BOOKS.
PHYSICAL AND MORAL LAW.*
[SECOND NOTICE.]
HITHERTO, in speaking of the remarkable volume before ns, we have confined our observations to the author's treatment of physical law ; and we have seen that the absolute regularity of the rules followed by physical forces, their minute elaboration and mathematical precision, lead the mind that ponders these things inevitably back to the cause of the rule ; and that that cause, as being necessarily one who has the intelligence to con- ceive and the power to enforce the rule, leads us to look upon that which as seen from below is rule only, as being in reality a law impressed from above. But another fact, equally signifi- cant, and equally pregnant with consequences, forces itself on the attention of him who watches closely the constant sequence of cause and effect in the visible universe. Hitherto, we have considered only the rigidness of its uniformities. And yet, practically, in looking at the world around us, we are far from finding it a monotonous world. It is full of surprises. The regularity of Nature does not make us in the least certain when we pass a tree one day that we shall find it standing the next, or when we see a rosebud full of promise that it will ever bloom a rose. The wood-cutter may fell the tree ; a girl may pluck the bud and wear it in her hair. This thought brings us abruptly upon a totally distinct class of agencies from those which we have been hitherto considering. We pass in a moment from the contemplation of one mighty uniform power, marshal- ling and controlling, with Von hand and unswerving regularity, the whole order of Nature, to the perception of beings with a power limited, but still real, of modifying that order—beings who can co-operate with the law-giver, or cap thwart him ; who can water the plant or kill it, who can direct natural forces to the preservation or the destruction of life, can fill our wine-glass with win e or with prussic acid. The complete change in the class of ideas which this thought introduces is forcibly shown in a passage of Mr. Arthur's book, which we shall.quote immediately. So long as we confine our attention strictly to physical forces, our one immediate inquiry takes the form always of "How P" The cause—the " Why" is in every case the same. The sound thinker will not for that reason consider that there is no cause. Bnt we have already said enough on this subject. The details as to " How " each particular modification takes place are various, and call in each case for special study. But when we come upon the power of man to set in motion a chain of physical causes, the question " Why," so easily dropped out of sight in purely physical sequence, comes upon us in full force, and reminds us of its importance, and of a class of ideas which modern men of science would relegate to the limbo of exploded metaphysics :- "With a physical agent the answer to Why' is always oue—be. cause it is forced. The paddle-wheel turns for no other reason. In asking why it turns, you go back to a phenomenon lying behind the first one—the phenomenon, namely, of the forcing of the wheel to turn ; and standing within that the `How' +properly comes in again. How is it forced ? The axle turns and makes it turn. Why does the axle turn ? Again because it is forced. How ? The crank pushes it. Why does the crank push it ? Still because it is forced. How ? The piston-rod pushes it. Why does the piston-rod push ? Once more because it is forced. How ? The steam pushes it. Yet another time, why does the steam push it ? Only because it is forced. HOT' is it forced ? The fire pushes the water all asunder and follows up . the flying particles, pushing them so violently that they drive all be- fore them.. Do not get tired, but follow the chain through. Why, then, does the fire push the water ? Because it is forced. How ? The combustion forces up heat and flame. Here you are compelled to change your question. It is is now a new case—a case for the question What.' Hitherto the work was all pushing ; it was pare mechanics, motion compelling motion. But what is combustion ? It is something by which a force different altogether from that of pushing — a chemical force—makes fire seize upon earth, air, and water, and fuses them all into itself—into the force that pushes more mightily than any. Why did the chemical force cause combustion ? Because it was forced. How ? The fireman struck a match which made a flame; be removed the flame from where it was made to where the combustibles were ready, and kept it there till it made them fire up. Why did the fireman strike the match ? Because it was his orders ;—orders—orders ! Do
you mean he was pushed ? No. Do you mean he was forced ? No.
Did an axle turn and compel him to turn with it ? No. Then, if orders are not force what are they ? If they don't push, and yet do make things move, what can they be ? It was a great break when we passed from the tangible mechanical pushing to that recondite thing called a chemical force ; but it seems like a chasm when from • On the Difference between Physical and Moral Law. The Fernley Lecture for 1883. By William Arthur. London : T. Woolmer. 1863. the realm of forces we have to pass into another region where that which causes action is not force, but something you call orders. And to think that we have to leap this chasm is tracing a chain so simple as that of the turning of a paddle-wheel."
Here there is an absolutely new kind of idea,—orders. The whole of the purpose of the mechanist who constructed the steamer, and of the captain who wishes it to proceed, can be thwarted by one simple act of disobedience. The crank cannot refuse to push the axle; the piston-rod cannot refuse to push the crank, nor the steam to push the piston-rod. But there is one link in the whole chain of sequence which is of an entirely different kind from these ; and here we are at once brought across the pregnant conception "moral responsibility." The fireman can aid the whole scheme or thwart it —and this with- out any great power or skill of his own. He did not design, and very likely does not understand, the mechanism of the apparatus ; but still he can make the whole thing move, or can refuse to make it move. Extend this conception beyond an individual case, and beyond the carrying-out of a merely human purpose. Look at the whole world in which we live, with its possibilities of happiness and unhappiness, with the power of physical forces for good or for evil. Consider that at every moment each individual is setting in motion a train of causes and effects which will ultimately tell for good or for evil. Every act is an example for good or for ill. The writer of a good book is setting physical forces in motion which will ultimately convey to thousands of minds, perhaps, higher and nobler aspirations, resulting in higher and nobler actions. The father of a family who is care- less of his children's moral training is likely enough sowing seeds which will issue in generations of worthless citizens. Such thoughts raise the conception of "responsibility" to its highest pitch. Has not the world a purpose as well as the paddle-wheel ? And, are there not " orders " infinitely more weighty, infinitely more sacred, than those of the captain—bidding the writer write for good and not for evil, bidding the father bring up good citizens and not bad ? Such orders there are ; and those orders are conveyed by the sense of moral law which each man, explain it as he may, is conscious of within himself. And now let us quote the conclusion which Mr. Arthur draws from these considerations :—
" The debauched, the idle, and the malevolent may employ mental power over lower agents to the disfiguring of nature, the debasement of the man himself, and the undoing of his fellow-men. The good man will employ them for directly opposite ends. And in the hands of those who, in discharge of personal duty and the promotion of the general welfare, pursue ends of peaceful industry, the face of Nature proves fairer, and the unconscious tools she supplies rise into instruments, and even works which minister to well-being in all time to come. This power of the moral agent over the physical one, and his consequent power of modifying phenomena, link the twofold province of nature into one system, connected, from the lowest to the highest agent, and from one world to another, either by chains of contact or lines of communication. Each order of laws in itself represents infinite powers of mind, deliberate will, and pregnant acts. The two in co-ordinated operation carry all this up into the sphere of beneficent moral purpose. And you can ask me to believe that all this arrangement does not pre-suppose any arranging mind or determining will ! Now, I am free to say that to me such a demand appears to be not reason but unreason ; and unreason pushed so far as to be accounted for in men of sane mind not without difficulty. We cannot banish our intellect to that Arctic world of the Agnostics where middles -come without beginnings, beginnings without causes, and order without an ordainer; where mind begins by putting on the snow spec- tacles which prevent it from looking behind a fact for the explana- tion of the fact, and ends by bestowing on abstract Humanity the attributes of Providence. If a man is resolved that his reason shall in no case compel his heart to unsay what he has said in it—namely, that there is no God—he may well begin by telling his intellect that it is not in a condition to be left at large but must be put under restraint, and may well lace it up so tightly that it shall never ask Why ? To what end ? or Who did it ? This being done, he may enjoy such mental dignity and happiness as are coveted in schools and nurseries at certain moments when the thing most desirable is that no one should ask ' Who did it ? ' and the real object of desire is that, should the unwelcome question be asked, all should be contented with the answer No one did it.' The Agnostics are well aware that in the ear of experience the answer 'No one did it,' is a coin of suspected ring ; therefore do they very wisely counsel universal intellect never more to put the question Who did it ?' " In conclusion, we may remark generally of this volume that it is before all things a suggestive book, full of eloquent pas- sages and pregnant remarks, but is, perhaps, less remarkable for logical consecutiveness. And for this reason no sufficient idea can be given of its scope in a review like the present. The author starts trains of thought with greater ability than be pursues them. We have not for a long time read so suggestive a book on topics of the kind he treats of ; but we think that Mr. Arthur estimates his own labours correctly when he implies
in his preface that he is calling attention to a certain class of considerations, rather than pressing them satisfactorily to their issue, and expresses his hope that " a vein of thought is here•
struck which, followed up by others may yield some useful results." Not that we should deny that the book itself has yielded useful and really valuable results, but that its value is not confined to what it fully accomplishes, and extends to what it may enable others to accomplish.
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