Vanity Fair
An Ambassador of Peace : Pages from the Diary of
Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin, 1920-1926). Vol. : From Spa (1920) to Rapallo (1922). With Historical Notes by Maurice Alfred Gerotwohl, Litt.D. (Dublin). (Hodder and Stoughton. 21s.)
WuEN Lord D'Abernon was invited in June, 1920, to undertake the post of Ambassador on special mission at Berlin, he confessed that, though able to read German, he had not sufficient knowledge to carry on a discussion in that language. Fortunately for Europe, however, and for the peace of the -world the Prime Minister decided that this was of secondary importance by the side of Lord D'Abernon's special qualifica- tions as an authority on economic and financial subjects and as a non-party figure with wide experience of life and humanity. And, as every page of his diary shows, Great Britain's first Ambassador to Germany after the War possessed a far more important and indeed inestimable quality he could " speak European " and did speak European unflinchingly for many years before M. Briand set up any such standard of international behaviour. He was able from his position in the wings, as it were, to see more clearly perhaps than any other man the intimate details of the post- War scene. And now not only has he set down the facts and his conclusions in a manner that for detachment and humour could hardly be surpassed, but he has put us still more in his debt by some brilliant character-sketches of the chief players and an introductory survey which is a masterly analysis both of the German character and of the whole European economic situation.
The keynote of Lord D'Abernon's policy was struck in the speech he made on presenting his letters of credence : " In the execution of my mission I shall constantly remember that peace has been signed." Not so easy as it sounds, for, as has been truly said, " the paradox of modern war is that in order to win you must reduce the belligerent nations to a condition in which they are unfit to make peace." And if Great Britain was prepared to let bygones be bygones, perhaps this was not only because it is not in the national character to bear malice but also because of Mr. Lloyd George's " out- standing achievement " in attaining at the Versailles Conference all the essential and fundamental objects of British policy. The other " debenture holders in the German Company," whose political aims were far from satisfied, could hardly be expected to view reparations quite in the same light. Nor could the Germans be blamed if they were sullen and suspicious. Yet, as Lord D'Abemon discovered at once, apart from an invincible tendency to complain and a habit of chicane, they behaved exceedingly well, and the new officials, men like Simons, Wirth, Sthamer—later Rathenau and Stresemann—he found " sincere, straightforward, in no sense servile, but sensible and businesslike."
His work in Berlin did not actually begin until October, 1920, for in the meanwhile there was the Spa Conference which finally broke up in confusion at the news of the Bolshevik advance in Poland. Lord D'Abernon himself was convinced of the reality of the danger to the whole of Central Europe. He was called upon to lead the Anglo-French Mission to Warsaw, and we may safely infer that it was the combination of his energy and brains with the military genius of General Weygand that saved the situation.
The first of the succession of futile conferences between the Allies and Germany—in all of which both sides displayed an 'xtraordinary ignorance of economic realities—took place in a large villa where many German Councils of War had been held in 1917-18. With his tongue in his cheek no doubt, our diarist noted that "M. Millerand as the first French delegate occupies not only the mansion but, the bed so long occupied by William II." It was the first occasion on which the Germans had been asked to negotiate on level terms, and there were some
" tense moments, notably when Herr Stinnes, the coal magnate. opened a peroration with " whoever is not afflicted with the disease of victory . . ." This was, of course, only what
everyone in Germany was thinking, but the outburst was in vivid contrast to the language used by M. Millerand, who. ta the amazement of his subordinates, described Germany as a necessary and useful member of the European family." Lord D'Abernon hailed this at the time as " a turning-point in European history." Unfortunately, as we know, it was an isolated gesture which French policy for years afterwards belied. Those two tendencies which found initial expression at Spa were destined to fight one another unceasingly at Brussels- Paris, London, Cannes and Genoa, to the despair of right, minded men who could see that nothing less than European civilization was at stake. The " disease of victory " was all the time from Spa to Rapallo working its poison in the European system—is to-day for that matter—and in 1920 Great Britain alone dared to prescribe the antidote, economic reconstruction.'
Lord D'Abernon soon saw that owing to the immense gulf that separated French and German opinion on reparations no agreement was possible respecting total in- debtedness. What must be sought was a temporary solution, untrammelled if possible by financial theories, and based on the elementary principle of the restoration of German currency. Yet for three years and more there could be no progress on these lines. Mr. Lloyd George insisted that Germany should know her maximum debt, since otherwise she could not recover, and he also clung obstinately to his idea of safeguarding British trade from the effects of reparation payments by imposing a 50 per cent. duty on German imports. Apparently both the English Prime Minister and Herr Rathenau maintained in spite of all advice to the contrary the popular heresy that balance of trade determines exchange values. Lord D'Abernon suggests that, as applied to Germany's inability to pay, this was not merely the cart before the horse, but the cart dragging the horse. And yet the great majority of German theorists and financiers upheld the same view and condemned as currency cranks those who pressed for immediate stabilization. Inci- dentally, when Professors Keynes and Cassel, the two best authorities, went to Berlin at the end of 1922 and presented a report on German finance, it was ignored both by the German Government and the Allies !
There could be no better image of post-War Europe than the remark of Rathenau when he heard that Mr. Lloyd George had no definite programme to back up his plan of European economic co-operation at Genoa :—" The Conference will become a kind of Vanity Fair in which each (nation) will parade his own particular local affairs. A still more disquieting feature is the part played by personal vanity in high politics, though it provides the author with some delightful mots. Of Lord Curzon, for instance, he says : " Nothing about him was more imperial than his enjoyment of vanity," and he suggests as the noble lord's epitaph : " Immense orgueil : justifie." M. Briand " might be deemed the St. Sebastian of pacification but for the perpetual smile and the perpetual cigarette." And Rathenau, the " prophet in a tail-coat," provides a parallel with Mephistopheles, " ein Heber charmanler Mann," who shared the last named's dominant weakness, an egregious vanity, " a determination if he could not rule in heaven to shine on earth." The Genoa Conference itself, on which Mr. Lloyd George staked his policy of concilia- ting Germany and, above all, bringing Russia into the European conclave, is shown here to have been in the last analysis a conflict of three vanities. The German Foreign Minister was as anxious as the English that the Conference should succeed. M. Poincare was determined that it should fail. And that fateful talk at Boulogne a few weeks before was inter- preted by Rathenau in the Reichstag as the defeat of Mr. Lloyd George by M. Poineare. The former read the speech, went to Genoa full of resentment, and was at pains to avoid meeting Rathenau. This apparent change of front convinced the Germans that deep plots were being hatched between the Allies and the Russians, with Germany left out in the cold ; and the result was the Rapallo Treaty, which threatened to throw the whole diplomatic machinery of Europe out of gear.
As a good deed shines in a naughty world, so does Lord D'Abemon's work for reconciliation 'between Great Britain and Germany stand out the more luminously against the dark background of Europe which this diary reveals. This is not merely a good book—it is a great book.
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