Brief Encounter
WHAT, then, may we hope from the Summit?' the Spectator asked a year ago. 'The grim but realistic answer is: very little.' And we got even less. The events of the last twelve months have only served to confirm the impression that a Summit conference at that time could have achieved nothing of real value—that the U2 episode in fact saved much waste of time and talk. Even disarmament, on which it was then still possible to hold out some hope, has since proved an intractable problem.
What, then, may we hope from the meeting of K and K? Again, very little; but for a different reason. This is not a Summit; not, at least, in the sense the term has come to be used. It is simply • a meeting between two Heads of State, and its effects are likely to be as marginal as such meet- ings commonly are. On the other hand, little harm can come out of it: and such meetings are pro- ductive of some good even if they do nothing else but enable the Heads of State to know and understand each other better. Obviously Mr. Kennedy is going to make it clear where he stands over Laos (and Thailand, and South Viet- nam); and the clearer he makes it, the less chance there is that Mr. Khrushchev will let something foolish be done in that part of the world.
Significantly, there have been no protests this time about the other nations in the alliance being left out. Nobody fears that Mr. Kennedy is preparing to do a deal with Russia over Berlin or anywhere else (though Mr. A. J. P. Taylor is busy urging him to). That Mr. Kennedy, who was always opposed to Summit meetings, should have agreed to meet Mr. Khrushchev is itself an indication that it is not designed to settle all the world's problems with a scrap of paper; the dis- appointment when nothing materialises will therefore be the less. It will give Mr. Kennedy an opportunity io size up his opponent face to face; and for that limited object, it is worth the voyage.
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