. TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE RELIEF OF EKOWE. THE relief of Ekowe is a relief to the whole country, which, in its weariness of mismanagement in all directions, had sunk into an apprehensive mood, and was feeling an almost superstitious expectation of new disaster. Either the relieving column would be defeated, or it would arrive just too late to save.Colonel Pearson. This despondency has happily proved to be without reason. The beleaguered garrison, for which there was such just and keen sympathy, has been taken away, and the relieving column, after a march slower than was expected, but sensibly and cautiously managed and accom- panied by exceedingly little loss, has returned successful to the Tugela. ,But we confess, though we share to the full the sense of relief and pleasure at Colonel Pearson's escape, and rejoice at the absence of any long list of killed and wounded, that we fail to see any justification for the trumpetings of the daily papers, or for the " headings " about " decisive victories " and splendid successes." The work of the expedition has been accomplished with little loss, but there has been no decisive victory and no splendid success. The war is no nearer an end than before, and the feat accomplished, though most gratifying, is not splendid. Lord Chelmsford had several unexpected advantages in his march. The coast-road proved to be much easier than the direct one, and much less 'hampered with bush. He had, till towards the end, little need of scouts, and at Ginglihovo he could see without them, Colonel Pearson warning him by the heliograph •from his -watch=tower in Ekowe that the Zulu army was approaching. The Zulu army arrived slowly, giving him the better part of two days for preparation, and when it came ' up, the British camp was roughly entrenched, with a ditch, - affording shelter to the riflemen, and clear, visible space • around. The Zulu army, again, was but a wing, the main body having gone with King Cetewayo to attack Colonel Evelyn Wood ; and though the 12,000 men, under Dabul- manzi, the victor of Isandlana, attacked with devoted gallantry, they never reached within twenty yards of ; the entrenchment. The Infantry and the Naval Brigade were firm and quick ; they had Martini-Henrys and plenty of ammunition, and even Russians could not have , forced a passage through that storm of shot. -As was pointed out so strongly in the first days of the siege of Plevna, the fire of the breech-loader is now so rapid, that no troops in the world can pass the open space round an entrenchment in the face of what is virtually -a continuous outpour of leaden spray. Too many men fall, so many that the remainder think all will fall—that it is a massacre, and not a battle—and they give way. No troops, we believe, have ever been known to advance after losing a third of their numbers; and these Zulus, gallant as they ire—braver decidedly than any savages we have ever encountered, except one or two Maori clans—found 'the position impregnable, and retreated, pursued by the Native Horse and Contingent, who behaved splendidly, and completely cleared the line of march; leaving Lord Chelmsford to make a rapid march from Ginglihovo without impedimenta into Ekowe. Colonel Pearson' was ready, the sick were carried out, the entrenchment evacu- ated, and the whole force brought back in safety, first to Ginglihovo, and afterwards, it is rather rumoured than accurately known, to the Tugela. The beleaguered regi- ments have in the two months lost only twenty-eight men, and the sick, though ten per cent. of the whole strength, will now probably recover. We are now, therefore, exactly where we were when the war began, except that we have lost about eighty good officers, whom we can ill spare, ' and 1,400 good men, whom we cannot spare at all ; and that Cetewayo has lost probably 5,000 men, who make very little difference to his strength. Neither party is in any way cowed, and the total of experience gained is that the . British know they must fight in Zululand as cautiously as in Europe, and the Zulus know that although they have a chance in the open when they can throw away four lives for one, they have none whatever against an entrenchment. In the former case, it is Zuln against Briton, the former as brave as the other, and more active ; in the latter case, it is Zulu against Briton and civilisation, and the Zulu ranks are " withered " as by shot thrown from machinery, before they can approach. So were the Russian ranks before Plevna, till famine had done its work. The cam- paign has now. to be begun afresh, the British army, pre- sumably 12,000 strong,—for entrenchments, the hospitals, and communications, will absorb at,least 3,000,—marching in two columns against Ulundi, the King's place of residence. If on the road the Zulus, as is possible, -contest the way, a decisive victory, may be gained ; but if Cetewayo retreats, -the same work will have t o be commenced once more, for the third time. There are rumours of peace abroad, but Cetewayo's action does not look peaceful. He appears to have made, while watching the column of relief, a desperate attempt to destroy Colonel Wood's force at Kambula Kop, and to have very nearly succeeded. His agents enticed Colonel Wood, probably by false information, up to the top of Mlobhane, a steep hill, where a large quantity of 'cattle were corralled, and there surrounded him with a large army, estimated at -20,000 strong, composed of his oldest and best regiments. Colonel Wood, discovering his danger, cut his way down the hill step by step, losing seven officers and ninety men in what must have been an enterprise like that of a forlorn-hope ; in which all men expected to be killed. Owing to circumstances not yet explained, the body of his force escaped scatheless, but he only regained his camp to be attacked on the following morning by the enemy's whole army. The Zulus, flushed with their success, renewed their attacks on Kambula again and again for four hours, and lost, it cannot be doubted, a prodigious number of men ; but the entrenchment on a broad shelf of the hill was better even than that of Ekowe, the ammunition held out, and the. Zulus were once more convinced that behind an entrenchment the' Martini- Henry in 'steady hands, is invincible.- Nothing but artillery can take such positions from Englishmen -or Turks, and of artillery the Zulus have none. The fresh loss-, toUgli most regrettable, was not great, including only- two officers killed, and the Zulus were so thoroughly disheartened that they were pursued for sOme'distance. - If Cetewayo were a Hyder Ali, with influence sufficient to keep his troops constantly in retreat, we should never conquer Zululand, but wear out our army in useless marches, in each of which we should lose a few officers and men ; while the enemy, with no cities to protect, no depots to guard, and no waggons to convoy, would march over the country at his own discretion. Cetewayo, however, probably cannot pursue such a policy, as perpetual flight might break his power, while the tactics to which he has trained his troops are the tactics for attack and for pitched battles. He will, we imagine, endeavour to fight, and in the next engagement the British ought to have an advantage they have not yet possessed in their contest with him, cavalry sufficient to make a victory decisive. They had none to speak of at Ginglihovo, and but very few at Kambula Kop. It is evident that the Boers are right, and that it is cavalry, which. can outstrip themselves, that Zulus chiefly dread. At present they have only to turn to get away, for no soldier can catch a Zulu; but with cavalry they cannot _escape, and breaking up as they do after defeat, must fall an eas y prey. ..One battle in which an army was really destroyed would greatly' reduce their willingness to fight, and their confidence in-themselves ; and the next " decisive victory" ought to be one of this kind, and to produce a peace. Lord Chelmsford has, hOweier, done his best to make peace difficult, by de- manding, it is stated, not only an unconditional accept- ance of the original terms, but that Cetewayo and his IndUnas should personally surrender themselves in his camp. The King Understands by this demand that he is to share the fate of Langalibalele, and will undotibtedly'avoid it to the last extremity. • It would be far-Wiser,vas we do not want Zulu- land, to allow him to reign biaten ,man, with, his mili- tary organisation broken up, and an immovable impression that to attack the British is to court destruction. The Resi- dent at his Court would be obeyed, whereas any successor will have to prove to his 'People, in the interests- of his own authority, that he is not mean-spirited. " -
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