An Atlantic Agreement
THE peace of the world depends in the first degree upon the maintenance of peace between Great Britain and the United States, and in scarcely a lesser degree on the absence of a naval competition between these- two countries. The decision of the British Govern- ment to postpone the laying down of two out of the three cruisers due for this year is • a flashlight signal to America that we do not want a competition and that we do not regard the failure of the -Geneva Conference as having made competition in the least necessary. But Iet us understand that a slowing down in our Construction Of cruisers does little to compose the various differences which were diScovered it Geneva.
Great Britain did not dispute the right of the United States to build a' navy equal to our own in strength.
What the Admiralty representatives did demur to was that, whereas Great Britain would use up the greater part of the permitted tonnage in building light cruisers for patrolling the seas, the United States would use the greater part of her tonnage for building 10,000 ton cruisers. The United States might thus become- our superior in large cruisers. " That," said the Admiralty in effect, " is a result of ' mathematical parity' to which we cannot consent. For Great Britain it would mean inferiority in real fighting strength." The danger seems to us to be much leis than the Admiralty reckoned. It must be remembered, at all events, that at present we are still some way ahead of the United States in large cruisers. Apart from the British cruiser which is now to be laid down, Great Britain is building fourteen against the eight of the United States.
A much more accommodating policy is necessary on both sides if we are to come to a permanent under- standing. One of the most interesting proposals we have read for an entirely new approach to the subject appeared in the Sunday Times last Sunday. " Scrutator," the writer of the article, suggests that Great Britain has no longer any need to preserve the right to destroy the sea-borne commerce of a nation with which she is at war.
A change in this matter would, of course, be a complete break with the long-established doctrine of the Admiralty. The old argument used to run : " Great Britain is the greatest naval power in the world, and she must be free to use her naval strength to the full. To consent to any unnecessary limitation of right of capture would be to cut off our right hand. We can only hope to destroy our enemies by destroying their trade."
Under the old conditions this doctrine was perfectly true. When Germany talked insinuatingly about the "Freedom of the Seas "—the phrase that was taken up by President Wilson—she was really trying to make us forfeit our right to exercise our naval strength. In this country the phrase was very rightly suspected.
Now, however, that we have agreed in principle (though not yet h detail) to equality of naval strength with the United States., the whole situation is changed. Our anxieties and responsibilities would be enormously lessened if our sea-borne commerce, was not liable to capture and therefore had not be protected. • " Scrutator proposes that there should be an agree- ment (referring at first only to the Atlantic and the British seas) between Great Britain and the United States not to -molest each other's Commerce " on the high seas " in the event of their ever being at war with each other. Further, the North Atlantic and British seas would be declared a " free sea " in which non- contraband commerce would be exempt from molestation by any belligerent craft. Great Britain and America would agree to take joint measures against any belligerent Power which did not respect this freedom. Of course, the British and American Navies in Combination would be so overwhelming in strength that no other Power would risk their hostility.
It may be said that it is useless to make new rules for the conduct of war. Nobody, it is argued, will keep the rules when driven to desperation. Only three weeks ago Lord Wester VVemyss was arguing in the House of Lords that we ought to get rid of the Declaration of Paris and reassert the unbridled right of the British NaVy to do what it has the strength to do. For our part we are under no illusions about regulations. It is useless to draw them up if they will not be observed. But although this may be a fair generalization it would be quite untrue of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain. By agreeing to parity with the United States we have already 'shown that we trust her. If that is a " risk " it is a risk that we have already accepted. -" Scrutator " follows Lord Cecil in imagining Great Britain and the United States as the joint police of the seas. Beginning with the Atlantic the system might perhaps be indefinitely extended ; but even if extension were impossible, the preliminary agreement would be of inestimable value in ruling out the one cause of Anglo-American rivalry and' mistrust. The most important seas in the world would be safe for commerce in all circumstances. There might be fleet actions, but there would be no commerce raiding.
If such an agreement could be secured, everything else that is desirable as between the United States and ourselves would follow. A joint responsibility is com- pletely consonant with parity, but parity which takes no account of geography—as so far proposed by the United States—alarms the Admiralty out of its wits. Ever since the time of Franklin the United States has invited us to exempt sea-borne commerce from capture in war. In the past we were right to refuse. We had to ask ourselves whether we could afford to tie one hand behind our backs in a prospective war with France and then in a prospective war with Germany. Now our only possible rival at sea is the United States, and our statesmen tell us that she is no rival at all, as war with her is " unthinkable."
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