The Riddle of Singapore
In his speech on Tuesday the Prime Minister made certain statements about the position at Singapore which, if they account for the fall of the island, do not account for the action taken. He said that Singapore was a naval base rather than a fortress. It depended on the command of the sea and the air ; we had neither. Its fortifications were constructed from the naval point of view, and the field works on the island were not on a sufficient
scale. All of these are arguments which go to show that S pore was not defensible against an attack from the land by enemy enjoying overwhelming supremacy in the air. If these sound, then why was the decision taken to send 4o,000 additi men with equipment in nine convoys to share the fate of tin men already in or retreating on the island? On these point other Government speakers have cast some light. Lord Cranborm said bluntly in the House of Lords on Tuesday that the reasca for the fall of Singapore were not known (though surely loss of the reservoirs goes far towards explaining it). Sir Stake Cripps, in the House of Commons, asked pertinently, what tin country would have said if the Government had left Singapore to its fate without even trying to reinforce it. Only an interim answer can be given to the many questions raised. It is that, co the whole, there was enough hope of saving the island to justie7 a desperate attempt to save it_
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