[To TES EDITOR OP THE " SPECTATOR."] EaR,—As a Catholic
anti-vivisectionist, may I venture to express a word of doubt whether Cardinal Newman's defini- tion of cruelty, as given in the letter from Father John Vaughan, in the Spectator of July 20th, is the usually accepted one P He calls it " the infliction of pain for pain's sake." Surely, if this was the definition of cruelty admitted in our law courts, the cases of conviction for cruelty to animals would be exceedingly rare. I read just now in a local paper that John Smith—let us call him—was con- victed. The Cardinal tells ns, we are justified in inflicting pain " for our own benefit and satisfaction, provided we can give a rational account of what we do." This dictum would perfectly justify John Smith. Yet John was punished for cruelty. The vivisectionist does not torture a dog or rabbit for torture's sake, but for the sake of obtaining a certain amount of knowledge, and he can give a per- fectly "rational account" of what he does. Anti-vivi- sectionists think that he and John Smith might fairly be put on an equality by the law, and that what has been decided to be cruelty worthy of punishment in the one case, should also be cruelty worthy of punishment in the other. Should we not be wiser if we kept to this ground, leaving alone those moral considerations which, though perfectly convincing to our own hearts and consciences, may not be so easily provable by logical arguments P—I am, Sir, &c., I. WILLIS.
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