REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.*
WHETHER it is possible in these days of the division of labour that we should have another Stagyrite, we may fairly doubt, but so far as different circumstances will permit of it, Mr. Mill certainly bids fair to become our political Aristotle. Nor do we suggest the analogy in any fanciful spirit of partiality or exaggeration. From Sir Thomas More's Utopia downwards we have certainly had no lack of disqui- sitions upon government both in the abstract and in the concrete, but it can scarcely fail to be conceded, that to its it has been reserved to see the dawn of discussions on political subjects, as theoretical as those of the ancient Greeks, and even more scientific. It is indeed most curious to observe how the spirit of modern scientific treatment is beginning to penetrate into the realms of moral action, and how deeply, under every conceivable modification of view, men are in- fluenced by the dynamical theory of social forces and resultant effects. According to that theory, the moral no less than the physical world is subject to scientific law and scientific inquiry. This doctrine, simple as it seems to many minds, has, however, just landed us upon the threshold of one of the greatest and most prolific controversies of the day arising out of the collateral point, whether the same laws which regulate the physical also rule the moral world. Those who adopt the affirmative are accused of eliminating moral action alto- gether, and in their turn they retort upon their adversaries with the charge of shutting their eyes to the natural and inevitable extension of science. Between these two parties Mr. Mill, in his introduc chapter, steers his way with his usual calm and deep sagacity. All speculations, he says, concerning forms of government bear the im- press of two conflicting theories. By some minds, government is conceived as an affair of invention and contrivance, a problem to be solved—a steam-plough to be perfected, a threshing machine to be improved. To these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who, far from viewing government as as a machine, con- sider it as a growth. " Governments," say they, " are not made, they grow." "Of these conflicting speculations," Mr. Mill pro- fesses, that it would be difficult to decide, which would be the most absurd, if we could suppose either of them held as an exclusive theory." But as he proceeds to show, the principles of the contend- ing schools are a very imperfect exponent of the opinions they really hold. On the one hand, those whom he aptly calls the "naturalistic school" of politicians, are not really the political fatalists they give themselves out to be, since they do not profess that mankind have ab- solutely no range of choice as to the government they will live under. On the other hand, none of their opponents believe that every people is capable of working every sort of institutions. Allowing, how- ever, for the exaggeration on both sides, Mr. Mill admits that the two doctrines correspond to a deep-seated difference between two modes of thought, and proceeds to trace out the amount of truth at * Considerations on Representative Government. By John Stuart Min. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand.
the root of each. Political institutions, he reminds us, are the work of men, and owe their whole existence to human will. "Men did not wake on a summer morning to find them sprung up." Nor, once planted, are they "aye growing" while men "are sleeping." They are the results of voluntary agency, and are well or ill made. "On the other hand," and here we quote a passage at length, which is the key-note of the volume
" It is also to be borne in mind that political machinery does not act of it s f. As it is first made, so it has to be worked by men, and even by ordinary. men. It needs not their simple acquiescence, but their active participation, and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available. This im- plies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it ; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insur- mountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them, to enable it to fulfil its purposes. The word do' must be understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the conditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the ends, its conduciveness to which forms its recommendation. The failure of any of these conditions renders a form of government, whatever favour- able promise it may otherwise hold oat, unsuitable to the particular case."
Starting from these three conditions, as premises, Mr. Mill endea- vours to show how far forms of government are really matters of choice, and he winds up an argument into which, though we might have much to say, we cannot enter, by concluding that "the maxim that the government of a country is what the social forces in exist- ence compel it to be; is true only in the sense in which it favours, instead of discouraging, the attempt to exercise, among all forms of government practicable in the existing condition of society, a rational choice."
The form of government being amenable to choice, the next question which arises is, of course, that of the test, or criterion, by which the choice is to be directed. In other words, what are the distinctive characteristics of the form of government best fitted to promote the interests of any given society ? Mr. Mill's chapter upon this point is exceedingly remarkable. After laying down that "the proper func- tions of a government are not a fixed thing, but different in dif- ferent states of society," and also that, inasmuch as the good a government can do is limited by its legitimate sphere, but its badness unhappily not, it follows that a set of political institutions cannot be sufficiently estimated by a simple attention to the legitimate sphere of governmental functions ; he proceeds to attempt a classification of the constituents of social well-being. Here we may remark that Mr. Mill abandons the French partition of the exigencies of society between the two heads of Order and Progress, and that of Coleridge, _Permanence and Progress, as plausible, indeed, and seductive, but unscientific and incorrect. For, first, what are Order and Progress? In answering the question, Mr. Mill shows that progress includes order, but order does not include progress, and that conduciveness toprogress, understood in its fullest sense, includes the whole excel- lence of a Government. Nevertheless, though metaphysically defen- sible, this definition of the criterion of good government would not be appropriate, because, though it contains the whole truth, it recals only a part of the whole idea—namely, that of moving onward— whereas the meaning of it here would be quite as much the preven- tion of falling back. As he leaves, therefore, the distinction most commonly adopted for the classification of social exigencies, Mr. Mill has to seek for a better distribution. This he finds in the "qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the govern- ment is exercised." What, he asks, are rules of procedure, and the majesty of the bench, if the judge is corrupt, and the witness a liar? Of what avail representation, if unfit men are returned ? Of what use a House, if the M.P.s shoot one another across the floor ? Virtue and intelligence, then, in the human beings composing the community, are the first elements of good government. Ergo, one criterion of the goodness of a oevemment is the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that, their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the ma- chinery. "This leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of the machinery itself." For instance, "the arrangements for rendering the choice of the judges such as to obtain the highest average of virtue and intelligence; the salutary forms of procedure ; the publicity which allows observation and criticism of whatever is amiss ; the liberty of discussion and censure through the press; the mode of taking evidence, according as it is well or ill adapted to elicit troth,—all these things are not the power, but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle." Thus the two elements adopted by Mr. Mill in his new classification are to be seen, firstly, in the operation of a government as an agency of national education, and, secondly, in its arrangements for conduct- ing the collective affairs of the community, the latter varying mach less from difference of country and state of civilization than the former. Now, although the best government in our age may not be the best in another, yet at any given point, under any given cir- cumstances, that government will be best which most tends to raise the nation, and thus prepare it for the ideally best form of govern- ment. What that ideally best form is, Mr. Mill next proceeds to discuss, and at once closes with Mr. Carlyle's school, who maintain
that if a good despot could be ensured, the despotic would be the best form of government. Upon this notion Mr. Mill looks as a of obedience implied in a despotism must gradually debase the sub- jects of the good despot into impotence. "The food of feeling is action," Mr. Mill finely remarks : "even domestic affection lives upon voluntary good offices." "Evil for evil, a good despotism, in a country at all advanced in civilization, is more noxious than a bad one." It relaxes and emasculates the people. The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. It is inherent in human affairs that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands. Still more true that by their own hands only can improve- ment be worked out. The most brilliant prosperity has been attained by free communities. And if we pass to the influence of the form of government upon character, we shall find the superiority of popular government over every other to be decided and indisputable. The question, however, really depends upon one still more fundamental, viz. which type of human character should predominate for the general good—the active or the passive. The common-places of mo- ralists and the general sympathies of mankind are in favour of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but men prefer acquiescence and submission, which increase their sense of security. Not so Mr. Mill, who, in the middle of a most striking passage, strongly reminding the reader of his former work on Liberty, de- clares that "inactivity, unaspiringness, absence of desire, is a more fatal hindrance to improvement than any misdirection of energy." It is this mainly which retains in a savage or semi-savage state the great majority of the human race. From these and other accumu- lated considerations, Mr. Mill concludes " That the only government which can folly satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate ; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is weal ; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow ; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state. But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative."
In the very brief and imperfect account we are able to give of the work before us we have endeavoured to preserve the main steps by which the author reaches the table-land of his subject. We leave a host of questions untouched which Mr. Mill has treated with con- summate ability. Our readers will have observed that we have pur- posely abstained from entering into any discussion of his views, and confined ourselves to present some account of a work too important to be discussed in a couple of columns. Upon individual topics we pur- pose to return. Every page teems with matter for thought and study. To what extent forms of government are a matter of choice, by what criterion a good form of government may be known, whether representative government is ideally the best, under what social conditions it is inapplicable, what are its proper functions, infir- mities, dangers, what is true, what is false democracy, the represen- tation of all, the representation of the majority only, the suffrage, election and its stages, voting, the duration of parliaments, ple4res, the bicameral system, the executive, local representation, nationality, federation, dependencies,—these are subjects and problems, any one of which is enough for a volume. We will only say, at present, and in conclusion, that however we may differ from Mr. Mill upon some points, we cannot but again record our admiration of his powers of thought, and, above all, the wonderful combination, so rare, of prac- tical sagacity and moderation, united in him with powers of gene- ralization so unusually lofty-
Previous page
