TOPICS OF THE DAY.
MR. COLLINS'S DEATH AND THE STATE OF IRELAND.
THE killing of Mr. Michael Collins by the Irregulars in an am bush at Bandon is an event which cannot but have an evil effect upon the state of Ireland. Which- ever way the matter is looked at, and whatever our sym- pathies, it is clear that it can do nothing but harm. It weakens the Provisional Government. It puts new hope into the hearts of the followers of Mr. De Valera and Mr. Childers. Worst of all, it is a triumph for the policy of murder and destruction. It will keep alive, in the minds of Irishmen, the belief that great things can be accomplished by mere murder. Before this notable success on the part of the extremists there were signs that the Irish people were tiring of the policy of assassination, or, at any rate, were beginning to think it futile. They were, in fact, following the example of Michael Collins anl giving up the killing of individuals as bad business. And now, through that irony which so often mocks the working of human affairs, the ruthless Irish leader himself perishes through the roadside ambush—a system of killing which he taught his countrymen to adopt, and the mechanism of which he gradually perfected. His end. showed that you cannot trifle with murder or alter its character by calling it by newer and pleasanter names.
But though it is of practical, nay, of vital importance to get people to realize that you must take murder seriously and that it is not something which you can use in a political emergency when convenient and then light-heartedly put aside, our immediate purpose is not to deal with the moral aspects of the crime but to consider whether any- thing can be done to prevent the worst consequences of the blow that has fallen on the Provisional Government. We feared. from the first that the policy of the Treaty as adopted by Mr. Lloyd George would prove a failure. It went too far and yet not far enough. It was one of those fatal compromises which have not been properly thought out—a compromise in which the object is tem- porary and opportunist and does not touch the funda- mental aspects of the problem. When once the Govern- ment determined on abandoning the policy which they adopted when they sent Sir Hamar Greenwood to Ireland and announced that they meant to apply vigorous measures dt repression, they should have chosen a far bolder course of action. They devised 'a, scheme which, though it tempted the section of Irishmen led by Griffith and Collins to acquiescence, was inherently vicious. No doubt it looked on the surface very clever to adopt the policy of divide et impera, to prevail by splitting your opponent's forces, but it was in reality only a subterfuge for getting out of the Irish trouble on the cheap. Further, it could only succeed through the imposition of terrible injuries to Ireland. We pretended to give South Ireland what she wanted, but in reality only gave her what Mr. Lloyd George wanted- i.e., something which he could pretend to a section of Irishmen was independence and to Englishmen was a super-Dominion Government. But though this was only a kind of verbal smoke-screen under cover of which we could evacuate South Ireland and cut our losses and our responsibilities, it meant in fact endowing the Irish political adventurers whom we had bribed and cajoled into agreeing to the Treaty, with a damrtosa hereditas, the fatal legacy, of a bitter feud between the ticked and ousted extremist Republicans and the sham Dominionists.
What we ought to have done—granted that we had determined on a fundamental change of policy—was to scout any idea of half measures, and boldly to adopt the policy of complete severance. We should have given South Ireland that complete Republican independence which the majority of its people desired. If the Govern- ment were afraid to go so far as this, it would have been better to do nothing. But though we feel that the damage which the Govern- ment have done by their weakness and timidity, and by their double pretence as to the position of Ireland, is terrible, we recognize that an account of past misdeeds is now of little value, except so far as it illuminates the present situation. What we have to consider is, Can we do anything to prevent the further spread of ruin and demoralization in Ireland ? The first thing to do in any attempt to avert danger is fully to realize its nature. The danger is that the murder of Michael Collins will prolong the Guerrilla War. But if it is prolonged, is it likely that the Provisional Government, with their two ablest and most competent men dead, will be able to stand the strain Is it not more likely that as they find out their own im- potence, and also as they watch the spread of physical ruin and misery in Ireland, they will come to the despairing conclusion that they must make terms with the Irregulars—i.e., abandon Collins's strong policy of no parleying with brigands ? But a compromise means the triumph of Mr. De Valera, and so the triumph of the policy of Republican Independence. But if that happens what is to be our line of action? Are we prepared to call out the Reserves, mobilize our whole Army, and plunge into the reconquest of an Ireland in which all the difficulties of transport will have been immensely increased by the destruction wrought in the last two months ? The People of Great Britain would not, we believe, sanction so mad a policy. They might and no doubt would dismiss the present Ministry, but they would not return to Ireland— except to prevent the invasion of the Northern Province. But who can feel sure that this is not the very thing upon which the Southern Irish factions will compromise ?
Goethe, with that uncanny insight which he possessed, even in matters where he knew little• of the facts, once made a generalization about Ireland and the Irish which strangely endorses our fears. Speaking to Eckermann at the end of his life, he declared that, "badly as the Irish Catholics behave to one another, they will hold together when it is a question of attacking a Protestant." "They are," he said, "like a pack of hounds who are always biting each other when by themselves, but the moment a stag appears, they combine into one body and go full-cry after the stag." The process thus described is exactly what we expect to happen in Ireland, and the stag will be the Northern Province. If we are right as to what will be the course of events the Government must be prepared to take the initiative, and, by anticipating, to prevent an attack on Ulster. They had better give South Ireland that Independence which she will certainly take sooner or later, but while giving it they must also make those terms for the protection of the Southern Loyalists which we have so often described in these columns. The protection of the North from invasion needs no stipu- lation. There is a duty from which the British people will not shrink, no matter what the cost.
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