26 AUGUST 1854, Page 1

NEWS OF THE WEEK.

-Com) we transfer ourselves to that chamber where, probably, the most intense amount of anxiety in all the world at present exists, -Com) we transfer ourselves to that chamber where, probably, the most intense amount of anxiety in all the world at present exists, we might see the dark side of the warlike scene which at present

we in the West view only with hope. -Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown ; but when that head has by inheritance received a grant of universal conquest—has also Inherited the exulting thought that the conquest marched generation by generation, and believed it almost on the point of accomplishment, yet sees at that

point the triumphant hopes reversed and succeeded by defeat,—then the uneasiness that belongs to crowns must become something like settled despair—the despair of a dynasty aching in one doomed head. Not a year ago the Czar of Russia thought that he had ar- rived at a point in the advancement of his country and his ambi- tions which enabled him to throw Off the mask, to go forward un-

disguised disomised, and to defy alike the opinion and the resistance of the world. 3Toiv- the vision is reversed. Wherever he has perpetrated an aggression, there, at the present moment, the Czar is sustaining a pressure. His armies are driven back upon him. The capital wladoh he and his forefathers had guarded by a long series of granite fortifications' begins to be threatened. Those granite precautions indicate the scale of the fears which must seize the Imperial mind ehould the precautions prove insufficient ; and if he listened, he might have heard the guns of England and France breaking down his outworks of rock. The outermost of the portals has been taken. For although the island of Bomiusund belongs 6eographi- cally more to Sweden and to Finland than to Russia, it is the first in the series of marine forts; and it is now under the protec- tion of France and England, in possession of their soldiers and sailors.

The occupation of the Aland fortress cannot be in itself of sub- stantive importance to the Allies; it is of much more importance in a moral than in a military sense, and mainly as an experiment. We cannot help taking it as being to a great extent a sample of the work to be done, and we are fain to accept the reduction of it as a sample of the work done. In both respects it is satis- factory. It is no reproach to the Allies to say that the force mustered for the purpose was more than sufficient for its object. In the history of the affair we shall find not only that there was no waste of work, but that the quality as well as the magnitude of the instrument was fairly tested.

The task was to take a fortress of granite, armed with some hundred guns, and defended by detached outworks on the uplands above it. The Allies had to construct their batteries, land their guns, and break into the fortifications piecemeal. It was done in dashing style : the Western tower, was rapidly taken by the French ; the heavier work of the Eastern tower was next mastered by the Enk- lish ; and then the main fort euceumbed ; the ships assisting through- out. The work was well done, because it was done effectually, be- Cause the obstacles to be overcome were not inconsiderable, and they did but serve to draw forth the spirit and invention both of Trench and English, both of officers and men, while the loss on our side was trifling. All this work was done with sixteen guns on shore, including five mortars; a fact which in itself tells how ad- mirable the gunnery must have been. The weakness of the Rus- sian gunnery is shown by the firing at the Penelope, which got aground. The Russians were energetic and resolute ; they were fertile in treachery: a truce for burying their dead was employed to import ammumtion, and more than one spy was detected, in fe- minine and clerical clothes. Our side relied neither on spies nor truces : the steadiness of the firing and eagerness with which individual officers landed their guns and established batteries of their own—the sang froid of the officers, making their toilet or writing notes in the intervals of duty and in I the midst of the firing—the English sailors tramping over the uplands, to a band of music, in dragging the heavy guns, while the French sailors rushed forward with an admiring wish to share in the labour—the cheerful promptitude of the sailors when summoned from their dinners after their toil, to succour the Pene- lope—the keen vigilance of the French chasseurs, picking off the Russians who showed themselves in the embrasures—are so many incidental traits which test the quality, we say, of the machine. At the same time that it proves to us that the machine is sufficient, it proves to us that the Russian machine is insufficient : the men are brave, but the granite will splinter—it fails to hold together like the alliance of France and England in the fight.

The experiment is not without its value even in reference to Sebastopol,—whither, according to a report that looks correct, an army of sixty thousand men has at last gone ; since the principles of Russian fort-fighting are the same, and on the side of the Allies, the men, the appliances, and the invention, will be the same as at Bomarsund. It is with satisfaction, therefore, that we hear of our troops' exchanging the scene of inaction at Varna for that of action at Sebastopol. We had amongst us writers who used to gloat over the disease and mortality among the Russians in the malaria of the Lower Danube,—forgetting that the exultation would have to be exchanged for mourning when our own troops should approach the same deadly vicinity ; and when the disease did seize our own, the same class of writers complained of the "delays." For there always are men at home who, without mili- tary or naval knowledge, or at all events without knowledge of present circumstances, can tell to an hour when attacks should be made, and when armies should march, in the most distant parts of the world. Whether it is in Baltic or Black Sea, it is all the same to these profound cyclopredists—who know more of campaigning than St. Arnaud. or Raglan, more of gunnery than Paixhans or Chads, more of rifle-shooting than Canrobert, more of naval taaties than a Napier. Criticism before a design has been deve- loped in its execution is always idle ; but the performance at Bo- marsund enables us to judge the anticipative grumblers as well as the commanders.