THE INEXPITGNABILITY OF RUSSIA.
NOTHING since the war began has been finer from the military point of view, nothing more chivalrous from the moral, nothing bolder from the political, than the action of our Russian allies. The fall of Lemberg, or, rather, its evacuation, for of course an open city cannot be said to have fallen, gives no ground for revising that statement. It is possible that the Russians' retreat will not end at Lemberg, and that they will have to abandon the line of the Vistula and fall back on that of the Bug. On the other hand, it may be that the Germans have reached the point where the force of the wave is exhausted, and that they will be held at no great distance from the city. Without question there is a point somewhere where the force of the German advance will be stayed, just as the German advance was stayed before it reached Paris. The only question is Where,— for there is not the slightest fear of the Russian armies being destroyed and swept out of existence, leaving an indefinite quantity of our ally's country to be overrun and occupied. The very worst that can happen to the Russians is that they will continue to fall back as they Lava fallen back so often in their history. But falling back by Russians, as Charles XIL of Sweden found when he made his mad rush to Poltava, as Napoleon found before Moscow, as the Allies found in the Crimea, and as Japan found in Manchuria, does not mean defeat or the end of a war, or anything but a very ticklish situation for the proud invader. It merely mean, that the so-called conqueror has got to decide whether he will plod on after the Russians and get more and more deeply involved in their country, or whether he will sit down till they have collected strength enough to come at him again. Although Lemberg is reoccupied—remember, it was not a Russian city, but a Russian conquest—and even if Warsaw is taken, the Germane will be faced with this triple dilemma—to use a Hibernianism. If they go on, and try vaguely but stubbornly to hack their way through to somewhere in European Russia, their advance will eat up more and more troops, and expose them, not only to endless transport difficulties, but to tremendous commitments in the way of drafts to keep their fighting line intact. If they sit down where they are and dig themselves in, they have an amazingly difficult job before them. Even German hardi- hood and ingenuity must quail at the thought of a line of ditches from the Roumanian frontier to a point in the Baltic provinces north of Libau. Such an entrenched line could only be effectively held by a couple of million men, and Heaven only knows how many guns. But even if this heroic remedy is employed, the line must be very thin almost everywhere. This means that it is liable to be pierced by the Russians, who would soon discover that it was not necessary for them to have as we and the French have in Flanders, a corresponding line—in this case a thousand miles long. The Russians would be able to select a point or points where they could break through the attenuated enceinte, for lateral railway communication on, say, the line of the Vistula is not like lateral railway communication in Silesia. The third course is for the Germans,after having inflicted& serious defeat in the field on the Russians, to keep two or three mobile armies ready to watch the frontier, and then withdraw the mass of their troops and hurl them on the Allies in France or on the Italian frontier. But this plan, though it sounds excellent on paper, is really a very difficult business. In the first place, the Russians would return, as a swarm of bees returns no matter how many times it has been driven off —provided that "the spirit of the hive" has decreed that the bees shall swarm at a particular spot. The Russian armies are, in a word, most difficult armies from which to disentangle oneself. They have a habit of clinging round the necks of their conquerors which is most embarrassing.
The only hope for their antagonists is that the Russians may get tired of being hit all over, and may agree to leave off fighting, as they did in the case of the Japanese War. But this is a vain hope. The Russians will never leave off fighting in the present war till the Germans and the Austrians are thoroughly beaten. Russia knows that the whole future of the Slavonic world is at stake, and also her leadership of the race. There- fore even if the Allies were to desert her—a proposition, of course, wholly unthinkable—she would, we are fully cimvinced, insist on struggling on alone. Her heart is in this war as it has never been in any war before, and to abandon it means for her the abandonment of every ideal that she possesses. The way in which Russia has waged this war, alluded to in the first sentence of this article, is proof that we do not speak without warrant. Russia from the beginning has taken all risks, and taken them cheerfully, and with a cheerfulness due not to ignorance but determination. Knowing, as she knew, her own want of preparation and her lack of strategic railways on the frontier, she might have played a waiting game and dared the Germans to come at her while she perfected her mobilization and her accumulation of munitions behind her covering troops. Instead of that she boldly "waded in," went for her enemy, and, in spite of the dangers to which it exposed her, invaded Galicia, crossed the Carpathians, and left herself open to the attack of her enemies. By acting in this way Russia gave to her allies a whole-hearted support, not merely military but political, and she deserves their warmest gratitude. But for the bold Russian advance into Galicia and to the south Serbia might have been overrun, and, it is conceivable, Roumania and Bulgaria bullied or cajoled into taking the German side. Russia's daring not only greatly relieved the pressure in Flanders when such relief was most required, but steadied the situation in the Balkans, and also no doubt largely influenced the policy of Italy. Therefore, once again, all gratitude to Russia! We sympathize with her deeply in her disappointment at having temporarily to withdraw from the country she has conquered from the Austrians, a country which she was specially anxious to retain owing to the Slavonic character of the population. When, however, she makes her second leap, the better to achieve which she has gone back, the liberation of the Slav will be permanent and not tem- porary. Though the Austrian flag may wave over Lemberg once more for a few months, ita permanent re-establishment there is impossible.
In dealing with the military problems which confront Russia we must never forget the size and the thickness of her Empire. It is like an enormous cloak. The fringe may get very ragged, and you may cut huge pieces out of it before and behind, but so vast are its dimensions that it will still remain for all purposes of warmth and security a perfectly serviceable garment. Pieces cut from it are hardly noticed—pieces which if cut from a smaller coat would leave nothing but a collar and a pair of sleeves. That is why the duration of war, which is so de.ngeroua to smaller and more con- centrated States, affects Russia so little. Short wars are her danger. Long wars only prove her strength. At this moment, after nearly a year's fighting, Russia is only just beginning to be mistress of her resources in men and munitions. The hardy soldiers of her Far Eastern [provinces are in many cases only just beginning to be got ready for the firing line. But though Russia is slow "she gets there just the same." Her hundred and seventy millions of population have not yet really begun to make their presence felt in Poland, though we may be sure that they will do so before many months have passed. The giant limbs are stirring, even though the giant is not yet properly awake. Therefore let there be no hysterical talk about Russian clibcieles or crushing German and Austrian victories merely because the Russians have walked out of Lemberg as they walked out of Przemysl, and as quite conceivably they may walk out of Warsaw. The Russians are not worried about it, although they not unnaturally feel annoyed at the want of understanding of the true position shown here and in France. But if they do not worry, why should we do so ? There is something ungentlemanly and ill-bred in offering condolences with streaming eyes and drawn face to a man who is taking his punishment like a hero. Do not let us begin to mourn for Russia till she mourns for herself. The only effect of Russian reverses in Petrograd and Moscow is to make the people harden their hearts and determine to do better next time. Let us, then, thank Heaven for allies so heroic, and not perturb or disgust them by even the best-meant lamentations. Rather let us thank them from our hearts because, like the ROM= General of old, they "have not despaired of the Republic."
Previous page
