THE NEW RUSSIAN POLICY.
IF it were worth while to scrutinize the speech ascribed to the Emperor Alexander, it might be open to more than one interpre- tation. In one pari, for example, he is made to say—" My father had reasons for acting as he did. I knew his purposes and they had my full adhesion. But the treaty of Paris accomplishes what it was his ambition to attain; and I prefer such means to war." Some might discern in this a confession that Russia has promoted her objects of encroachment better by diplomacy than war.
Sfill there . are reasons for supposing that the Emperor Alex- ander means a greater change than he acknowledges, and that he
intends to reverse the policy of his father. However we may do homage to the official etiquette of Russia, which demands, in pub- lic documents, a large quantum of lying, the acts of Alexander are consistent with his supposed disposition and with the language here ascribed to him. Although Russia could have maintained the war for many years, the empire " would have exhausted its resources in keeping on foot so many and such numerous armies, the soldiers of which had quitted agriculture and manufacture, both of which languished _m. consequence. Even in the govern- ment of Moscow, the founderies, factories, and workshops, had been compelled to close. I prefer the real prosperity of the arts of peace to the vain glory of combats." And the Emperor promises to follow up the opening of the ports with measures to encourage native industry and production. We shall see shortly what this means ; but since a large proportion of the Russian community have been in advance of the Government, and they desire to give that impulse to trade and production which he now invites, there is every probability that his invitation will be accepted and turned to profit. If so, Russia will give those ho s to peace which
consist in accumulated wealth and the stakes of commerce.
Every country thus developing its own resources must regret to interrupt the process, and every step in the prosperity of Russia will be a new guarantee for the peace of her neighbours.
It is not to be forgotten' and perhaps the truth has not been overlooked in Russia, that the arts of peace accumulate the means of war. Russia and England stand in perfect contrast at the present moment. Russia has spent the last forty years in heap- ing up the machinery of warfare ; and what is the confession of her Emperor ? He stops at this moment because he was exhaust- ing the resources of his empire. England, his antagonist in the quarrel, stops simply on grounds of policy, at his request ; our adaptation of resources to the war having barely commenced. He admits a difficulty in keeping up the expenditure ; we were ready to continue it as long as might be necessary. He has be- gun to feel the exhaustion of the population ; we have never re- sorted to anything but volunteering. His fleets are nowhere ; our fleet is at Spithead. The lesson, indeed, does not exactly confirm the dogma of the Peace party or the strict economist. The Peace men would point to it as a tribute to the superiority of their counsel ; but we have drawn Russia into peace by showing that we could beat her in the power of war. After all, then, strength is necessary for the preservation of peace ; and it is likely to continue so, until some few generations of Russians and Sclavonians have learned to mind their own business and leave their neighbours in tranquil- lity. The economists tell us that it is better to abandon all at- tention to warlike machinery as soon as war is over, and to con- centrate our attention on peace : the experience of the last two years has shown us, that if, instead of maintaining warlike esta- blishments only as a colonial police in the distance, or as a state toy at home, we had kept up the nucleus of an efficient army, with its proper scientific branches, we should not have wasted many. millions which have been expended, not in combating the Russians, but in learning experience for ourselves. Russia had the advantage of us in the East, because she was readier than we were ; we have the advantage of her in the end, because we can lay down sovereigns against her and win at that game. She has been right in supposing that the possession of great military force gives a predominance in Europe ; but she has been mistaken in not perceiving how to acquire the means of developing great mili- tary force. The moral of the story exactly reverses the moral of the Peace men. If we would secure a predominance for civiliza- tion, for justice, and for the arts of peace, we must be prepared to defend them against barbarians who would invade them with other arts.
We have found that although we can beat Russia in the contest of wealth for wealth, we have not lost our military qualities, but that we can place upon the field, either of land or water, a pre- dominant power. But the possession of power involves a corre- sponding obligation. We can give a great practical vote on the side of constitutional freedom or of absolutism, of commercial free- dom or of exclusion, of justice or of injustice ; and the knowledge that we posses that power dictates to us a corresponding duty. It indicates to us also a premium for the fulfilment of that duty. There is this great difference between the principles which Russia has impersonated and those of Great Britain—the policy of abso- lutism, of exclusion, and injustice, can only accumulate power for one state at the cost of its neighbours ; the policy of justice, free- dom, and constitutional government, brings power to the state that maintains those principles, but in the process assists its neighbours and allies in obtaining the same advantages. The more we can extend the application of those principles by means of the force which we possess for doing so, the more we increase the advantages for ourselves as well as our allies—the more we develop our wealth, bring aid in carrying forward our civiliza- tion, and establish outposts for our constitutimall liberty.
Previous page
