THE DOUBLE VOICE OF THE GOVERNMENT.
IT is hardly possible for the country to exaggerate the political importance of the diametrical contradiction in the language now held by the leading members of the Govern-
ment in relation to foreign affairs. Lord Beaconsfield, on Monday week, asserted, in the most positive and ostentatious manner, the critical condition of Europe, the immense im- portance of strengthening the Government in relation to that critical condition, and the indisputable right which he had, as Prime Minister, to be permitted to judge of this matter without communicating to Parliament the elements of which that judgment was composed. Sir Stafford Northcote, on Tuesday, in his speech at Shoreditch, asserted, with equal emphasis, the complete absence of any crisis in foreign affairs, and his belief that if the Government should remain in office after the Dissolution, they would be enabled, by the complete tranquillity of foreign affairs, to devote themselves quietly to the promotion of internal reforms. It is most important to put these two contradictory assertions of the " men of light and leading " on record, that the electors may know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has no confidence in the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister with the utmost authority and even majesty of utterance, on the condition of our foreign affairs ; nay that, having heard that opinion, he rejects it with some- thing like positive contempt, and adopts a precisely opposite view as his own. Here is Lord Beaconsfield's language, ad- dressed to the House of Lords on Monday week :—
" I will go to that point in the noble Earl's speech in which he questioned my right to describe what my views are with regard to the relations between this and other countries, and the degree of danger or security that may depend upon them. I must assert that right in a manner which cannot be mistaken. I do not understand what the noble Earl means by impressing upon us perpetually the necessity of telling the nation every single thing in our foreign affairs. I wish to say that it is not our duty as Ministers to shuffle off the responsibility which it is our duty to encounter. My Lords, there is not an expression in that letter which was not well weighed and sincerely felt. I believe the state of affairs is critical. When we look at the condition of Europe—when we find these mighty hosts embattled in every direction—when we End increased armaments proposed, recommended, and carried with facility—if there were no other causes, these alone would impress upon my countrymen that this is not a time when vigilance can be neglected, and when resolu- tion can be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' " And while reading this, we must remember that Lord Beacons- field is not one who has failed to consider his responsibilities in this way, and to weigh them carefully. Long ago, when in Opposition, he defined strictly the kind of responsibility which, as a Minister, he now assumes. " Her Majesty's Govern- ment," he said, " are not bound to impart to Parliament the secret information on which their policy is framed. But her Majesty's Government are bound to do this—if they think the state of our foreign affairs to be serious and menacing,—they are bound to convey that impression to Parliament, although they are not bound to state the grounds which have led them to arrive at this conclusion." That sentence, spoken long ago in Opposition, anticipates precisely that anxious condition of our foreign affairs which Lord Beaconsfield now declares, on his responsibility as a Minister, to be at present existing. And, conforming to his own principle, he tells us of the danger, while concealing the elements on which his anxiety is founded. It would be impossible for any Minister who used the language of statesmen in the sense which statesmen are accustomed to attach to it, to sound a note of peril in a more emphatic way. He rehearses his right to warn the nation of the critical nature of foreign affairs, "in language that cannot be mistaken?' Moreover, while declining to tell us what the grounds are on which that judgment is formed, he hints at causes beyond even the apparent causes for uneasiness,—the swollen and swelling armaments,—and insists that an attitude of vigilance and resolve is essential to our safety. Now hear Sir Stafford Northcote, in Shoreditch :— " Now, gentlemen, let me ask you to consider whether this is not a time when the great industrial classes of the country have a specially good opportunity for promoting legislative measures which will be for the advantage of themselves ? It too often happens that legislation of importance and of a valuable kind is interrupted and prevented, either by some great constitutional struggle such as the question of reforming the representation of the people, or the destruc- tion or modification of some great institution ; or else it is prevented by some great question, some agitating cause of foreign policy which disturbs the peace of the world, and affects with it the tranquillity of the country, putting into the shade measures of domestic interest, however important. But I venture to say that never was there a moment more suitable than the present for dealing rationally and quietly with measures of domestic reform. You have now no occa- sion, unless you choose to force one, for entering upon any great Constitutional struggles; nor, as I happen to think, is it likely that our deliberations in the next Parliament will be disturbed by those agitating questions of foreign policy which have of late taken up so much of our time and attention. This is a time, gentlemen, for good practical social and domestic measures."
It is clear, at all events, that whoever else has perfect con- fidence in the judgment of the Prime Minister, his own Chancellor of the Exchequer has no such confidence. The Prime Minister makes a statement, which, if it came from any mouth but Lord Beaconsfield's, would alarm all Europe ; and a week later, Sir Stafford Northcote assures his friends that there really never was a more tranquil moment, never was a better chance of giving our whole attention to business matters and domestic legislation, without having our minds agitated and disturbed by the character of European events. A more com- plete collision of view than that between the leader of the Government in the House of Lords and the leader of the Government in the House of Commons can hardly be imagined.
Now, in whatever fashion we may explain this collision.— whether we say that Lord Beaconsfield does not take Sir Stafford Northcote into his confidence, or that Sir Stafford Northcote dis- counts liberally Lord Beaconsfield's attempts to play on the fears of the British public,—one thing we think we may deduce, that a Government whosechief fails to inspirehis second-in-command with anything approaching to confidence, and whose second officer has followed so long and so faithfully a chief whose most solemn official utterances he pushes virtually aside as mere rhodomontade not even worth his notice, is not fit to be trusted either with foreign affairs or with domestic legislation.
What can be a better justification of the opinion which the whole Liberal party have from the first expressed of Lord Beaconsfield, than the calm way in which Sir Stafford Northcote wholly ignores the judgment of his superior, on the most momentous point in the policy of the moment ? It must be remembered that Sir Stafford Northcote had said nearly what he said in Shoreditch in his address to the electors of his division of Devonshire ; that Lord Granville commented strongly in the House of Lords on the discrepancy between that very unsensational view of foreign affairs and the Prime Minister's extremely sensational view, in his letter to the Duke of Marlborough ; and that it was after Lord Granville had called special attention to this discrepancy that Lord Beaconsfield reiterated, and reiterated with even greater emphasis, the anxiety he felt in relation to the critical condition of foreign affairs. Moreover, it was after this reitera- tion by the Prime Minister of the sensational view, that the leader of the House of Commons reiterated, in very much stronger language than before, his own unsensational view of the situa- tion. Nothing is wanting, then, to complete the diametrical contradiction between them. It is plain that each has the most profound contempt for the view of the other, though it is not convenient to express that contempt in any but an in- direct way. For our own part, we are disposed to think that Sir Stafford Northcote's view of the situation is probably the soberer and sounder. But then, what does not that imply as to the opinion which Sir Stafford Northcote must really enter- tains of his nominal chief ? He must think him given up to bounce and brag. He must have the poorest possible opinion of Lord Beaconsfield's judgment, and the highest possible opinion of his power of mixing up history with romancings of his own. And yet he has .followed Lord Beaconsfield all through this critical time, and' followed him where far abler and wiser men, disgusted by Lord. Beaconsfield's propensities in this direction, fell away from him. Plainly such a Government as this deserves no trust either in foreign affairs or in domestic reforms. If Lord' Beaconsfield is what Sir Stafford Northcote evidently thinks him, it is positive madness to leave foreign affairs in his hands, and not very wise to leave domestic affairs in the hands of one who has continued to serve with him, while entertaining no respect at all for his judgment. If Lord Beaconsfield is not what Sir Stafford Northcote evidently thinks him, it is most danger- ous to leave the leadership of the House of Commons in the hands of one who has formed so false and de- rogatory an opinion of his chief, and has yet continued to be guided by his counsels in the most momentous mat- ters. To say nothing of the fact that the domestic legisla- tion of this Government has been so feeble, so utterly deficient in sincerity and earnestness, that we should have no right, even on that ground alone, to look to it for the domestic reforms of the future, it seems to us perfectly clear that the present Government has either got a most untrustworthy head, or a most disloyal second officer, or both. As it is clearly a bad thing to have a Government with an untrustworthy head, and a bad thing to have a Government with a disloyal second officer, and a very bad thing indeed' to have a Government with both, the only safe course for the British Elector is to get rid of the Government.
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