Reforming the Lords
Norman Lamont
Some hopes have been expressed that Mrs Thatcher, when she becomes Prime Minister, will revive hereditary peerages. Though it is good to know the spirit of Tory romanticism lives on, that would be a thoroughly retrograde step back into the nineteenth century, which would achieve nothing except a considerable amount of ridicule. Far from reviving ancient practices like hereditary peerages, the next Tory Government should limit or abolish the hereditary element in the Lords with a view to radically reforming that institution and creating the effective second chamber Which we need so badly.
The 'other place' is now in Bagehot's distinction a dignified rather than an efficient part of the constitution. Certainly a respect for history is the essence of Toryism, but that should not mean the maintenance of empty symbols that no longer command the respect and affection they once had. Who knows for sure what the Lords mean today to the British Public? But to some at least they are simply an unjustifiable anachronism, part of 'quaint Britain'. • The modern Conservative Party is the party of opportunity, incentives, and the meritocracy. Conservatives believe the glittering prizes should be available for those with talent and swords to seize them. It is a bold view of society but one easily misrepresented. Already the Conservative Party has to work hard to counter the myth-makers and their legends. The idea that Britain is an unfair society with a markedly unequal distribution of income and wealth will not die simply because the Diamond report has shown it to have no basis in fact. Nor will the widespread caricature of the Tory Party as the defender of privilege simply disappear. What better and more dramatic way to lay these myths and to underline the real nature of the modern Conservative Party, than a commitment to reform the House of Lords?
Conservatives also believe strongly in the rights of inheritance. The freedom of a man to pass on the fruits of his labour to his children is not just an important incentive, but an integral part of a free society. There is no reason whatsoever why that principle should be extended to include a seat in the legislature. Why Should a person inherit the right to sit in Parliament and legislate for his fellow citizens simply because an ancestor of his Performed some favour for a Stuart monarch, or fought on the right side in the Wars of the Roses ? Indeed the principle of freedom of inheritance and the rights of Property are likely to be more difficult to justify if they are associated not with an open competitive society, but with feudal privilege and obsolete traditions.
There are, of course, things that can be said in favour of the hereditary principle. Some of those who opposed the Conservatives' attempted reforms of the Lords did so on the grounds that the only real independence in the second chamber came from the hereditary element. It can also be said that it is the hereditary principle that has brought into public life all the younger members of the Lords. Were it not for the hereditary peers the Lords would be a very aged assembly indeed, since the life peers, even if they are not all superannuated politicians, inevitably tend to be people who have already made their careers. But that is not to say that young or independent minded people would not be brought into the Lords by some other form of selection.
Other defenders of the Lords will point out that it is a distinguished assembly of • people of great experience and that its debates are often better informed and less partisan than those in the Commons. They will further argue that whatever the theory of the matter, the road to reform is fraught with difficulty, and, after all, the combination of active life peers together with a fluctuating element of hereditary peers works well in practice. Why not leave it well alone!
The real objection to the House of Lords in its present form is that it is inevitably so unsure of itself it can no longer discharge its proper constitutional duties. It lives so much under the shadow of abolition it dare not challenge the will of the House of Commons, on any matter of real substance or principle. In its present weak and exposed position an unreformed House of Lords admirably suits the convenience of a Socialist administration committed to far-reaching, illiberal and irreversible changes in society.
These are issues on which a strong second chamber, confident of its legitimacy, ought to be able to challenge the Commons. The Lords should not have had to back down over Clay Cross. Above all, when real questions of freedom are at stake, as in the closed shop and the press, they ought to be in a position to obstruct the House of Commons.
Lord Goodman and his friends did their best, but in the end, predictably they decided to avoid a showdown with the Commons. Few more absurd scenes can have taken place in the Commons than Michael Foot's solemn warnings to the Lords about the consequences of trying to frustrate the will of the democratically elected chamber. To have listened to him one would have thought the Goodman amendments were the work of Tory lastditchers up to town from the Shires. In fact of course there was a majority of life peers in support of the amendments. But thus does an unreformed House of Lords support the mythology of the Labour Party. Awareness of the untrammelled and unchecked powers of the House of Commons, or rather of the Executive through the House of Commons, has prompted some people to turn to electoral reform. But the problem is not simply one of governments elected on a minority vote. The tyranny of the House of Commons could still be as big a problem with a government supported by a majority vote.
What is needed is an Upper House which can be an effective guardian of the citizens' liberties. The Upper House should also be able to slow down the speed with which the Commons churns manifestoes into laws. As an Irish politician once told me, nothing much should happen in politics and what does should happen slowly. There should certainly be more time for second thoughts on what the House of Commons does in response to party pressures or the whims of fashion.
The best way to achieve these objectives would be to have a second chamber with real powers of veto which was either wholly or partially elected. It would have to be elected on a different system and at a different time from the House of Commons so as to ensure that it was not the mirror image of the Commons. This could be done by a system of proportional representation for the Upper House, together with a fixed term for the House of Commons—a change which would have the desirable effect of considerably reducing the power of the Prime Minister.
One can understand why any future Conservative administration should shrink from taking on once again the combined opposition of Enoch Powell and Michael Foot. Many Conservatives who saw the last attempt to reform the Lords will have resolved, like Charles II, never to go on their travels again. But how long can we go on being one of the few countries without an effective second chamber?
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