BOOKS.

THE THIERS MEMOIRS.*

RARELY has a statesman in any country been placed in a position of such responsibility, or has had to encounter such formidable difficulties, as M. Thiers when, upon the fall of that artificial and rococo political fabric termed the Second Empire, he undertook, at seventy-three years of ago, to guide the destinies of France. He had to make peace with an absolutist and narrow-minded Sovereign at the head of a victorious Army, camped in the heart of French territory, whose commanders knew no pity for a vanquished foe, and whose efforts were seconded by the most adroit and unscrupulous .diplomatist of the age. Not only had he to make a peace whose conditions were sure to be leonine, but he had to ensure the execution of its provisions, and in doing so he was, at the very outset, met with the contingency that many of his most influential opponents, alarmed at the recuperative powers shown by their stricken foe, repented of what they deemed the undue moderation of their demands, and showed a strong disposition to renew the contest whilst they still held positions of great military vantage. Before the task of freeing French territory from the abhorred presence of the foreigner could even be commenced, the tottering Ministry of which Thiers was the head had to deal with an outburst of anarchical rage on the part of the proletariat of Paris so furious and serious as to amount to a civil war. A gigantic sum of money had to be raised from an impoverished country in order to satisfy Prussian avarice. A demoralized Army .bad to be reorganized, at all events to such an extent as to show both friend and foe alike that the military power of Franco was still a factor in the European situation. In settling the future form of government with which France was to be endowed, the claims and bitter dissensions of rival dynasties, as well as of those Republicans, some of an extreme, others of a moderate type, who were opposed to all _dynasties, had to be carefully weighed and considered. The constant disputes between angry coadjutors, whose nerves were in a high state of tension, enhanced at every moment the friction attendant on the working of a hastily constructed administrative machine composed of very heterogeneous elements.

That, .amidst this extraordinary combination of adverse circumstances, one man should have been able to control events ; that he should have succeeded in maintaining his position ; that he should have secured peace on terms which, though severe, were snore favourable than eould have been expected ; that he should have speedily freed French soil from the presence of the enemy ; that he should have restored French credit and reorganized the French Army ; and that for three years he should have prevented the smouldering embers of Royalist and Republican animosity from bursting into a blaze which would have been disastrous to the future of his country—these constitute feats of which any statesman might well be proud. Probably no then Jiving Frenchman but Thiers could have accom- plished it. Nevertheless, any survivor of that eventful period, speaking merely from memory and without any minute research into contemporary records, will have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the Thiers Memoirs, deeply, interesting

though they be, do not tell the whole tale. Neither, indeed, do they add much to the information previously in the possession of the public. The lion's account of his own conduct is pro- verbially one-sided. .111. Thiers frequently dwells on his own "almost superhuman efforts." He vaunts both the ".moderation and firmness" with which he governed France. and the esteem with which he was regarded throughout Europe. These boasts are by no means without justification. At the same time, it is impossible not to feel that, in inditing every page of his Memoirs, the autobiographer has wished to pose as z_inodern_Fabius,. and. to invite his _eountrymen with one voice to cry: "Unus homo nobis restituit rem ! " A modest sense of self-depreciation never, dr-Memoirs of M. Thiess, 1871-73. Translated by r. M. 'Atkinson. London: George Allen and UnwIn. [12s. 68. net.]

however, counted amongst the numerous and unquestionably high qualities of M. Thiers.

The omissions in the Memoirs are, in fact, notable. Take, for instance, the history of the Commune, in itself a political

episode of the •utmost importance, whose incidents appear to have faded in a manner whisih is both unaccountable and regrettable front the memories Of the present generation. Its true history has never yet been written. The best account is that contained in Les Convulsions de Paris, and M. Maxima du Camp, the author of that work, acknowledged that, until free access was allowed to the records of the period, many points of importance had to be left in obscurity. M. Thiers adds little or nothing to our knowledge on the subject. More especially does he appear to gloss over the terrible nature of the vengeance which was wreaked on the insurrectionists. That the French Army and the French people should have been madly exasperated against those who, whilst the foreigner was in their midst, raised tho standard of rebellion, and who were guilty of the ghastly crime of murdering the Archbishop of Paris and his associates,.

was natural enough. But it is notorious that the punishment subsequently infficted was perhaps even more than commensurate with the offence. M. Thiers tells us nothing of what really

occurred in this connexion. He contents himself with observing that many thousands of prisoners were taken, and that ".the English Press, always well informed, declared that greater humanity had never been evinced towards greater criminalS.".

Again, M. Thiers tells us little of the negotiations with the Royalists which took place immediately after his assumption of office. His own sympathies were avowedly Orleanist, but he, very rightly, cared more for conservatism than for the interests of individual Princes. "Every Government," he declared to the Chamber, "must be conservative, and no society could live under a Government that was not." This unequivocal declara- tion evoked, curiously enough, applause from the Moderate Republican Loft and murmurs from the Right, which looked for a more distinct adhesion to its own Royalist principles. Occi- sionally, the hearts of the small Bonapartist clique beat high.; but although Prince Bismarck, who did not wish to see a Republican Government established in France, at one time suggested with .malign adroitness that the three hundred thousand French prisoners then in German hands might be made to constitute an army at the head of which a Napoleon might again be seated on the throne, there was never any really serious prospect of a genuine Napoleonic revival. The case of the Royalists was different. There can be little doubt that if, at the time, they had been able to agree on the choice of a man, there would have been a Royalist Restoration. But it was hopeless to expect any such agreement. I well remember that a distinguished Legitimist said to me at the time : "Mon cher, les Orleanistcs sent pires que les Communards." M. Thiess: speedily convinced himself that a Restoration was impossible, and that the only hope of the future lay in the establishment Of a conservative Republic. None the less, he eventually fell a victim to Royalist effort. Had the Comte de Chambord wished, he could have been King of France, but his historic letter of October 27th, 1873, to that strange and self-elected negotiator,

M. Chesnelong, which is given at length in M. Hanotaux's history, finally dashed Royalist hopes to the ground. It showed that, like a true Bourbonathe Count had learnt nothing and had forgotten nothing, and that when !he insisted on the substitution of the white flag for the tricolor,,which was associated with all the glories of the French- Army—ran episode afterwards cruelly satirized by Anatole France in his ile. des Pengouin-s—he meant

more than a sentimental attachment to a piece of bunting, and that he only wished to: return. to: power if the principles which

were implied in the symbol were.again to be enforced. It was honourable to himself,. and also beneficial to France, that he showed his hand se unreservedly. The country was at heart

Republican. A restoration of the Monarchy could only have been temporary, and would .assuredly -have led to further internal strife, and possibly to European complications.

Perhaps, however, the most interesting, and -certainly the most pathetic, portion of the Memoirs is that in which the veteran statesman gives a full account of his experiences at the time when he was-knocking at the door of every Foreign Office in Europe in the vain hope of obtaining material, assistance for his sorely stricken country. All with one consent began to make excuse. None were prepared for war. All were stupefied at the completeness and rapidity of the Prussian success: In London, . he had an interview with Lord Granville, whom he found " guided chiefly by a policy of inertia." A tradition survives at the Foreign Office that what really occurred at this interview, which took place. late in the afternoon, was that 141: Thiers delivered a. long, iMpassionod, and carefully prepared- speech. Lord 'Granville Men made some remarks in reply, but in a few minutesnoticed that M. Tillers had leant back in his chair and had fallen fast asleep. He Was. in the habit of getting up very early in the morning, and, in consequence, often felt greatly fatigued later in the day. Lord Granville allowed him to sleep for a 'Shed time, and then took. from the grate the fireirons, which happen to be of a rather exceptionally massive description, and allowed them to fall with a crash on the floor. This awoke M. Thiers, Who then rose, shook Lord Granville warmly by the hand, and, after a few words of compliment, withdreW. M. Thiers also saw Mr. Gladstone, to whom he pleaded the cause of France. Mr. Gladstone " preserved a grieved and uncomfortable silence," and then, as we learn from Lord Morley's history, relieved his feelings by suggesting that Alsace and Lorraine might be neutralized under the guarantee of all the Powers, and by writing to Professor Max Midler a moral disquisition showing how " the smallest errors in the forum of conscience are the greatest in the vast theatre of action." Such arguments addressed to Prince Bismarck produced as much effect as a missile launched from a peashooter on an elephant. He was of opinion that " a guarantee is in these days of little value." Since then, Europe has had every reason to learn that Prince Bismarck's view was correct. At Vienna, the Austrians " clearly saw the danger that threatened Europe," but Count Andrassy, speaking on behalf of Hungary, said that they were " not in a position to make war." All that Count Beust could suggest was that Italy might be utilized as a cat's-paw. " The intervention of Italy was the only way to make the war universal." At St. Petersburg, M. Thiers found Prince Gortchakow animated by the most profound distrust and dislike of the Prussians. " The whole of Russia," he said to M. Thiers, " is full of sympathy for you and of the opposite for Prussia." But the Tsar was manifestly under secret engagements to Berlin, and definitely declined to afford any material assistance. At Rome, the Italian Ministers were " prodigal of protestations of friendship and of regret that they could not help France:" Thus, the chastened and discomfited emissary returned to Paris convinced that France must rely solely on her own resources.

Perhaps the reflection which most forces itself on the mind, after reading this striking example of the results obtained by military preparedness when brought in contact with absence of preparation, is profound astonishment at the ease with which British statesmen and the British public" allowed themselves to be lulled into a false state of security, and remained inactive during the long armed truce which ensued before Germany, judging that the time had at last come, drew up the curtain on the second act of the world-drama, of which that of the first fell at Sedan. Yet there ware not wanting acute observers whose vision into the future was more prophetic. Sir Robert Morier had been a strong German sympathizer. He had hoped that German victory would prove a great benefit to civilization. But when he saw that the result would not be a German but what he called a " Bismarckian " peace, ho fully realized what it meant. Writing to Sir Louis Mallet, he said that it was " of the greatest importance that we should strengthen and evoke all the Nationalism and Imperialism left within us if we are to hold our own."

Equally interesting is the full account given in the Memoirs of the negotiations between Prince Bismarck and M. Thiers. At the risk of being considered an advocatus diaboli, I am con- - strained to confess that the former of these two statesmen is revealed in a character more worthy of esteem than might have been supposed probable. Indignation at Prussian proceedings and at later Prussian policy should not he allowed to obscure the fact that at that time the Germans had a real grievance against the French. They wished to create a united nation. The first step towards the achievement of this object had been taken. 'Austria was humbled. It was then hoped to unite together all the South Germans under Prussian hegemony. The aim was perfectly legitimate. It was certainly in complete accordance with the Nationalist principles now generally accepted in this-country. But it was welt known that the French Govern- ment, being still under the influence of the old Balance of Power theories, would resist its accomplishment by force of arms. Hence the necessity- of - either. abandoning the National pro- gramiae or engaging' in . a War.

. .

. But if.somoreaeonable justification can be.pleaded for making waranone whatever. can be proffered for the methods adopted to

bring it about. Talleyranda speaking of his intimate friend Montrond, said " Je Panne, parecqu'il West pas infinitneut serupuleux," to which Montrond replied : " Et moi

Talleyramh parecqu'il West pas .du tout serupuleux." Prince Bismarck bore a closer resemblance to Talleyrand than to Montrond. He was front the first determined on -war. He allowed no scruples of any kind to hinder the attainment of his object. His diplomatic conduct resembled the proceedings of the picadors at a Spanish bull-fight, who goad their victim into a fury as a preliminary to the enraged animal launching himself on the matador, who awaits him, sword in hand, to give him his coup de gnice. The Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne was a trap which, it omelet be doubted, was designedly laid by Prussian diplomacy with the intention of precipitating the contest which was thought to be inevitable, and when it appeared doubtful whether the desired result would even then be obtained, recourse was had to a falsified telegram, whilst the sympathies of Europe, and especially of England, were alienated from Franco by the timely production of a draft treaty, which it was ingeniously arranged should be in the handwriting-of the French Ambassador, Benedetti, and in which Belgium's guarantee of independence was torn to shreds. But for all that, Prince Bismarck was not a fire-eating bully. He was a statesman.

He had no wish to humiliate France unduly, or to lay the seeds for further dissensions. It is clear from the account given by M. Thiers that, if the terms of peace had had to be decided only by him, they would have been more fltvourable to France than was actually the ease. As it was, in the face of strong opposition, he allowed the original demand for an indemnity to be reduced from six to five milliards of francs, and, after a tough tussle, he agreed to the French remaining in possession of Belfort, a point . to which they attached the utmost importance. For the rest, Prince Bismarck was overborne by the Prussian military party and by tho King, whose obstinacy and importunities made him declare that " Monarchy makes one a Republican."

It is but an act of posthumous justice to recognize that, although it may be that Prince Bismarck's policy was ruthless and utterly unscrupulous, none the less, had it not undergone a notable change for the worse at the hands of his no less un- scrupulous but far less statesmanlike successors, the terrible cataclysm, of which a dismayed world is now the witness, would most probably never have taken place. CROMER.