Tremors by the Wall
WE have by now had long and unpleasant experiences of successive Soviet efforts to inflame the Berlin situation, so that, like dwellers on the sides of a volcano, we have become un- naturally sensitive to even the first rumblings. It is possible that nothing may come of the current preliminary moves of the Soviet and East German Governments. But, in the past, such things have often heralded full-blown crises, and it behoves us to be as vigilant as we are firm.
The new Soviet nuclear tests, arranged with such tactful timing to follow the conclusion of the recent Peace Congress in Moscow, are in themselves just a moderate disappointment. But the last lot were set off to fit in with, and worsen, the 1961 phase of the Berlin crisis. And Gromyko, it appears, has again been uttering threats—if only the fairly moderate ones be- fitting the approach stage of an imbroglio--to the Western representatives at Geneva.
The East German Government has published a ludicrous, but provocative, attack on the West Berliners, and through them the West, contain- ing a list of alleged illegalities—against the wholly illegal Wall. If every yard of this mon- strous structure were blown up tomorrow, that would not be an illegal act. It has been tolerated by the West for reasons of expediency, not of legality, and in this the West has shown patience, common sense and abstention from acts that might exacerbate the problem. This might have produced some reasonable response from the other side. Instead, we get this insolent rampage. Nor is it the only sign of aggressive-mindedness on the Soviet side. Two separate buzzing in- cidents on a single day, such as took place on Monday, are not likely to have been accidental.
In spite of Khrushchev's apparent determina- tion to destroy the free Berlin whose existence even Stalin found it possible to acquiesce in, there is no reason to think that his tactics will succeed any more in the future than they have in the past. The only new move open to him is the often-threatened 'separate peace treaty' with East Germany. There is no doubt that this would increase the perils of the situation. The Soviet Union presumably does not want war in any foreseeable circumstances. It would not be mor- tally threatened even if its entire German policy had to be abandoned. But with Ulbricht things are different. As the case of his regime grows more desperate, he would be much more likely to resort to desperate measures.
Meanwhile, if the Western Foreign Ministers have told Mr. Gromyko that we are standing as firm as ever, all should be well. The politi- cal defence of Berlin is now the keystone of the Western alliance. Once it crumbled, we should be in a retreat and disintegration which might lead anywhere.
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