VIEWS OF THE WEEK

Beyond the Concord

By OLIVER STEWART

ASHORT time ago members of the Royal Aero- nautical Society were asking one another what had gone wrong with the British aircraft industry, but were not getting any very con- vincing replies. There was a general inclination to date the decline from the Duncan Sandys defence White Paper of 1957, and many of the letters and other communications printed in the society's journal put most of the blame upon the politicians.

Sir Roy Dobson was most specific, saying that things had gone wrong in the `areas of specifi- cation of requirement and in the subsequent administration of its procurement.' Other critics referred to inadequate control of costs, to wrong decisions and indecisions by government depart- ments, to 'amateurism' among the Services in stating their requirements and even to the absence of informed aeronautical criticism in the national press.

The rationalisation of the industry, which the late Sir Frederick Handley Page called 'nationali- sation spelt with an r,' with its regrouping of the companies, was forced through by the Con- servative administration, and, ever since, govern- ment departments must accept the major responsibility for what goes right and for, what goes wrong. Yet plans for the future do not in- spire confidence. They do not seem to come to grips with the troubles of the past.

Too much is expected from the collaboration with the French aircraft industry initiated by the Conservatives and carried on and extended by Labour. It is true that M. Rend Bloch expressed the opinion that there was no hope for the sur- vival of the British and French industries outside Anglo-French co-operation, and that M. Louis Giusta, director-general of Sud Aviation, went so far as to say that the salvation of both industries lay in their unity. But neither they nor the British advocates of the same course have ex- plained why Anglo-French co-operation should cure the `wrong decisions and indecisions' and the specification, procurement and financial de- fects of the past. It is in the study of these defects that the best hope lies of finding out what must be done to give the industry back its confidence and stability.

At the moment, the supersonic Concord and the light-strike fighter-trainer to be built by Louis Breguet and the British Aircraft Corpora- tion and called the 'Jaguar' are the outstanding items of Anglo-French collaboration. The Con- cord is the more advanced project and the validity of the specification can be more readily examined. In itself it appears to be thoroughly sound. It is imaginative, yet well within the capacity of the two industries. It may be saleable to the world's airlines.

Where it may prove inadequate is in its limi- tations. It will only carry the Anglo-French effort to a point some way behind the leapfrogging United States effort. Its cruising speed will be Mach 2.2 against the Mach 2.7 to Mach 3.0 of the American projects, and it will carry some hundred fewer passengers. Because it will be ready perhaps two years earlier, however, a lower performance is admissible; but it is admissible

only when the plans are already laid for the next step forward. No such plans have yet been laid. Mr. L. E. Baynes, the pioneer of comprehen-

sive variable-sweep aircraft, has put the matter clearly. In a television interview he said that the Concord design ought to be paired with a supersonic variable-sweep design so that the potentialities of the Concord's ogival wing and those of variable-sweep surfaces, were fully covered. For the variable-sweep design, a cruis- ing speed of Mach 3.0 or even higher might be envisaged. The undertaking of two types of aircraft would provide a better stimulus to design and constructional work and would em- body incentives to development.

If it be agreed that the industry, if not con- trolled by the Government is at least guided by it, it must follow that ministerial decisions bear enormous loads. But aeronautics has become so complex that individual ministers can hardly be expected to assess accurately the merits of the different designs and inventions that come before them and without that appreciation they must be in difficulties about planning for the future. In short, they must lean upon their scientific and technical advisers. Their decisions must be markedly influenced by expert advice. It is, in fact, expert advice rather than ministerial de- cisions that deserves most of the blame for the industry's decline.

There can be few large-scale activities in which the scientific and technical advisers have been so wrong so often and so catastrophically. Unless .the civil servants upon whom aviation ministers rely can be aeronautically re-educated, the mistakes must continue. The very technicality of aviation has increased their power and made them impervious to criticism. Here is where the Plowden Committee should look for the source of nearly all the troubles.

Reductions in defence spending must reduce the work available for the aircraft industry, no matter whether American aircraft are ordered for the Royal Air Force or not. But out of this reduction, good might come if it were to loosen the hold of the scientific and technical advisers upon the rate and direction of progress in the industry. It has been extraordinary to observe how, during the past ten years or so, the de- cisions of single technical advisers, holding their posts for only brief periods, can change the course of aeronautical history in this country. This excessive power must be broken, and the scope for the development of varied ideas and inventions must be extended if improvement is to occur.

The complaint that British aviation lacks a sound forward-looking policy has been heard

repeatedly and is, in general, justified. But he again the hand of the expert is to be seen cow fusing things and thrusting aside the bright idea British constructors made their most notable ad: vances when they were working independently. chasing government orders perhaps, but not 10 any way subservient to government officials; Now they do nothing that has not been 'approve4 by whatever ministry is concerned. The lock ls almost unbreakable.

European collaboration has been carried .11 long way and there are now.aero-engine. missile and space vehicle as well as aircraft agreements between the main United Kingdom companies and French, Belgian, German, Italian, Swedish and Yugoslav organisations, government and commercial. In all, there are twenty-eight agree' ments of this kind. But while the British effort is kept within the rigidly circumscribed con' ditions imposed by large numbers of scientific and technical advisers to the Government, it an never be expected to become dominant or even particularly noticeable. Damped down and muffled in this way, the British aircraft industry cannot hope to flourish. The risk of casting aside expert advice must sometimes be taken.