27 FEBRUARY 1864, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE.

THE British Government has taken another step in the Dano-German affair, and encountered another humilia- tion. It is a fixed idea with Earl Russell that if people can only be induced to come together and talk over their quarrels they are sure to come to an arrangement more or less accept- able. He acknowledges, indeed, when the proposition comes from the Emperor of the French, that discussion very often only embitters dispute; but then a French proposal and a pro- posal by a Whig chief, you see, are such very different things. Accordingly he proposed to all the Powers at war that they should conclude an armistice, and with the Power engaged but not at war, the Diet, and the Powers neither engaged nor at war, should hold a conference, and settle the dispute upon some new basis. The only part of this proposal which was beneficial was the armistice, for nations once cool are at all events less likely than before to rush again into battle. The Austrian and Prussian Governments were well aware of this, and they therefore declined the armistice, but accepted the con- ference, being ready for any amount of talk provided only they could go on killing, occupying, and decreeing undisturbed. Indeed, the talk was rather an advantage, for it might amuse bystanders, who were very quiescent, but beginning to get rather an eager look in the eyes. The Government had the meanness to accept even this wretched concession, France gave way in some disdain, and if little Denmark will only consent, which is doubtful, and the Diet will reply in the affirmative, which would be for it a humiliation, then a con- ference will be held.

What is it to chat about ? It cannot re-affirm the Treaty of 1852, for that document already has the signatures of amajority of the German States, of Denmark, and of the Five Powers, and while not one of them has yet made an effort to carry out its letter two are acting in direct defiance of its spirit. To re-affirm its provisions would be merely to stultify the recent action of the Diet and of the enemies of the Diet, to reduce the occupation of Holstein to an absurd display of official impudence, and to show the invasion of Schleswig in its true light—that of a crime committed in order to give Prussia and Austria a position of great advantage in Germany. Nor can the conference be called simply to secure the concessions from Denmark, upon which, according to Count Rechberg and Herr von Bismark, their obligation to keep faith depends. For England, France, and Russia have already offered to guarantee the performance of those conditions, and a new treaty in that sense would be only a renewal of the pledges in spite of which the Germans commenced killing the Danes. Consequently, some new basis must be found, and it can only strengthen or weaken the Danish monarchy. The former theory is out of the pale of discussion by men responsible for their time, and the latter must be in some form or other the intention of the proposers. England, therefore, after advis- ing the Danes to evacuate Holstein, after promising to com- pel them to revise their internal constitution, after, there is too much reason to fear, preventing Sweden from marching to their aid, after exciting the wrath of all Germany by recom- mendations to moderation, is about to legalize that diminution of Danish strength which she twelve years ago framed a treaty in order to prevent. That, to begin with, is a pleasant result of Earl Russell's diplomacy; but that is nothing, the point being the extent of this diminution. It cannot be that Holstein is to be assigned to Germany, and Schleswig to Denmark —for that corn- _promise would be reasonable, and perhaps just, might have Ibeelipsecured at any moment without war, and would not give the Germans full control of Kid. Besides, it would make the invasion of Schleswig as absurd as it was wicked, and though the military tyrannies care little about crime, they are aware that vitriol will bite steel, and fear ridicule accordingly. It is barely possible that the basis may be the surrender of Holstein and South Schleswig, for that proposal has in it sufficient of the necessary flavour of violence—South Schleswig belonging to Germany, just as Alsace and Heligo- land do—and it would cover Kiel. But then what be- comes of the indivisibility of the two Duchies, and the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg, and the pretensions of the Diet, and the Treaty of 1852 ? The Diet, at least, will not consent ; and if they do not consent, then, on the next opportunity, say next time it freezes, the Diet will threaten war, and Austria and Prussia will help them, and will then take the affair out of their hands, and Schleswig will be overrun, and the old swindle will once more be a basis for a fresh conference called to legalize illegal plunder. That can hardly be the solution, and we greatly fear the one whispered about is the only one that will ever be proposed. This one contemplates the junction of Schles- wig and Holstein into a single Duchy as a German State, with full self-governing powers, King Christian to be Duke, and the Augustenburg family to be declared next in succession to his own. In other words, England, in her fear of income- tax, is to propose that the most violent act of aggression com- mitted in our time shall be triumphantly successful, that the nation she has tried to protect shall be stripped of a vitally important province, which the nation she has tried to resist will acquire in full sovereignty. The war begun nominally to prevent a few Germans continuing within a free but Danish monarchy, is to end in placing many Danes under a German and very much less free Duchy, under, indeed, a Diet which is controlled by despotic sovereigns, and is created, as the fundamental articles of the Confederation avow, in the interest of the Princes. And all England will be called upon by a Premier, whose single claim to rule is that he protects English honour abroad, to sanction and approve a voluntary initiative taken by England towards betraying an ally. We are not only to be " friendly bystanders " while our friend is being garrotted, but to suggest to the ruffian that a handker- chief would be a quieter instrument of compression than his arm !

This is the best result possible, supposing the Conference to succeed—but what if it fails? Failure is at least probable, for both Austria and Prussia have always claimed that the Duchies shall have an equal voice in the Danish monarchy, that Schleswig-Holstein, which must obey the Diet or be filled with troops, shall have a right to veto the resolutions of all Denmark, to reduce Denmark, in fact, to the position of a dependency, and their arrogance has not been diminished by victory. There is no knowing to what depths of humiliation Lord Palmerston is not prepared to descend, and there are great influences in England to which any German pretension is acceptable ; but we doubt if the Peers are ready to follow quite so far, and even the House of Commons would doubt whether Mr. Gladstone's surplus, or even his services, might not be too dearly bought. If that claim is pressed the Con- ference will, we imagine, fail, leaving to England the satisfac- tion that she has disheartened the Danes for resistance with- out disheartening Prussia for action. Then Berlin intends to ask to be paid for the trouble she has been at in break- ing the Treaty, to make Denmark pay for the plasters wasted in burking her into the condition most favourable for spolia- tion. She may even demand a material guarantee for the money,—Jutland as the German papers suggest, or Alsen, or Lauenburg, or, better than all, the Sound Dues, which Bis- mark has already stolen and expended. In that case also the Conference fails. Finally, though we admit that is not a matter on which statesmen in their present temper can be expected to bestow much attention, it is possible that the victim herself may resist, that Denmark may prefer death in battle to death by a friendly vivisection, that she may think half Schleswig without a frontier not worth having, and either die in harness or send King Christian to live as a pensioner in Athens, declare herself part of the Swedish monarchy, and when the day for Poland comes exact from her oppressors a retribution which shall not be forgotten through the ages. In any of these cases the result of British diplo- macy will have been the murder of a feeble friend, the en- richment of a violent aggressor, and the scorn of all who be- lieve that a nation's honour is one of its possessions. And we are paying seventy millions a year in order that the dignity, security, and influence of Great Britain may be maintained !