THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IN SPAIN.
IT seems certain that Don Carlos has failed, but it is by no means certain that Don Alfonso has been established on his throne. It is possible that tranquillity may follow the suppres- sion of the Civil War in Spain, but those who hold it probable are, we fear, unduly sanguine. The facts, broadly stated, are, we believe, these :—The Government of S. Canovas del Castillo, finding that all Spain south of the four insurgent provinces was heartily weary of the war, exerted itself seriously to create an army. They had a revenue actually tangible of about £16,000,000 a year, or two-thirds of the nominal receipt, and by continuing the suspension of interest on the Debt, by leaving the budget of the Church unpaid, by postponing the salaries of the civilian employes, by selling exemptions from the Conscription wholesale, and by making Cuba provide tem- porarily for a large portion of the Navy, they have contrived to get together, pay, feed, and supply with materiel a very powerful army. The number of that army is probably unknown outside the Ministry of War, but there is reason to believe that it is not less than 140,000 effective men, very fairly supplied with munitions, especially artillery. The army being ready, the Ministry resolved to employ Generals who could use it, even if they distrusted some of them—as, for example, Martinez Campos and Moriones—on political grounds, and to convey to them that the Administration was in earnest, that it wanted a victory, and not a mere campaign. The Generals found, the army found, and the policy found, the work itself was not difficult, being, as it was, the thorough subjugation of Wales by England, as both were a century ago. It had always been asserted that if the Alfonsist troops could get behind their adversaries, so as to cut them off from France, the Carlists would be paralysed ; and this was done by General Martinez Campos, while his colleagues traversed and cleared three of the four insurgent provinces, with the result that the peasantry for the first time saw the natural defences of their country made useless. They lost heart, their Generals lost heart, position after position was carried, the Carlist Staff sought refuge in France, and little doubt exists that Don Carlos, with or without afinal battle, will almost immediately retire to Vienna, probably under an arrangement securing him an income and binding him not to re-enter Spain. The influ- ence of Czar Alexander, who is his protector, over the French Government is sufficient to secure him terms, and the inter- vention of the Pope, reported by telegraph, will furnish a dignified excuse.
If Spain were like any other country, the war having ter- minated, the course of events would be in this wise :—The Government, supported by its victorous army, would feel itself very powerful, would advise rather than consult the Cortes, and would find its most serious danger the condition of the Treasury, which, bad as it is, is not quite so bad as represented. The revenue of Spain in times of order is about £22,000,000 a year, which could readily be made £25,000,000, and the nominal Debt, after unpaid coupons and all are added, cannot nearly ready £500,000,000, at three per cent. The creditors would take half gladly, if they could be sure of their money, and a charge for Debt° of £7,500,000, or even £10,000,000, could be defrayed. A strong Government, with Canovas del Castillo for moderator, and General Martinez Campos for supporter, and an obedient Cortes for speaking- trumpet, could master ,existing difficulties, and possibly com- mence a career of material improvement and progress towards Western civilisation. Many observers expect that this will be the case, and if the army remains strong and remains faithful, we do not deny its possibility. But there are circumstances in the condition of Spain which render us far from sanguine. In the first place, there is no guarantee that the army will re- main "faithful." The regular course of affairs in Spain is for the Generals to become jealous of one another, to aspire to supreme power and to seize it through military pronunciamientos, and nothing has occurred to show that the regular course will be interrupted. The Generals may quarrel in King Alfonso's name, but they may also declare for Queen Isabella, who is to be allowed to return to Madrid; or for the Republic; or, as Prim and his colleagues did, for a monarchy in the abstract. They cannot all be satisfied or all have power, and their dissensions will exhaust all the vigour of the Government, and much of its pecuniary resources to keep the Army content. Then there can be little doubt that the Republican party in Spain, which has gathered strength all through the war, though it has assisted the Government to put down Carlism, will be fiercely stimulated by the success which has attended its fellow-believers in France, and will, almost for the first time, be assisted by the " Francising tendency" which is the permanent weakness of the middle- class populations in Spain. They feel the effect of all political movements in France sooner than any other people, and sooner or later always respond. They are sure to have ample provocation from the Government, both in the form of new taxation, which will soon be indispensable, and in the ecclesiasti- cal aggressiveness which will be forced upon the Royal Govern- ment, partly by the priesthood, partly by the courtiers, partly b., the Queen-Mother—whose influence will be very great—and partly by the bitter opponents of all religion, who in Spain are more savage and more out-spoken than in any country in Europe, Belgium not excepted. If the Republicans had any legal path opened to them, such as is open in France, if they could plead their cause in the tribune, if they could go to the polls, or even express themselves freely in the newspapers, they might not be seriously dangerous ; but they are shut out from the Cortes, they have no place at the polls, they are liable to indictment if they plead their cause in the Press, and they are consequently driven, as it were, to win over Generals, to or- ganise urban revolts, to exaggerate the King's personal foibles —which seem to be generally those of a much tempted lad of his class, aggravated by a certain impatience of being bored—and to recommence once more the sterile round of Spanish party intrigue. We expect from the day of the convenio to hear that the Intransigentes are again agitating, and the Republicans again becoming a power, and to see that the strife of parties is daily becoming more envenomed and more dangerous. Of course, if the army can be trusted implicitly, overt rebellion is impossible, but the army in Spain follows its leaders ; it will be impossible, for financial reasons, to keep it at its present strength, and forty thousand men will, it is stated, be at once despatched to Cuba, partly to suppress the insurrection, but chiefly to demand obedience from the Volunteers to the Royal authority. Nothing has happened since King Alfonso returned to make the cities more contented, or to make the soldiery more obedient to the Crown instead of their leaders, or to convince the peasantry that the existing regime must be defended at all hazards. There has been no reconciliation with Rome, and no asser- tion of the principle of religious freedom. The muni- cipalities have not been enfranchised. The Government shrinks from even appearing to touch the deep-rooted agrarian evils of the South, where, in certain districts at all events, owners and peasantry live in an atmosphere of dangerous and implacable hostility. None of the reforms which give stability to Governments have been attempted, while the one thing which might have supplied the want of them—devotion to the King—has not sprung up. There is no reason that we know of why King Alfonso, though head-strong and young, should not make a good average Monarch ; but it is evident that he has not in him the genius of a born ruler, unless, indeed, it be shown in the firmness with which, under extreme pressure, he has adhered to his first adviser, Del Castillo.
But Spain may enjoy the quiet of exhaustion? Spain may, just as Spain may develop a Minister of genius; but where is the evidence that Spain will ? All the testimony points to the singular fact that Spain has not been exhausted by this war, that except through the conscription, the greater portion of her territory has not felt its effects. The country has not been taxed. The bondholders, the civil employe's, and the clergy have paid the expenses of the war between them, and though no doubt the well-to-do have yielded part of their hoards to buy exemptions, and the civil servants have demanded fees, and those who required ecclesiastical help have had to pay the clergy, still nations easily survive and forget minor oppressions of that sort. Spain has been growing rich all through the war. The truth is, that with a country so rich and so nearly untaxed, and a people so thrifty, wealth, when it has once begun to accumulate, increases almost of itself, till when the hour arrives, Europe is startled to see the resources possessed by an " exhausted " nation. The conscription, no doubt, has been bitterly felt, but the actual number who have joined the colours has not been half the number of youths who read twenty every year in Spain—that is, about 175,000—and not above half of these can have been used up. There is just enough exhaustion in Spain to make the people feel bitter, and disposed to seek some remedy for their uneasiness ; and in the absence of a great ruler, they are likely, according to all the precedents of Southern Europe, to find relief in secret agitation for a change of Government, which, in this instance, can only be a change to a Republic.
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