Russian Realpolitik
From DEV MURARKA
MOSCOW rr HE course of Soviet-American relations is not I intrinsically determined by the Vietnam war, which is only a factor in the situation. It is determined as between two rival powers on a basis of mutual self-interest, and the interests continue to clash. The cold war has not ended yet, but even if it were to end tomorrow this would not alter this basic element of hostility between the two, although might blur the edges. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is constantly changing, yet re- mains the same. As the newer and possibly the weaker power, the Soviet Union has always looked upon America as a challenge to its own authority and status, and its foreign policy has been preoccupied with meeting this challenge. Lately, however, there have been indications that the Russians are now confident enough of their own strength to face the Americans on an equal level. Thus tough postures have been gradually replaced by subtler diplomacy.
So the challenge has shifted from a military to a political plane and this is perhaps the most important factor in both Soviet-American rela- tions and world affairs today. For a decade and more, particularly during the last two years, Soviet diplomacy has been active and successful in forging new links with those very countries which were the staunchest allies of America at the height of the cold war. Moreover, the Soviet Union is now bidding fair to have closer links with the republics of Latin America, thus chal- lenging America's pre-eminence at its most sen- sitive spot. With Western Europe at cross- purposes with America, with Asia heaving with relief at the weakening of the American hold and seething with indignation at the continuation of the Vietnam war, the Soviet Union has little rea- son to consider itself at a disadvantage.
This world-picture is sufficient to show that, peaceful co-existence or not, a political confron- tation of immense magnitude is still taking place between the two super-powers. Both of them are disturbed by the predatory power of rising China and in their own ways seeking to contain it; but this need not detract from the essential conflict between American and Soviet interests. On the contrary, the disturbance by China may even re- inforce it.
Expressions of amity and goodwill by either side or even specific agreements are insufficient reason for regarding the conflict as over. It is fashionable nowadays to claim that but for this or that irritant, the two giants could live together in blissful peace and happiness. It is even more fashionable to claim that the rise of China is enough cause for them to come together and keep China under control. But the idea that China could be contained in such a way is dubious enough, and even more dubious is the concept that Moscow and Washington can coalesce to- gether to form a directorate to run the world. Very likely this impression is derived from the fact that at many points American and Russian policies seem to be running along parallel lines. But parallelism in politics is not the same as identity.
Take, for instance, Europe. The Soviet objec- tive is still to remove the American presence, and the emphasis in keeping the military tension down is only part of this policy. It may be thought of as an impossible goal, but only if taken in a literal sense. What matters to the Russians is whether the West European states are sufficiently independent of pressures from Wash- ington. Their treatment of General de Gaulle, for instance, showed nothing more vividly than their belief that sooner or later other European leaders will be bound to follow his line of ending Europe's dependence on America. As for Ger- many, the Russians are genuinely afraid of German designs on Europe; but they would still prefer to deal with a Germany not hand-in-glove with the Americans, because then they could deal with her as a European power. So long as the American involvement in Europe is there, how- ever, from the Soviet viewpoint it acquires an extra and unreal dimension. The Russians are realistic enough to recognise that the American presence in some form or other cannot be easily avoided, but it seems incredible to them that any- one should think that their own European policy has anything in common with the aims of the United States. An American departure, in fact, would make it far easier for them to reconcile themselves to the pressures for greater indepen- dence among the Eastern bloc countries, whereas the American presence in Europe makes such pressures embarrassing. This is not a view which will lightly be changed.
In South and South-East Asia, the Russians, like the Americans, are competing with the Chinese for influence and friendship. But, unlike the Americans, they are not involving themselves in a war. And, contrary to the American policy of playing off one Asian country against another, they have initiated attempts to form a coherent grouping which at least will be impervious to Chinese penetration in the years to come. Soviet policy may not succeed entirely, but in terms of prestige and popularity the Russians have great and increasing advantages over the Americans. In a situation where the Americans appear the direct protagonists of China, but where many of the Asian countries have not yet made up their minds where they stand in the conflict, it is relatively easy for the Russians to increase their influence. Indonesia, for instance, broke with China, but the Soviet presence remains. Ameri- can-Japanese ties remain close, but the Russians are coming up fast. Thus, over a world-wide theatre, hardly any evidence can be found that Soviet and American policies are beginning to coalesce. It would be a possible, even a desirable, development, but it is just not happening. China, of course, still remains for consideration, but it is around China that some of the most fallacious notions about the nature of the Soviet-American relationship have centred.
The reality is that the Soviet Union is far more concerned about China than the Americans are. China is not only geographically and ideologi- cally contiguous to the Soviet Union, it has also a legitimate interest in establishing its pre- eminent position in the Far East and in South and South-East Asia. Thus China threatens Soviet security far more than the American bases, which in any case are now melting away in the warmth of co-existence. China is also a per- manent threat to the Soviet position in the world at large.
Characteristically, the Russians have shown themselves adept at dealing with China. They realise, more than the Americans with their anti- Chinese obsessions, that the smaller nations in Asia both fear and respect China at the same time. Though few of these countries wish to ex- pose themselves by being provocative to China, the Russians realise that they need outside sup- port from somewhere. This support the Soviet Union is providing on a small but rising scale, and the response is remarkable. Not only has North Vietnam cautiously responded to the Soviet initiatives, to the point where it has be- come more or less neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but even countries like Pakistan have accepted the Soviet overtures aimed at isolating China.
It can be tentatively surmised then that Soviet policy in Asia is designed to isolate both China and America together. In this task, to seek the willing co-operation of America would be self- defeating. Indeed, if there is to be a big-power understanding in the area, it is more likely to be between the Americans and the Chinese. After all, the United States and China could agree to share political influence in Asia when all else fails. But the Soviet Union cannot make such a concession to Peking without forfeiting its right to an in- dependent foreign policy in Asia. The antagonism between Peking and Washington may be sharp at the moment, but it is of recent origin. The antagonism between Moscow and Washington, however, is older, on a greater scale and very deep-rooted. It also takes the form of an open and direct competition for influence, besides which Washington's obsession with China may be only temporary.
If, for instance, the Soviet Union is seeking an arms agreement, it is because it is no longer afraid of America. But it is not because Moscow can forget even for a moment the feeling of competition with Washington. A wary sus- picion is all that can be expected of mutual re- lations between Moscow and Washington in the immediate future, and even after.
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