26 JANUARY 1884, Page 6

THE "REFORM OF THE LORDS."

WE wish some of the speakers, no longer all Radical, but including some Moderate Liberals, like Lord Aberdare and Sir H. Vivian, who begin to allude to a "Reform of the House of Lords," would give the country some notion of the plan of Reform in their minds. They never say a word about methods. We agree heartily with those who say that a House of Commons, elected by all householders, and a House of Peers

permanently and rather bitterly Tory, cannot long co-exist ; but we have never yet seen so much as a suggestive hint as to the practical way to avoid the probable deadlock. Mr. Chamberlain's idea that all will go well, if the Lords will efface themselves when the Commons tell them, is, indeed, very nice and simple, but is a little too like the statement that when husband and wife agree there is always peace in the house. It is quite true, but it does not exactly settle the domestic difficulty, which only arises when Carlyle's "melo- dious agreement of vote is no longer possible, or, at least, is no longer in existence. The necessity of reform may be seen never so clearly, but there is no more difficult problem in politics ; and as we believe the question to be much nearer at hand than Peers generally imagine, we think an effort to clear the ground will not be wholly wasted.

In the first place, we see no ground for thinking that the Lords will efface themselves, will, that is, desist from rejecting minor but valuable Bills, and compelling appeals to the country upon important Bills, to the endless hindrance of business and vexation of the people. Effacement is abolition, and the Lords have, politically, only abolition to risk ; 'while, socially, abolition would be pleasanter than effacement, because of the bargain they would be able to make that no more Peers should be created. The existing Peers would then be the only titled persons among the English-speaking peoples, already a hundred millions, owning a fourth of the world. The Lords will go on opposing as long as ever they can, the more determinedly as legislation, especially about taxation and bequest, becomes, as it will become, more democratic. In the second place, we have little hope from any scheme of arbitration. There could be but one which would be accepted, the Referendum," as it is called in Switzerland,—that is, an arrangement that when the Houses disagree the whole body of electors should vote "yes ' or " no " to the proposal in dispute. That would be a final settlement, and not out of accord with the English scheme of making "the legal nation" the final arbiter ; but statesmen will shrink from it, as introducing the dangerous idea of the pl6biscite, or government by direct vote, instead of government through the vote of a picked though representa- tive Assembly. Some of them would dread a Caesar, and many would believe, as we should, that the vote on a Referendum would prove unbearably Conservative. And in the third place, we may leave, we believe, schemes of abolition entirely out of the question. They could be passed easily enough, if the people wished, for Kings never care for nobles, who are to them a mere class, and a small class ; but the people do not wish. They like the ornamental portion of the Constitution, the red robe of the Judge, and will keep it, if only that may be done without impediment to business. They would bear a good deal before they abolished the Lords and suppressed titles in the only practicable way, namely, by heavy taxation for the use of them. (The French made their use capital, yet they are used as much as ever, but they could not survive taxation.) Moreover, the fear of single-Chamber government is in this country historic and deep-seated. No Colony dispenses with a second House, and it would probably be impossible to con- vince Englishmen that a revival of the Royal veto, to be used on the responsibility of Ministers, would be a sufficient check against the only serious danger,—the passage of a dangerous Bill against the advice of responsible Ministers, in a fit of temper or emotion. The country distrusts every Ministry a little, and regards the Second Chamber as a reserve force with which it is dangerous to dispense,—as, indeed, if the millionaires ever succeeded in bribing a majority or a Cabinet, it might be. The practical end to be sought—at least, if the change is to be made before a Revolutionary storm gets up —is therefore Reform, and not abolition, and the diffi- culties of Reform are very considerable. There is, for example, no method of limiting the co-ordinate power of the Lords which would not involve dangers. To compel them, for instance, to accept any Bill passed on its third reading by a majority of a hundred Commoners would leave them powerless just when they might be most useful, when a great wave of emotion was passing over the Lower House, or it was carried away by temper. We have never been able to forget the stampede in favour of the Cattle Disease Bill, or the way in which the House changed its view when Mr. Plimsoll seemed likely to die of philanthropy. To change, again, the absolute veto of the Peers, into a suspensive veto for one Parliament, would be to introduce such excessive delay into politics as would take all interest out of them ; while to narrow the veto to one Session would be simply to reduplicate every debate, and load the House of Commons with "old business " and " new business," to be taken together, till Members would give up in despair, or be deprived of all assistance from men who could not make of representation a regular and, very soon, we fear, a paid profession. Any work could be done, if all Members would work at it every day, all day, and through the year ; but only paid professionals will do that. No other limitation of power can, we believe, be suggested, while the usual devices for compromise by consulta- tion are nearly useless. They exist already, and when applied always end either in the Bill being spoiled, or in the Houses finding that the divergence between them is one of principle, and incurable by argument.

The Reform must be effected through some change in the composition of the Lords as a House, and the point is to dis- cover one which would work. No attempt to create Peers and so equalise the parties will succeed, for besides the dislike of the country for the multiplication of Lords till they be- came, as the Knights are becoming, a sort of labelled caste and nothing else, new Lords cannot be relied on to be Liberal. Half of them rat at once, cynically and shamelessly, and the remainder become Tories in the next generation. Nor have we much reliance on Life Peerages. Where should we get three hundred fit men ? and if we did get them, why should they not all pose as defenders of Conservative order ? Besides, it would take a revolution to pass the Bill, the Lords being as impatient of the idea as of abolition ; while the country scarcely cares to be legislated for by dignified old gentlemen, not elected, not historic, and not very wealthy. The only modifying power conceivable is a process of election. We suppose that if two hundred Peers were elected to form the voting House—for we would leave each hereditary Peer right of speech—two being sent up by all householders in each county, they would desire to be re-elected, and therefore pay some attention to the opinions of their constituents ; but it is not certain they would. That plan might be tried, as the one which is most in accordance with our man- ners, which leaves the Upper House in existence, and which maintains the interest of the aristocratic class in the business of politics ; but it might result in a Tory majority, with more power than at present. The Borough Tories and County Tories voting together would certainly carry many seats. Still, if the Representative Peers cared for their seats, such a scheme might work well, while it would have the further advantage that Scotland and Ireland would be better represented in the Upper House than they are now. It is not quite certain, however, that two hundred Peers would care, for nothing like that number attend to the business of the House ; and if they did not, the scheme would either break down, or lead to a great increase in the number of Peers. Or the election might be arranged in another way, the working two hundred being chosen by the Crown, that is, the Cabinet, on the commencement of each Parliament. That would ensure general accord between the two Houses, yet leave sufficient difference of tone, for every Peer is at heart less Liberal than the usually dominant party, and if he works at all is ready, if not to throw out a Radical Bill, to make it as little Radical as he can. The objection to this scheme, which would otherwise work, is not that the Peers would be nomi- nees, for it would be understood that they were to be inde-

pendent, but that if the majority in the Commons shifted, and a new Government came in without a Dissolution—now, it is true, an nnfrequent occurrence—the Houses might again be brought to a deadlock. There is no visible scheme, in fact, except possibly direct election, which holds out much hope, and we wish the statesmen who have considered the subject would tell the country whether they see any which has not hitherto been discussed. Do they mean Reform of the Peers, or do they mean supersession of the Peers by Senators ; and if the latter, who are the Senators to be At present, all remarks upon the Reform of the Lords, unless they mean at bottom coercion of the Lords till the majority are afraid to vote—a very bad mode of carrying anything but a revolution —are a little in the air.