RUSSIAN PROBLEMS. T HE special strength of the Russian Revolution has
proved to be its special weakness. In the first instance, Europe looked on with wonder at a vast uprising of the Russian people with no recognised leaders and only partial and intermittent organisation. Crowds assembled and dispersed, strikes began and ended, towns were plundered, castles were burned, and throughout it all no leaders came to the front or attempted to guide or control the authors of these several efforts. The revo- lution gained immensely as regards the impression on those who watched its course from the appearance of mystery with which it was thus invested. We seemed to be looking on at the slow progress of a universal uprising, an uprising which could afford to dispense with all the ordinary elements of success, and moved forward to its goal with the irresistible force of a natural convulsion. By degrees it became evident that the elements which were missing from the Russian Revolution were such as could not safely be dispensed with. The news that came in from all parts of the Empire showed little in the way of real progress. It was difficult to say what the revolutionists were aiming at, and by degrees it became doubtful whether they could. be said to be aiming at anything of a positive and intelli- gible kind. Were we watching a dynastic or a Constitu- tional movement? Did its real strength lie in the towns or in the country? Was its object industrial or agrarian? Or was it simply the manifestation of an aggregate discontent, formidable—most formidable—from the point of view of the prosperity and good administration of the Empire, but not such a revolution as left the Government no choice but that between conquering and being conquered ? So far from this being the case, the two parties have remained in view of one another, each gaining a victory here or sustaining a defeat there, the authorities driving men to work in one place, and looking on helplessly while the Revolutionary Party forbade them to work at another. And throughout the whole period, no single name has been heard of among the insurgents for more than a very short time. No one has emerged from the confusion with whom the Government could negotiate if it wished, or to whose death or capture the authorities could possibly attribute a decisive effect. The outcome of these unusual character- istics has undoubtedly been favourable to the Government. The Czar is still on the throne, Count Witte is still his first Minister, enough of the Army is still faithful to him to give him the command of the situation, at all events in St. Petersburg and in Moscow. Last Monday, the anniversary of that "Red Sunday" which was the birthday of the revolution, has come and gone with little to mark the exceptional character of the date. We hear, indeed, of factories being closed, but a strike that is declared only for one day, and then is only partially observed, is a singularly ineffective instrument of terrorism, even when it is sought to invest it with special terrors by the non-publication of the evening papers. A correspondent of the Times describes the day as a "solemn demonstration against the Government, all the more impressive by reason of its essentially pacific character." No doubt "essentially pacific" demonstrations have their place and use, but that place and that use are hardly in the crisis of a, revolution. There is an abundance of dangerous elements at large in the country, but the men or the ideas that can combine them seem to be wanting.
This position of affairs would give a Government which knew how to turn it to account a very great advantage. There would be an interval of comparative tranquillity in which to gain information about the relative strength of the revolutionary forces, and to determime which must be fought and which conciliated. What constitutes the real uncertainty of the situation is the ignorance which prevails, alike in Russia and outside it, as to what the plans of the Czar's Government are, or whether it has any plans beyond what are needed to meet, in whole or in part, the dangers that confront it from hour to hour. Some ten days back, a reassuring announcement was issued by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency denying the reports that the execution of the Manifesto of October 30th would be delayed. So far, it said, is this from being the case, that the object of the repressive measures taken by the Government has been to secure the complete execution of the reforms promised in that document. The enemies of the Manifesto are the revolutionaries, who do not want the Puma to meet, because the Duren stands for Monarchy and order, whereas the objects they have in view are a Republic and anarchy. Assurances of this kind do not go for very much. In Russia for the last twelve months liberty and good government have always been promised in the near future, but never given in the actual present. Still, there are signs here and there of amendment. The Press seems to enjoy a certain amount of liberty, for newspapers in which the policy of the Government is sharply criticised are not seized. The preparations for the Puma go on, though very slowly; but as the settlement of details remains in the hands of the bureaucracy, delays of this kind are inevitable. The most hopeful thing in Russia at this moment is the acceptance of the Puma by the Con- stitutional Democratic Congress. This places one of the revolutionary elements on the side of the Government, and promises to save the Duma from being the mere farce which the reactionary advisers of the Czar would like to make it. That he has still a chance left him is a piece of pure good fortune. There has been nothing in his handling of affairs which gave him any right to expect it.
One very black spot in Russian affairs is the condition of the Baltic provinces. There has been an absolute reign of terror in large parts of them, and an amount of wanton destruction of property to which it would be diffi- cult to find a parallel in a civilised country. In the last ten days of December in one of these provinces over a hundred castles of the nobility—nearly half the whole number—were set on fire and burnt with all their contents ; the distilleries, which constitute a great part of the wealth of the province, were destroyed with all their machinery ; and the cattle were driven off and slaughtered. In the other provinces the pro- cess was spread over three months, but in other ways the destruction has been equally complete. The Russian Government will thus have a problem of the greatest difficulty and importance to deal with. The owners of property in the Baltic provinces have for the most part fled, thankful to escape with their lives. It is to be supposed that the peasants will take as their own property so much of each estate as they can cultivate; but even if this method of improving their position be condoned, what is to become of the rest of the land? Are the nobles to be brought back ? In that case they must be furnished with fresh capital, for all they had has been destroyed, and they must take their chance of getting as labourers the men who have destroyed it. Owners and labourers will alike,have to be protected and watched by soldiers. At present the chief thing that the authorities are doing is to hunt down the village schoolmasters, who are said to have been the main authors of these outbreaks. But when the schoolmaster and his most prominent pupils have been shot the fruits of his teaching will remain. Russian administration has been as great a failure in the Baltic provinces as in any other part of the Empire where its principal aim has been to set class against class. The reconquest of the territory will probably not be difficult. The peasantry have neither the weapons nor the organi- sation to meet Regular troops in the field, and isolated resistance will be worn down by degrees. But when the peasants have been killed or taken prisoners the work of reconstruction will begin, and that will demand a kind of statesmanship of which as yet there is no visible trace. More than this, we are quite ignorant how far what has happened in the Baltic provinces may have had its counterpart in the interior of Russia, from which information comes far more slowly. To suppress a revolution is not always to be rid of its cousequence,s.
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