26 SEPTEMBER 1941, Page 5

, War Surveyed GERMANY AND THE CAUCASUS

By STRATEGICUS

F we would understand the tempo, scope and chances of the German plan in the East we cannot do better than dy with some care the battle of Kiev which is now in its ncluding stages. It has been stated from the Russian side t this great battle began some six weeks before the fall of ley, and that takes us back to the end of the battle of Uman. at ended about August loth; and already the German staff d come to the conclusion that it was developing as well as ey could wish, and Keitel had launched another heavy attack seemed as if it had no relation, or very little, to the events hich were running to their climax so far away. Gomel is cst 28o miles due north of Uman ; and it is so important junction that it was impossible to guess what use would be de of its capture. Indeed, it is quite possible that when e battle was first launched it was intended to threaten the orthern movement as well as the southern. About this me the Germans were still trying to take Bryansk, and omel lies on the direct fine to that even more important unction. But Timoshenko dealt roughly with Guderian's ttempt to take Bryansk, and Keitel turned the whole of his orce, including Guderian's reformed armoured group, owards the south.

From this point the operations of the left flank of von undstedt's army. and the right of von Bock's appear to have en closely co-ordinated. The battle of Gomel ended on ugust loth and the attack upon the crossings of the river sna began. Four days later the Dnieper bridgehead at erkasi was captured and on the following day that of niepropetrovsk was taken by von Kleist's armoured corps. e Dnieper began to look like a leaky dam. The fight for e crossings of the Desna seems to have been fierce and tubbom, for it was almost three weeks before the town of ernigov, at the elbow of the river, was fully in German ds. This town lies 6o miles south-east of Gomel and the ate of advance can easily be gauged ; but it seems tp have been Id in order to allow Budenny to withdraw his troops east- ard, because by the time that it had fallen the whole of the outhern flank was in jeopardy.

It has been announced that the two armies, the right of n Bock's and (Marshal von Reichenau's) the left of von undstedt's, achieved contact on Saturday, September 13th. armoured groups naturally cut all the communications of e armies lying to the west and events then marched quickly. September i4th Kremenchug was evacuated. Three days ter the Germans forced crossings at a number of points on e lower Dnieper and advanced upon a broad front towards e east. The next day, as I was writing last week, the final tuck on Kiev by von Reichenau's army began and the Germans announced that the attacks were " developing into a major operation." Two days later the Germans hoisted their flag over the citadel at Kiev after bitter street-fighting.

There are a number of points of very great interest in this story of the battle. At the outset it is admitted by the enemy that the Russians wrought " inconceivable destruction " in Kiev before abandoning it. That is a point of major importance, since it is in flagrant contradiction with the impression the German High Command suggest of a disorderly flight from the Ukraine capital. There appears to be no doubt that Marshal Budenny has again extricated a considerable propor- tion of his armies. He has been reported as attacking very heavily at Poltava, which the Germans claim to have taken last Saturday. But the most arresting point is that the Russian Command must have known what was afoot soon after the battle of Gomel and, recognising the delicacy of the southern flank and the very skilful and powerful attack that was being developed against it, they appear to have left Budenny to fight it out by himself.

This becomes the more extraordinary the more it is examined. Marshal Timoshenko has been very skilfully striking at the Germans north and south of Smolensk, steadily inflicting upon them heavy casualties and advancing towards the west at the very time that the Germans have been causing the Russians to suffer heavy losses while they advance towards the east. It is difficult to think of any even remote parallel for this extraordinary state of affairs. The Italians say that the Russians and the Germans are fighting back-to-back ; and indeed they are certainly advancing in opposite directions. Smolensk lies in about the same longitude as Kiev, so that the Germans are at this moment attacking 120 miles to the east of the heads of Timoshenko's columns. It is not easy to understand what is the objective of the, Russian Staff. It would appear to be far wiser to have struck at the flank of the German column moving down towards the rear of Budenny's troops than to be attacking about Smolensk as if the southern flank were of no moment.

These considerations become of some importance when we attempt to discover the enemy's objectives and his chances of achieving them. It is clear that Hitler has set his armies the task of pushing their way to the east at all costs. They are attempting to make their way to Rostov ; and there can be little doubt that they will do their best to descend upon the Caucasus from the north. They are aiming at the Trans- caucasian oil territory and must have and hold Baku as well at Batum. This will involve a Persian as well as a Turkish flank. If they are to secure the oil that is so necessary to them they must control the double pipe-line that connects Baku and Batum and runs about 5o miles from the Persian and 20 miles from the Turkish frontiers. These territories lie over 40o miles from Rostov, and before they can securely possess even that important base they must deal with the Russian reserves east and south of Kiev. In spite of all the German claims it is reasonably certain that they will be com- pelled to fight their way east. What becomes of importance is the reactions of Timoshenko's armies, which are fast losing the cover of their left flank.

Taking the front as a whole the Russian Command must now face either the necessity of constructing a strong flank from Gomel eastward or the possibility of the Germans strik- ing northward again towards Bryansk and Moscow from another direction. The next few weeks should reveal the solution of the new problems which the German victory has raised. It is clear that Russia has lost a great part of her indus- trial potential and is in imminent peril of losing more. This must create fresh difficulties for the defence. But they are not immediate difficulties. Unfortunately reinforcement is a matter of months, however much we strive; and Russia IQ pass through the critical days which lie ahead with only th material on the spot or about to arrive. It is the immedia future that must engage the painful attention of all Iv recognise the greatness of the issues that hang upon the even of the next few weeks or months. Germany is bent u securing Transcaucasia in the shortest possible time. s must have it, or she will face the prospect of a shortage of vital oil when she is most likely to need it. She has lost heavily that it seems she is bringing the heaviest pressu upon Bulgaria to reinforce her. That measures her conditi, lems to solve before she can secure the oil better than any other evidence. There are setillvenma if nsyhelm an reach the Caspian, and one of the most important of th concerns the attitude of Turkey. In fine, in spite of all h boasting, she has only just reached the critical phase of h plan and Russia shows no signs of lacking reserves or I. equipment for them. If Russia has her difficulties and weak nesses, it is idle to ignore the greatness of Germany's.