weapons should be limited to those deployed or being deployed; and the deployment of Soviet medium intermediate range nuclear missiles capable of striking Europe should be limited to a number equal to the total number of British and French weapons deployed as long-range missiles.

No summary judgement on proposals as novel as these is possible. They require, and will receive, much study and they are intended, in the first instance, as a contribution towards discussion. That such discussions ought to be taking place in Europe and among the European states as well as between the two super-states is incontestable. There is, unfortunately, no overpowering urgency which requires the immediate convening of a European security conference or the reaching of agreement on disarmament : and except at times of great crisis, when by definition such a conference could not be convened nor any agreement reached, it is easy for statesmen to take the view that the status quo is good enough. It is not enough, for the sufficient reason that the post-war European system is unstable and will not last for ever and could collapse catastrophically. At this comparatively cool and quiet time, the convening of a European security conference should be put in hand. The Finnish invitation should be accepted; and the whole question of the limitation of arms, conventional and nuclear, in Europe, in the context of a general European agreement, be treated.