An irreversible act
Edward Mortimer
Jerusalem Many people in Israel, in Egypt and elsewhere will be grateful to President Sadat for his astonishing unilateral gesture in going to Israel. But if any one person Should be especially grateful it is the President of the United States. For there can be little doubt that Sadat's immediate Objective was to strengthen Mr Carter in his struggle against a formidable coalition of American pressure groups.
That does not mean that Sadat is being insincere or devious. While we should all by now have learnt to beware of making Predictions about this magnificently unpredictable statesman, it still seems fair to assume that General 'Mot& Gur, the Israeli Chief of Staff, was wrong when he suggested last week that the whole thing might be a smokescreen for an imminent new Egyptian military offensive.
General Gur ought to know that the Psychological element is important in warfare, and that you do not effectively Prepare your people or your armed forces for a military offensive by publicly embracing the leaders of the nation you're about to attack, describing them as your friends, and proclaiming your belief in the sincerity of their desire for peace. There was certainly nothing like this in the diplomatic build-up to the war of October 1973.
No, the fact is that the changes which Sadat made last weekend in the ArabIsraeli relationship are largely irreversible — Which is precisely why they are so Infuriating to his Arab critics. Only if Sadat were to be overthrown by a full-scale coup crew in the next few days could there be any hope of re-erecting the psychological barrier which he has broken down. A mere assassination would not suffice, since his successor would then have to emerge from the ruling group which has endorsed his move and is already compromised by it. A fortiori, Sadat himself is now committed irrevocably to the strategy of seeking a peaceful settlement.
Why has he made this commitment? The simplest answer is probably the right one. He does not believe that another war could bring the problem any nearer a solution. He considers that the last four wars (five if Nasser's 'war of attrition' is counted, as it Should be) have done more than enough damage to the Arabs in general, and Egypt in particular. He therefore does not intend to start another war. Thus far Assad of Syria would probably agree with him. The difference between them is that Assad b. ,elieves the peaceful strategy can work only tithe threat of war is kept hanging over the heads of Israel and her western supporters. Sadat thinks that threats you do not intend to carry out are not credible, and therefore not effective but counter-productive, because they give arguments to the hawks on the other side.
From this follow other differences. Assad favours keeping in with the Russians, because only the Russians will supply the weapons which can make the threat of war at all credible. He has accepted Sadat's idea that American leverage is the key to the problem, but believes that the Americans will not do favours for the Arabs unless the Arabs play hard to get. Sadat, helped perhaps by a genuine personal dislike of communism in general and Russians in particular, has made a closer analysis of the American political system. He thinks the Americans will only give real help to those whom they believe to be wholeheartedly on their side.
Sadat knows very well that the emotional sympathies of the American public are with Israel, not with the Arabs, and he knows that this is a genuine limiting factor on the policies of US administrations, all of which without exception, once they have been in office long enough to gain a clear understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of American interests in the region, show a desire to move American policy away from the unconditional support of Israel which most American public opinion considers normal Traditional ly,Republican administrations are better at standing up to public opinion on , this issue than Democratic ones, because the Americans who feel strongest on the issue (by no means all of them Jews) tend to be Democrat voters.
Sadat and o*her Arab leaders were therefore initially dismayed by Jimmy Carter's victory over Gerald Ford, and were very favourably surprised when Carter quickly began to show a real interest in working for a Middle East settlement and even to show a real awareness of the Palestinian problem, which previous administrations had tended to brush aside.
Carter and his advisers have put forward proposals for a Middle East settlement corresponding very 'closely to what Sadat himself wants: Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, with only minor alterations, and a Palestinian homeland or entity in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, preferably linked to Jordan in some way but essentially giving independent expression to the Palestinian identity and thereby enabling the neighbouring Arab states to lay down the Palestinian cross they have borne for thirty years. It was obvious that Israel was not going to accept this solution, even before the election which brought Begin to power last May. When Carter began to urge it publicly, therefore, he inevitably came into conflict with the pro-Israeli lobby inside and outside Congress. And it was not only Arab paranoia that saw a connection between this fact and the trouble which he encountered in Congress in other areas of policy: energy, tax reform, social welfare, etc., not to mention poor old Bert Lance.
The strength of the Israel lobby is real, but it is not immutable or monolithic. Many congressmen admit that they vote with the Israeli lobby in response to pressure from constituents more than from personal conviction. A lot depends on public perception of the issues. Carter and his aides have explained often enough, privately and publicly, that they will not impose a solution on Israel. The don't believe it would work, and public opinion in any case would not let them do it. The question needs to be framed differently: how much support would Israel get it' it refused a settlement that the Americans — not only the administration, but the public — considered reasonable and how long could Israel go on refusing if it felt the American public was no longer behind it?
The answers to both questions depend in large part on the perception of the threat to Israel's existence and security by the public — both the American and the Israeli public. The arguments used by the Israeli political establishment and its American supporters to justify retention of large parts of the territories conquered in 1967 carry conviction only if one assumes a context of continued Arab hostility towards Israel even after a peace agreement. The chief object of Sadat's visit to Israel was precisely to undermine that assumption, thereby both eroding the Israeli consensus itself and reducing unconditional support, for Israeli government policies and demands (as opposed to Israel's existence) among the American public. The chances of an Israeli government holding out indefinitely against reasoned American persuasion should thus also be much reduced.
Sadat, therefore, was probably neither surprised nor disappointed by the stale, unimaginative arguments with which Begin and other Israeli leaders responded to his appeal, while heaping him with personal compliments and greetings. Other Arabs, including many Egyptians, have • indeed reacted bitterly, arguing that Sadat has wasted the strongest card in the Arab hand and thus reinforced the Israelis in their complacent unwillingness to compromise.
Sadat will have been more interested in the fact that Begin's obduracy (which he himself pretended not to notice) has been almost unanimously criticised by Israel's traditional friends in the West, and in Israel itself. He has indeed taken an enormous gamble, heaping all his chips on one number as is his wont. But the wheel must be allowed to spin for a bit before we see whether he has won or lost.
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